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Abstract
Uncertainty relations express the fundamental incompatibility of certain observables in
quantum mechanics. Far from just being puzzling constraints on our ability to know the
state of a quantum system, uncertainty relations are at the heart of why some classically
impossible cryptographic primitives become possible when quantum communication is
allowed. This thesis is concerned with strong notions of uncertainty relations and their
applications in quantum information theory.
One operational manifestation of such uncertainty relations is a purely quantum effect
referred to as information locking. A locking scheme can be viewed as a cryptographic
protocol in which a uniformly random n-bit message is encoded in a quantum system using
a classical key of size much smaller than n. Without the key, no measurement of this
quantum state can extract more than a negligible amount of information about the message,
in which case the message is said to be “locked”. Furthermore, knowing the key, it is
possible to recover, that is “unlock”, the message. We give new efficient constructions of
bases satisfying strong uncertainty relations leading to the first explicit construction of an
information locking scheme. We also give several other applications of our uncertainty
relations both to cryptographic and communication tasks.
In addition, we define objects called QC-extractors, that can be seen as strong
uncertainty relations that hold against quantum adversaries. We provide several
constructions of QC-extractors, and use them to prove the security of cryptographic
protocols for two-party computations based on the sole assumption that the parties’ storage
device is limited in transmitting quantum information. In doing so, we resolve a central
question in the so-called noisy-storage model by relating security to the quantum capacity
of storage devices.
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Re´sume´
Les relations d’incertitude expriment l’incompatibilite´ de certaines observables en
me´canique quantique. Les relations d’incertitude sont utiles pour comprendre pourquoi
certaines primitives cryptographiques impossibles dans le monde classique deviennent
possibles avec de la communication quantique. Cette the`se e´tudie des notions fortes de
relations d’incertitude et leurs applications a` la the´orie de l’information quantique.
Une manifestation ope´rationnelle de telles relations d’incertitude est un effet purement
quantique appele´ verrouillage d’information. Un syste`me de verrouillage peut eˆtre conside´re´
comme un protocole cryptographique dans lequel un message ale´atoire compose´ de n bits
est encode´ dans un syste`me quantique en utilisant une cle´ classique de taille beaucoup plus
petite que n. Sans la cle´, aucune mesure sur cet e´tat quantique ne peut extraire plus qu’une
quantite´ ne´gligeable d’information sur le message, auquel cas le message est “verrouille´”.
Par ailleurs, connaissant la cle´, il est possible de re´cupe´rer ou “de´verrouiller” le message.
Nous proposons de nouvelles constructions efficaces de bases ve´rifiant de fortes relations
d’incertitude conduisant a` la premie`re construction explicite d’un syste`me de verrouillage.
Nous exposons e´galement plusieurs autres applications de nos relations d’incertitude a` des
taˆches cryptographiques et des taˆches de communication.
Nous de´finissons e´galement des objets appele´s QC-extracteurs, qui peuvent eˆtre
conside´re´s comme de fortes relations d’incertitude qui tiennent contre des adversaires
quantiques. Nous fournissons plusieurs constructions de QC-extracteurs, que nous utilisons
pour prouver la se´curite´ de protocoles cryptographiques pour le calcul se´curise´ a` deux
joueurs en supposant uniquement que la me´moire des joueurs soit limite´e en ce qui concerne
la transmission d’information quantique. Ce faisant, nous re´solvons une question centrale
dans le mode`le de me´moire bruite´e en mettant en relation la se´curite´ et la capacite´ quantique
de la me´moire.
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Contents of the thesis
This thesis is mainly based on two papers. The first one is joint work with Patrick Hayden
and Pranab Sen [Fawzi et al., 2011] and is presented in Chapters 3 and 4. The second paper
is presented in Chapter 5 and is joint work with Mario Berta and Stephanie Wehner [Berta
et al., 2012].
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Notation
Common
log Binary logarithm.
ln Natural logarithm.
R Real numbers.
C Complex numbers.
M † Conjugate transpose of the matrix M .
[n] Set {1, . . . , n}.
dH Hamming distance dH(x, y) = {i : xi 6= yi}.
w Hamming weight w(x) = {i : xi 6= 0}.
pX The distribution of a random variable X .
Pr {E} Probability of the event E.
E {X} Expectation of a random variable X .
Ey {f(x, y)} Expectation over y and fixed x.
f ◦ g Composition of the functions f and g.
Spaces
A,B,C, . . . Hilbert spaces associated with the systems A,B,C, . . .
A ' A′ A′ is a copy of A.
dA Dimension of the space A.
AB Tensor product A⊗B or composite system AB.
L(A,B) Space of linear operators from A to B.
L(A) L(A,A).
Vectors
|ψ〉A, |φ〉A, . . . Vectors belonging to A.
〈ψ|A Dual vectors in L(A,C).
〈ψ|φ〉 Inner product of the vectors |ψ〉 and |φ〉.
vii
Operators
S(A) Set of density operators on A.
S≤(A) Set of sub-normalized density operators on A.
ρA = ρA, ψ
A, . . . Density operators on A.
idA = id
A Identity map on A or L(A).
‖X‖1 Trace norm of the operator X .
‖X‖2 Hilbert-Schmidt norm of the operator X .
Distance measures for operators
∆(ρ, σ) Trace distance between ρ and σ.
F (ρ, σ) Fidelity between ρ and σ.
F¯ (ρ, σ) Generalized fidelity between ρ and σ.
P (ρ, σ) Purified distance between ρ and σ.
Measures of information
H(A)ρ von Neumann entropy of the density operator ρA.
H(A|B)ρ Conditional von Neumann entropy of ρAB.
I(A;B)ρ Mutual information of the density operator ρAB.
Hmin(A|B)ρ|σ Min-entropy of ρAB relative to σB.
Hmin(A|B)ρ Conditional min-entropy of ρAB given B.
Hmax(A|B)ρ Conditional max-entropy of ρAB given B.
Hmin(A|B)ρ Smooth min-entropy of ρAB given B.
Hmax(A|B)ρ Smooth max-entropy of ρAB given B.
H2(A|B)ρ|σ Collision entropy of ρAB relative to σB.
h2() Binary entropy h2() = − log − (1− ) log(1− ).
viii
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Quantum information science
Even though Turing machines are abstract mathematical constructions, they are widely
believed to capture a universal notion of computation in our physical world. This is
reflected by the Church-Turing thesis, which states that any computation performed on a
physical device can also be performed by a Turing machine. The main reason the Church-
Turing thesis is believed is that all known models for (reasonable) physical computation
mechanisms were shown to be simulatable by a Turing machine. In fact, the strong Church-
Turing thesis states that any computation performed efficiently by some physical device can
be computed efficiently by a Turing machine.
Consider now the problem of information transmission through a physical channel.
How to model such a channel? A natural answer is to associate for each possible input
a probability distribution on the possible outputs of the channel. The randomness is
used to model our ignorance or lack of control of some phenomena happening in the
transmission. There is a feeling that a better understanding of the physical process can
always be incorporated in the model by adjusting the probabilities assigned to each outcome.
As for Turing machines, there is a belief that the most general way to model a physical
information channel is using probability distributions.
When taking into account quantum theory, these assumptions should be re-examined.
According to quantum physics, the state of a physical system, e.g., a potential computing
device, need not be represented by some string of characters written on a tape, but can
potentially be a superposition of many strings. Like for waves, different parts of the
system could interfere with each other. Could such a model define a different notion of
computation? There is by now significant evidence that this might be the case. Shor
1
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[1997] showed that one could make use of wave-like properties in a quantum system to
factor integers efficiently, a problem that is believed to be hard for classical computers.
In addition, many other computational tasks seem to be much more natural and efficiently
implementable for a quantum computer, in particular concerning the simulation of quantum
mechanical systems [Feynman, 1982]. For information transmission, imagine a channel
that carries information using photon polarization, a property which is known to be best
described by a quantum state. In this case, modelling the channel as a distribution over the
outputs for each possible input is incomplete. In fact, it turns out that one can use quantum
mechanical properties not only to increase the rate at which information is transmitted but
also to perform tasks that are simply impossible using only “classical” communication.
1.2 Conjugate coding
An example of a task that becomes possible when quantum properties are used is key
distribution. Suppose Alice and Bob are far apart and they want to exchange a secret over
email. To achieve unconditional security,1 it is well-known that they have to share a large
private key about which the adversary does not have any information. How can they obtain
such a key by communicating over a public channel? This task is impossible to achieve with
unconditional security using only classical communication.
In groundbreaking work, Bennett and Brassard [1984] based on an idea of Wiesner
[1983] devised a simple protocol for key distribution using quantum communication.2 One
of the key ideas of the protocol is to use “conjugate coding” [Wiesner, 1983]. Even though it
cannot store (reliably) more than one bit of information, there are several ways of encoding
one bit in the polarization of a photon. We can encode in the “rectilinear” basis, e.g., 0 7→ H
(horizontal) and 1 7→ V (vertical), or in the “diagonal” basis, e.g., 0 7→ M (main diagonal)
and 1 7→ A (anti-diagonal). This is a valid encoding because in both cases, the states
corresponding to 0 and 1 are perfectly distinguishable. However, an observer that does not
know which one of the two encodings was used cannot recover the encoded bit perfectly. In
fact, if he performs a measurement in the rectilinear basis and the actual state was M (which
belongs to the diagonal basis and encodes 0), then the result will be H (corresponding to 0)
with probability 1/2 and V (corresponding to 1) with probability 1/2.
We stress that this type of encoding in the polarization of a single photon does not have a
1Unconditional security means that security doesn’t rest on unproven computational assumptions.
2Note that this protocol can be and is implemented with today’s technology. In fact, encryptors based on
quantum key distribution can actually be bought from a handful of companies.
3classical analogue. Assume we have two perfectly distinguishable classical states A and B.
One can define two possible encodings for bits: 0 7→ A and 1 7→ B, or 0 7→ B and 1 7→ A.
An adversary who ignores which encoding was used cannot obtain any information about
the encoded bit by seeing A or B. But given that we see A, we know that the encoded bit
is 0 if the first encoding was chosen and it is 1 if the second encoding was chosen. For the
quantum encoding described above, for all possible states H,V,M or A, it is not possible
to have a definite encoded value for both the rectilinear and diagonal bases. This is a form
of the uncertainty principle: either the “rectilinear value” or the “diagonal value” of a state
has to be undetermined. This idea of encoding in conjugate bases is at the heart of the
whole field of quantum cryptography that takes advantage of the uncertainty principle and
related ideas to guarantee privacy properties; see [Gisin et al., 2002, Scarani et al., 2009] for
surveys. The results in this thesis can be seen as stronger versions of conjugate coding that
use multiple (more than two) encodings.
The following more technical sections describe the context and the main results in this
thesis.
1.3 Uncertainty relations for quantum measurements
1.3.1 Context
The uncertainty principle was first formulated by Heisenberg [1927] and it states that
the position and momentum of a particle cannot both have definite values. It was then
generalized by Robertson [1929] to arbitrary observables that do not commute. Here,
we consider modern formulations of the uncertainty principle for which the measure of
uncertainty is an entropic quantity. Entropic uncertainty relations were introduced in
Bialynicki-Birula and Mycielski [1975], Deutsch [1983], Hirschman [1957] and have found
many applications in quantum information theory. For example, such relations are the
main ingredients in the proofs of security of protocols for two-party computations in the
bounded and noisy quantum storage models [Damga˚rd et al., 2005, 2007, Ko¨nig et al.,
2012]. A simple example of an entropic uncertainty relation was given by Maassen and
Uffink [1988]. Let B+ denote a “rectilinear” or computational basis of C2 and B× be a
“diagonal” or Hadamard basis and let B+n and B×n be the corresponding bases obtained
on the tensor product space (C2)⊗n. All vectors in the rectilinear basis B+n have an inner
product with all vectors in the diagonal basis B×n upper bounded by 2−n/2 in absolute value.
The uncertainty relation of Maassen and Uffink [1988] states that for any quantum state on
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n qubits described by a unit vector |ψ〉 ∈ (C2)⊗n, the average measurement entropy satisfies
1
2
(
H(pB+n ,|ψ〉) +H(pB×n ,|ψ〉)
) ≥ n
2
, (1.1)
where pB,|ψ〉 denotes the outcome probability distribution when |ψ〉 is measured in basis B
and H denotes the Shannon entropy. Equation (1.1) expresses the fact that the outcome
of at least one of two measurements cannot be well predicted, even after knowing which
measurement was performed.
A surprising application of entropic uncertainty relations is the effect known as
information locking [DiVincenzo et al., 2004] (see also Leung [2009]). Suppose Alice holds
a uniformly distributed random n-bit stringX . She chooses a random basisK ∈u {+n,×n}
and encodes X in the basis BK . This random quantum state E(X,K) is then given to Bob.
How much information about X can Bob, who does not know K, extract from this quantum
system via a measurement? To better appreciate the quantum case, observe that if X were
encoded in a classical state Ec(X,K), then Ec(X,K) would “hide” at most one bit about
X; more precisely, the mutual information between X and Ec(X,K) is at least n − 1.
For the quantum encoding E , one can show that for any measurement that Bob applies on
E(X,K) whose outcome is denoted I , the mutual information between X and I is at most
n/2 [DiVincenzo et al., 2004]. The n/2 missing bits of information about X are said to be
locked in the quantum state E(X,K). If Bob had access toK, thenX can be easily obtained
from E(X,K): The one-bit key K can be used to unlock n/2 bits about X .
A natural question is whether it is possible to lock more than n/2 bits in this way.
In order to achieve this, the key K has to be chosen from a larger set. In terms of
uncertainty relations, this means that we need to consider t > 2 bases to achieve an average
measurement entropy larger than n/2 (equation (1.1)). In this case, the natural candidate is
a set of t mutually unbiased bases, the defining property of which is a small inner product
between any pair of vectors in different bases. Surprisingly, it was shown by Ballester and
Wehner [2007] and Ambainis [2010] that there are up to t = 2n/2 mutually unbiased bases
{B1,B2, . . . ,Bt} that only satisfy an average measurement entropy of n/2, which is only as
good as what can be achieved with two measurements (1.1). In other words, looking at the
pairwise inner product between vectors in different bases is not enough to obtain uncertainty
relations stronger than (1.1).
To achieve an average measurement entropy of (1 − )n for small  while keeping the
number of bases subexponential in n, the only known constructions are probabilistic and
computationally inefficient [Hayden et al., 2004].
51.3.2 Summary of the contributions
Chapter 3 We introduce the notion of a metric uncertainty relation and connect it to
low-distortion embeddings of `2 into `1. A metric uncertainty relation also implies an
entropic uncertainty relation. We prove that random bases satisfy uncertainty relations
with a stronger definition and better parameters than previously known. Our proof is also
considerably simpler than earlier proofs. We give efficient constructions of bases satisfying
metric uncertainty relations. The bases are computable by quantum circuits of almost linear
size. These constructions are obtained by adapting an explicit norm embedding due to Indyk
[2007] and an extractor construction of Guruswami et al. [2009].
Chapter 4 We prove that any metric uncertainty relation leads to a locking scheme.
Applying the results of Chapter 3, we show the existence of locking schemes with key size
independent of the message length. Moreover, using the efficient constructions, we give the
first explicit strong information locking scheme. Moreover, we present a locking scheme
that can in principle be implemented with current technology. We use our locking schemes
to construct hiding fingerprints as defined by Gavinsky and Ito [2010].
We also apply our metric uncertainty relations to exhibit communication protocols that
perform equality testing of n-qubit states. We prove that this task can be performed by a
single message protocol using O(log(1/)) qubits and n bits of communication, where 
is an error parameter. We also give a single message protocol that uses O(log2 n) qubits,
where the computation of the sender is efficient.
1.4 Uncertainty relations in the presence of quantum side
information
1.4.1 Context
Suppose that we are now looking for a stronger notion of uncertainty. We want the outcome
to be unpredictable even if the adversary, who is trying to predict the outcome of the
measurement, holds a system that is entangled with the system being measured. Let Alice
hold a system A and Eve hold E, and the two systems are maximally entangled. How
well can Eve predict the outcome of measurements in bases {B1, . . . ,Bt}? It turns out that
because Alice and Eve are maximally entangled, Eve can perfectly predict the outcome that
Alice obtains. In this case, there is no uncertainty at all from the point of view of Eve. The
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interesting question is then: Can we obtain some uncertainty if Eve holds some quantum
side information about the system A but is not maximally entangled with it? The amount
of uncertainty in the measurement outcomes should then be a function of some quantum
correlation measure between Alice and Eve. We should note here that unlike classical side
information which can usually be handled easily, quantum side information can behave
in unexpected ways; see for example the work on randomness extractors against quantum
adversaries [Gavinsky et al., 2007, Ko¨nig et al., 2005, Renner and Ko¨nig, 2005]. In beautiful
recent work, Renes and Boileau [2009] and Berta et al. [2010] showed that in fact one can
extend the uncertainty relation in equation (1.1) to allow for quantum side information.
Related uncertainty relations that hold in the presence of quantum memory have proven to
be a very useful tool in security proofs for quantum key distribution [Furrer et al., 2011,
Tomamichel and Renner, 2011, Tomamichel et al., 2012].
But as in the previous section, just two measurements are in many cases not sufficient to
obtain the desired amount of uncertainty. Before this work, uncertainty relations that hold
when the adversary has a quantum memory were known only for two measurements.
1.4.2 Summary of contributions
Chapter 5 We introduce QC-extractors by analogy to classical randomness extractors,
which are objects that found many applications in theoretical computer science, and relate
them to uncertainty relations with quantum side information. Using techniques similar to
the ones used for proving decoupling results, we give several constructions of QC-extractors
based on unitary two-designs, complete sets of mutually unbiased bases and single-qudit
unitaries. These naturally lead to uncertainty relations in terms of the min-entropy and
in terms of the von Neumann entropy. This gives the first uncertainty relations in the
presence of quantum side information for more than two measurements. Moreover, we
use the uncertainty relation for single-qubit measurements to finally link the security of
two-party secure function evaluation to the ability of the parties’ storage device to store
quantum information [Wehner et al., 2008]. Previously, the security could only be shown
when the classical capacity [Ko¨nig et al., 2012] or entanglement cost [Berta et al., 2011a]
of the storage device was limited.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
The objective of this chapter is to introduce some notations and results that will be used
throughout this thesis. We start with a very brief section about classical information theory
before moving to the description of quantum systems.
2.1 Classical information theory
Random variables are usually denoted by capital letters X,K, . . . , while pX denotes the
distribution of X , i.e., Pr {X = x} = pX(x). The notation X ∼ p means that X
has distribution p. unif(S) is the uniform distribution on the set S. To measure the
distance between probability distributions on a finite set X , we use the total variation
distance or trace distance ∆(p, q) = 1
2
∑
x∈X |p(x) − q(x)|. We also have ∆(p, q) =
maxA⊆X (
∑
x∈A p(x)−
∑
x∈A q(x)).
We will also write ∆(X, Y ) for ∆(pX , pY ). When ∆(X, Y ) ≤ , we say that
X is -close to Y . A useful characterization of the trace distance is ∆(p, q) =
maxX∼p,Y∼q Pr {X = Y } (this equality is sometimes attributed to Doeblin [1938]).
Another useful measure of closeness between distributions is the fidelity F (p, q) =∑
x∈X
√
p(x)q(x) also known as the Bhattacharyya distance and related to the Hellinger
distance. We have the following relation between the fidelity and the trace distance:
1− F (p, q) ≤ ∆(p, q) ≤
√
1− F (p, q)2. (2.1)
The Shannon entropy of a distribution p on X is defined as H(p) = −∑x∈X p(x) log p(x)
where the log is taken here and throughout the thesis to be base two. We will also write
H(X) for H(pX). The conditional entropy is defined by H(X|Y ) = H(XY ) −H(Y ). It
also has the property that H(X|Y ) = Ey {H(X|Y = y)}. The mutual information between
7
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two random variables X and Y is defined as I(X;Y ) = H(X) + H(Y ) −H(X, Y ). The
min-entropy of a distribution p is defined as Hmin(p) = − log maxx p(x). We say that a
random variable X is a k-source if Hmin(X) ≥ k.
2.2 Representation of physical systems
We briefly describe the notation and the basic facts about quantum theory that will be used
in this thesis. We refer the reader to Nielsen and Chuang [2000], Wilde [2011] for more
details.
2.2.1 Quantum states
The state of a (pure) quantum system is represented by a unit vector in a Hilbert space.
For the purpose of this thesis, a Hilbert space is a finite-dimensional complex inner product
space. Quantum systems are denotedA,B,C . . . and are identified with their corresponding
Hilbert spaces. The dimension of A is denoted dA. It is important to note that all unit
vectors represent valid physical states and for any two different vectors,1 one can perform
an experiment for which the two states have a different observable behaviour. Vectors in A
are denoted by “kets” |ψ〉A ∈ A and dual vectors (i.e., linear functions from A to C) are
denoted by “bras” 〈φ|, so that 〈φ| (|ψ〉) = 〈φ|ψ〉 is simply the inner product between the
vectors |φ〉 and |ψ〉. Performing the product in the other direction |ψ〉〈φ|, we obtain a linear
transformation mapping A to itself. In particular, |ψ〉〈ψ| is the orthogonal projector onto the
span of |ψ〉. If we fix a basis of the Hilbert space, then we can represent |ψ〉 as a column
vector ~v and the dual vector 〈ψ| can be represented by ~v†, whereM † represents the conjugate
transpose of the matrix M . In this thesis, every Hilbert space A comes with a preferred
orthonormal basis {|a〉}a∈[dA] that we call the computational basis. The elements of this
basis are labeled by integers in [dA]
def
= {1, . . . , dA}. Often, the Hilbert spaces we consider
are composed of n qubits, i.e., have the form (C2)⊗n. In this case, the computational basis
will also be labeled by strings in {0, 1}n.
In order to model our ignorance of the description of a quantum system, we can consider
distributions {p1, . . . , pr} over quantum states {|ψ1〉, . . . , |ψr〉}. It is well known that such
a distribution over states is best described by a density operator ρ =
∑r
i=1 pi|ψi〉〈ψi| acting
on A. We denote by L(A,B) the set of linear transformations from A to B and we write
1Technically, quantum states are actually rays rather than unit vectors in the Hilbert space, so two vectors
that only differ by a global phase represent the same state.
9 CHAPTER 2. Preliminaries
L(A) for L(A,A). Observe that a density operator is a Hermitian positive semidefinite
operator with unit trace. Conversely, any unit trace Hermitian operator ρ with non-negative
eigenvalues is a valid density operator. If we write ρA =
∑
i pi|ψi〉〈ψi| where {|ψi〉}i form
an orthonormal eigenbasis for ρ, we can interpret the state ofA as being |ψi〉with probability
pi. In particular, the density operator associated with a pure state |ψ〉 is |ψ〉〈ψ| and it will
be abbreviated by omitting the ket and bra: ψ def= |ψ〉〈ψ|. We use S(A) to denote the set of
density operators acting on A. The Hilbert space on which a density operator ρ ∈ S(A) acts
is sometimes denoted by a superscript or subscript, as in ρA or ρA. This notation is also used
for pure states |ψ〉A ∈ A.
In order to describe the joint state of a system AB, the associated state space is the
tensor product Hilbert space A ⊗ B, which is sometimes simply denoted AB. If ρAB
describes the joint state on AB, the state on the system A is described by the partial trace
ρA
def
= trB ρ
AB. The partial trace trB : L(A ⊗ B) → L(A) is defined as trB[ρAB] =∑
b (idA ⊗ 〈b|) ρAB (idA ⊗ |b〉), where {|b〉} is an orthonormal basis of B.
A classical system can easily be described using this formalism. A distribution {pi} over
[d] is represented by ρ =
∑
i∈[d] pi|i〉〈i|. A state on XB is said to be classical on X if there
exists a basis {|x〉} of X and a set of (non-normalized) operators ρx on B such that
ρXB =
∑
x
|x〉〈x|X ⊗ ρBx . (2.2)
2.2.2 Evolution of quantum systems
The operations that change the state of a closed quantum system A are unitary
transformations on A. Recall that U ∈ L(A) is unitary if UU † = U †U = id. After
applying such a transformation, the state of system A evolves from ρ to UρU †. We can
also consider a system AB and act by a unitary on A to obtain the state UAρABU
†
A =
(U ⊗ idB)ρAB(U ⊗ idB)†.
Another important class of quantum operations are measurements. The most general
way to obtain classical information from a quantum state is by performing a measurement.
A measurement is described by a positive operator-valued measure (POVM), which is a set
{P1, . . . , Ps} of positive semidefinite operators that sum to the identity. If the state of the
quantum system is represented by the density operator ρ, the probability of observing the
outcome labeled i is tr[Piρ] for all i ∈ {1, . . . , s}. Whenever {Pi} are orthogonal projectors,
we say that {Pi} is a projective measurement. A simple class of measurements that will be
extensively used in this thesis are measurements in a basis B. The measurement in the
basis B = {|ei〉}i∈[dA] is defined by the POVM described by the operators {|ei〉〈ei|}i∈[dA]
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so that we obtain outcome i with probability tr[|ei〉〈ei|ρ] = 〈ei|ρ|ei〉 whenever the state of
the system is ρ. In particular, if the measurement is in the computational basis, we use the
special notation pρ(a) = tr[|a〉〈a|ρ], and p|ψ〉(a) = |〈a|ψ〉|2 whenever the state ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ|
is pure.
More generally, we can represent the evolution of any quantum system by a completely
positive trace preserving (CPTP) map EA→C . A map is called positive if for any positive
operator ρ, E(ρ) is also positive. It is called completely positive if for any quantum system
B, the map E ⊗ idB : L(A⊗B)→ L(C ⊗B) is positive. Because this is the most general
kind of quantum operation, a CPTP map is also called a quantum channel.
We can view a measurement as a quantum channel that maps a quantum system to a
classical one. In particular, the map that performs a measurement in the computational basis
can be written as:
M(.)A→X =
∑
a
〈a|(.)|a〉|a〉〈a| , (2.3)
where {|a〉} is the computational basis of A. Note that we renamed the system X to
emphasize that it is a classical system. We will also use extensively in Chapter 5 the map
T (.)A→A1 =
∑
a1a2
〈a1a2|(.)|a1a2〉|a1〉〈a1| , (2.4)
where {|a1〉}, {|a2〉} are the computational bases ofA1, A2 respectively. A small calculation
readily reveals that this map can be understood as tracing out A2, and then measuring the
remaining system A1 in the basis {|a1〉}. Note that the outcome of the measurement map is
classical in the basis {|a1〉} on A1.
2.2.3 Distance measures
We will employ two well known distance measures between quantum states. The first is
the distance induced by the `1-norm defined by ‖M‖1 = tr
[√
M †M
]
. For ρ, σ ∈ S(A),
‖ρ − σ‖1 is the sum of the absolute values of the eigenvalues of ρ − σ. As in the classical
case, one half of the `1-norm of a difference of two density operators, also known as the
trace distance ∆(ρ, σ) = 1
2
· ‖ρ−σ‖1, is related to the success probability of distinguishing
two states ρ and σ given with a priori equal probability [Helstrom, 1967]:
∆(ρ, σ) = max
0≤Λ≤id
tr[Λ(ρ− σ)]. (2.5)
The second distance measure we use is the purified distance. To define it, we first define the
fidelity between two states ρ, σ ∈ S(A) by F (ρ, σ) = ‖√ρ√σ‖1. Note that if ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ|
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is pure, then F (ρ, σ) =
√〈ψ|σ|ψ〉. Another useful characterization of the fidelity is with
Uhlmann’s theorem. Before stating the theorem, we need to define the important notion of
a purification. A purification of a density operator ρ ∈ S(A) is a pure state |ρ〉 ∈ AR such
that trR[ρAR] = ρA. Such a purification always exists, for example one can choose R to be
a copy of A and |ρ〉 = ∑i√pi|ψi〉A|ψi〉R, where {|ψi〉}i is an eigenbasis for ρA.
Theorem 2.2.1 (Uhlmann’s theorem [Uhlmann, 1976]). Let ρ, σ ∈ S(A) and let |ρ〉AR and
|σ〉AR be purifications of ρ and σ. Then we have
F (ρ, σ) = max
U
|〈ρ|UR ⊗ idA|σ〉|.
See e.g., [Wilde, 2011, Theorem 9.2.1] for a proof. We will also need the concept of
generalized fidelity between two possibly sub-normalized positive operators ρ, σ, which can
be defined as [Tomamichel et al., 2010],
F¯ (ρ, σ) = F (ρ, σ) +
√
(1− tr[ρ]) (1− tr[σ]).
Note that if at least one of the states is normalized, then the generalized fidelity is the
same as the fidelity, i.e., F¯ (ρ, σ) = F (ρ, σ). The purified distance between two possibly
subnormalized states ρ, σ is then defined as:
P (ρ, σ) =
√
1− F¯ (ρ, σ)2 , (2.6)
and is a metric on the set of sub-normalized states [Tomamichel, 2012, Tomamichel et al.,
2010].
Observe that for pure states
√
1− F (|ρ〉〈ρ|, |σ〉〈σ|)2 = 1
2
‖|ρ〉〈ρ| − |σ〉〈σ|‖1. Hence, by
Uhlmann’s theorem, we can think of the purified distance between two normalized states
as the minimal trace distance between any two purifications of the states ρ and σ. The
purified distance is indeed closely related to the trace distance, as for any two states ρ, σ we
have [Fuchs and van de Graaf, 1999, Tomamichel et al., 2010]:
1
2
‖ρ− σ‖1 ≤ P (ρ, σ) ≤
√
2‖ρ− σ‖1 . (2.7)
It is furthermore easy to see that for normalized states the factor 2 on the right hand side can
be improved to 1.
For any distance measure, we can define an -ball of states around ρ as the states at a
distance of at most  from ρ. For the purified distance, we write
B(ρA) = {σA ∈ S≤(A) | P (ρA, σA) ≤ } ,
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where S≤(A) is the set of positive operators on A with trace at most 1.
All the distances we introduced have the property that they cannot increase by applying
a completely positive trace preserving map F : S(A) → S(C). For any ρ, σ ∈ S≤(A), we
have
P (ρ, σ) ≥ P (F(ρ),F(σ)), (2.8)
and
‖ρ− σ‖1 ≥ ‖F(ρ)−F(σ)‖1. (2.9)
2.2.4 Information measures
The von Neumann entropy of ρ ∈ S(A) is defined as H(A)ρ = − tr[ρ log ρ]. Note that for
a classical state ρX this is simply the Shannon entropy defined earlier. The conditional von
Neumann entropy of A given B for ρAB ∈ S(AB) is defined as
H(A|B)ρ = H(AB)ρ −H(B)ρ .
There is an important difference with the classical case: H(A|B)ρ can be negative when the
state ρ is entangled betweenA andB. The conditional min-entropy of a state ρAB ∈ S(AB)
defined as2
Hmin(A|B)ρ = max
σB∈S(B)
Hmin(A|B)ρ|σ , (2.10)
with
Hmin(A|B)ρ|σ = max
{
λ ∈ R : ρAB ≤ 2−λ · idA ⊗ σB
}
.
For the special case where B is trivial, we obtain Hmin(A)ρ = − log ‖ρA‖∞, where ‖ρ‖∞
denotes the largest singular value of ρ. For the case where we are conditioning on classical
side information, we can write the conditional min-entropy as:
Hmin(X|QJ) = − logEj
{
2−Hmin(X|Q,J=j)
}
. (2.11)
The min-entropy is known to have interesting operational interpretations [Ko¨nig et al.,
2009]. If A is classical, then the min-entropy can be expressed as
Hmin(A|B)ρ = − logPguess(A|B), (2.12)
where Pguess(A|B) is the average probability of guessing the classical symbol A = a
maximized over all possible measurements on B. If A is quantum, then Hmin(A|B)ρ is
2We write max instead of sup as we work with finite dimensional Hilbert spaces.
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directly related to the maximal singlet fraction achievable by performing an operation on B:
Hmin(A|B)ρ = − log |A| max
ΛB→A′
F (ΦAA′ , (idA ⊗ Λ)(ρAB)) , (2.13)
where ΦAA′ = 1|A|
∑
a,a′∈[|A|] |aa〉〈a′a′| is a maximally entangled state.
As the information theoretic tasks we wish to study usually allow for some error  ≥ 0,
the relevant entropy measures are often smoothed entropies. For the conditional min-entropy
this takes the form
Hmin(A|B)ρ = max
ρ˜AB∈B(ρAB)
Hmin(A|B)ρ˜ . (2.14)
More technical properties of entropic quantities
In this section, we state some additional entropic quantities that will be needed for some
proofs.
It will sometimes be more convenient to work with a version of the min-entropy in
which instead of maximizing over all states σB on B, we simply take σB = ρB. The
reason the standard definition of the conditional min-entropy involves a maximization as
in equation (2.10) is to obtain the nice operational interpretation presented above. In
particular, if the systems A and B are classical taking discrete values {a} and {b}, then
Hmin(A|B)ρ|ρ = − log maxa,b〈ab|ρ|ab〉, which is in general different from equation (2.11).
The smoothed version of this alternative definition becomes
Hmin(A|B)ρ|ρ = max
ρ˜AB∈B(ρAB)
Hmin(A|B)ρ˜|ρ˜ .
Tomamichel et al. [2011] showed that the smoothed versions of the two different definitions
cannot be too far apart from each other.
Lemma 2.2.2 ([Tomamichel et al., 2011, Lemma 18]). Let ′ ≥ 0, ′ > 0, and ρAB ∈
S(AB). Then
Hmin(A|B)ρ − log
(
2
′2
+
1
1− 
)
≤ H+′min (A|B)ρ|ρ ≤ H+
′
min (A|B)ρ .
The max-entropy is defined by
Hmax(A|B)ρ = max
σB∈S(B)
logF (ρAB, idA ⊗ σB)2 , (2.15)
and its smooth version
Hmax(A|B)ρ = min
ρ˜AB∈B(ρAB)
Hmax(A|B)ρ˜ . (2.16)
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The following lemma shows that the conditional min- and max-entropies are dual to one
another.
Lemma 2.2.3 (Tomamichel et al. [2010]). Let ρAB ∈ S(AB),  ≥ 0, and ρABC be an
arbitrary purification of ρAB. Then
Hmax(A|B)ρ = −Hmin(A|C)ρ .
Finally, the quantum conditional collision entropy, which is closely related to the min-
entropy, will be used in the proofs in Chapter 5. For a state ρAB ∈ S(AB) relative to a state
σB ∈ S(B), it is defined as
H2(A|B)ρ|σ = − log tr
[
(idA ⊗ σ−1/4B )ρAB(idA ⊗ σ−1/4B )
]2
, (2.17)
where the inverses are generalized inverses. For M ∈ L(A), M−1 is a generalized inverse
of M if MM−1 = M−1M = ΠS , where ΠS denotes the projector onto the support of M .
In particular, if M =
∑
i αi|vi〉〈vi| and the vectors |vi〉 are orthogonal with unit norm, then
M−1 =
∑
i:αi 6=0 α
−1
i |vi〉〈vi|.
The following lemma relates the collision and the min-entropy.
Lemma 2.2.4. Let ρAB ∈ S≤(AB) and σB ∈ S(B) with supp(ρAB) ⊆ idA ⊗ supp(σB),
where supp(.) denotes the support. Then
Hmin(A|B)ρ|σ ≤ H2(A|B)ρ|σ .
Proof We have supp(ρAB) ⊆ idA ⊗ supp(ρB) and hence by [Berta et al., 2011b, Lemma
B.2]
Hmin(A|B)ρ|σ = − log max
ωAB∈S(AB)
tr
[
ωAB
(
idA ⊗ σ−1/2B
)
ρAB
(
idA ⊗ σ−1/2B
)]
,
where the inverses are generalized inverses. But for ρˆAB = ρABtr[ρAB ] ∈ S(AB) we have,
H2(A|B)ρ|σ = − log tr
[
ρAB
(
idA ⊗ σ−1/2B
)
ρAB
(
idA ⊗ σ−1/2B
)]
= − log tr [ρAB]− log tr
[
ρˆAB
(
idA ⊗ σ−1/2B
)
ρAB
(
idA ⊗ σ−1/2B
)]
≥ − log max
ωAB∈S(AB)
tr
[
ωAB
(
idA ⊗ σ−1/2B
)
ρAB
(
idA ⊗ σ−1/2B
)]
= Hmin(A|B)ρ|σ .
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uunionsq
We finish with three diverse lemmas that will be used several times. First the Alicki-
Fannes inequality states that two states that are close in trace distance have von Neumann
entropies that are close.
Lemma 2.2.5 (Alicki and Fannes [2003]). For any states ρAB and σAB such that ‖ρAB −
σAB‖1 ≤  with  ≤ 1/2, we have
|H(A|B)ρ −H(A|B)σ| ≤ 4 log dA + 2h2() ,
where h2() = − log − (1− ) log(1− ) is the binary entropy function.
For a reference, see [Wilde, 2011, Theorem 11.9.4]. Note that such a statement is not true
of the min- and max-entropies, and it is for this reason that it is useful to define smoothed
versions.
The next lemma says that if you discard a classical system, the min-entropy can only
decrease.
Lemma 2.2.6 ([Berta et al., 2011c, Lemma C.5]). Let ρAXB ∈ S(AXB),  ≥ 0, with X
classical. Then
Hmin(AX|B)ρ ≥ Hmin(A|B)ρ .
The last lemma we present here states that for states of the form ρ⊗n, the smooth min-
entropy converges to the von Neumann entropy when the number of copies n grows. This is
called the asymptotic equipartition property (AEP) for the smooth conditional min-entropy.
Lemma 2.2.7 ([Tomamichel et al., 2009, Remark 10]). Let ρAB ∈ S(AB),  > 0, and
n ≥ 2 (1− 2). Then,
1
n
Hmin(A|B)ρ⊗n|ρ⊗n ≥ H(A|B)ρ −
4
√
1− 2 log 
(
2 + log |A|
2
)
√
n
.
For a more detailed discussion of smooth entropies we refer to Renner [2008],
Tomamichel [2012].
2.3 Quantum computation
The most widely used model for quantum computation is the quantum circuit model. Let
U be a unitary acting on an n-qubit space. The objective is to implement U with a small
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number of fixed gates. The main measure of efficiency is then the size of the circuit, which
is the number of elementary gates that are used to perform the unitary. We say that a circuit
is efficient if the size of the circuit is polynomial in n.
There are many standard choices of sets of one and two-qubit gates that allow the
approximation of all unitary transformations on n qubits. This choice is not important
here. The properties of quantum circuits we use here are the following. The Hadamard
single-qubit gate defined by
H =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
is part of our elementary gates. And any reversible classical circuit on n bits can be directly
extended to a quantum circuit with the same size that acts on the computational basis
elements in the same way as the classical circuit.
Chapter 3
Uncertainty relations for quantum
measurements: Definition and
constructions
Outline of the chapter In this chapter, we start by introducing uncertainty relations and
setting up some notation (Section 3.1). Then, we define metric uncertainty relations in
Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, we prove the existence of strong metric uncertainty relations.
Explicit constructions are given in Section 3.4.
3.1 Background
In quantum mechanics, an uncertainty relation is a statement about the relationship between
measurements (or observables).1 Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle [Heisenberg, 1927] is
one of the cornerstones of quantum mechanics. It states that the position and the momentum
of a quantum particle cannot both have definite values. The uncertainty principle is a feature
of quantum theory that makes it different from classical physics: having both a localized
position and momentum is not a valid state according to quantum theory.
Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation was generalized in several ways. The most common
way of presenting the uncertainty principle today is due to Robertson [1929]. It gives a lower
bound on the product of the variances of two observables as a function of their commutator,
which quantifies how compatible the two observables are. Later, Hirschman [1957] and
1In physics language, it probably makes more sense to use the word observable rather than measurement,
but as we have not given a mathematical definition of an observable, we mostly use the word measurement.
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Bialynicki-Birula and Mycielski [1975] gave a formulation of an uncertainty relation in
terms of the entropy of the measurement outcomes. Deutsch [1983] pointed out that using
an entropy instead of the variance is a more desirable way of expressing uncertainty. He
proved that for any state |ψ〉, we have H(pB1,|ψ〉) +H(pB2,|ψ〉) ≥ −2 log
(
1+c(B1,B2)
2
)
where
c(B1,B2) = max|b1〉∈B1,|b2〉∈B2 |〈b1|b2〉| and B1 and B2 are bases of the ambient Hilbert space.
pB,|ψ〉 denotes the outcome distribution when performing a measurement in B on the state
|ψ〉 and H denotes the Shannon entropy. This uncertainty relation was later improved by
Maassen and Uffink [1988] who showed that for all |ψ〉,
1
2
(
H(pB1,|ψ〉) +H(pB2,|ψ〉)
) ≥ − log c(B1,B2). (3.1)
Observe that by using the properties of the Shannon entropy, we can rewrite equation (3.1)
as H(X|K) ≥ − log c(B1,B2), where K is uniformly distributed on {1, 2} and X is the
outcome of a measurement in the computational basis for the state UK |ψ〉. This says that
even given the measurement K that was performed, there is some uncertainty about the
outcome. If B1 and B2 are mutually unbiased, i.e., c(B1,B2) ≤ 2−n/2 where 2n is the
dimension of the ambient Hilbert space, we obtain a lower bound of n
2
on the average
measurement entropy. It is easy to see that such a lower bound cannot be improved: For any
bases B1,B2, one can always choose a state |ψ1〉 that is aligned with one of the vectors of B1
so that H(pB1,|ψ1〉) = 0, in which case
1
2
(
H(pB1,|ψ2〉) +H(pB2,|ψ1〉)
) ≤ n
2
. More generally
when considering t basis, the best lower bound on the average measurement entropy one
can hope for is (1− 1/t)n.
For many applications, an average measurement entropy of n
2
is not good enough. In
this chapter, we want to find bases for which the average measurement entropy is larger
than n
2
and close to the maximal value of n. As mentioned earlier, in order to achieve this,
one has to consider a larger set of measurements. In this case, the natural candidate is a
set of t mutually unbiased bases, the defining property of which is a small inner product
between any pair of vectors in different bases, more precisely c(Bi,Bj) ≤ 2−n/2 for all
i 6= j. For 2n + 1 measurements, Ivanovic [1992], Larsen [1990], Sanchez [1993] showed
for t = 2n+1 mutually unbiased bases, the average entropy is at least log(2n+1)−1, which
is close to the best possible. In fact, their result is stronger: it even holds for the collision
entropy (Re´nyi entropy of order 2), which is in general smaller than the Shannon entropy.
For 2 < t < 2n + 1, the behaviour of mutually unbiased bases is not well understood.
The best general bound for an incomplete set of mutually unbiased bases was proved by
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Damga˚rd et al. [2004] and Azarchs [2004]:
1
t
t∑
k=1
H(pB1,|ψ〉) ≥ n+ log
(
t
2n + t− 1
)
. (3.2)
Observe that this bound is not useful for t ≤ 2n/2, because in this case the term
log(t/(2n + t − 1)) ≤ −n/2, which makes (3.2) at best as good as the uncertainty relation
for two measurements in equation (3.1). Equation (3.2) is known to also known to hold for
the collision entropy. A similar bound for the min-entropy was also proved in [Schaffner,
2007, Corollary 4.19]. Surprisingly, it was shown by Ballester and Wehner [2007] and
Ambainis [2010] that there are up to t =
√
2n mutually unbiased bases {B1,B2, . . . ,Bt}
that only satisfy an average measurement entropy of n
2
, which is only as good as what can be
achieved with two measurements (3.1). In other words, looking at the pairwise inner product
between vectors in different bases is not enough to obtain uncertainty relations stronger than
(3.1). To achieve an average measurement entropy of (1 − )n for small  while keeping
the number of bases subexponential in n, the only known constructions are probabilistic and
computationally inefficient. Hayden et al. [2004] prove that random bases satisfy entropic
uncertainty relations of the form (3.1) with n4 measurements with an average measurement
entropy of n− 3.
Brief word on applications of uncertainty relations Other than being one of the
defining features of quantum mechanics, uncertainty relations have many applications
particularly to proving the security of quantum cryptographic protocols. As an example,
probably the simplest and most elegant proof of security for quantum key distribution known
to date is based on a recently discovered uncertainty relation [Tomamichel and Renner,
2011]. Moreover, the proofs of the security of bit commitment and oblivious transfer in
the bounded storage model are based on an uncertainty relation [Damga˚rd et al., 2005,
2007, Ko¨nig et al., 2012]. We will describe several applications of uncertainty relations
in Chapter 4 and Section 5.4. For more details on entropic uncertainty relations and their
applications, see the survey [Wehner and Winter, 2010].
Notation Instead of talking about uncertainty relations for a set of bases, it is more
convenient here to talk about uncertainty relations for a set of unitary transformations. Let
{|x〉C}x be the computational basis of C. We associate to the unitary transformation U the
basis {U †|x〉}x. On a state |ψ〉, the outcome distribution is described by
pU |ψ〉(x) = |〈x|U |ψ〉|2.
As can be seen from this equation, we can equivalently talk about measuring the state U |ψ〉
in the computational basis. An entropic uncertainty relation for U1, . . . , Ut can be written as
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1
t
t∑
k=1
H(pUk|ψ〉) ≥ h. (3.3)
3.2 Metric uncertainty relations
Even though entropy is a good measure of randomness, it is usually easier to work with the
distance to the uniform distribution when the distance is small. This will be our approach
here: our measure of uncertainty will be the closeness in total variation distance to the
uniform distribution. In other words, we are interested in sets of unitary transformations
U1, . . . , Ut that for all |ψ〉 ∈ C satisfy
1
t
t∑
k=1
∆
(
pUk|ψ〉, unif([dC ])
) ≤ 
for some  ∈ (0, 1). ∆(p, q) refers to the total variation distance between distributions p and
q. This condition is very strong, in fact too strong for our purposes, and we will see that a
weaker definition is sufficient to imply entropic uncertainty relations. Let C = A⊗B. (For
example, if C consists of n qubits, A might represent the first n− log n qubits and B the last
log n qubits.) Moreover, let the computational basis for C be of the form {|a〉A ⊗ |b〉B}a,b
where {|a〉} and {|b〉} are the computational bases of A and B. Instead of asking for the
outcome of the measurement on the computational basis of the whole space to be uniform,
we only require that the outcome of a measurement of the A system in its computational
basis {|a〉} be close to uniform. More precisely, we define for a ∈ [dA],
pAUk|ψ〉(a) =
dB∑
b=1
|〈a|A〈b|BUk|ψ〉|2.
We can then define a metric uncertainty relation. Naturally, the larger the A system, the
stronger the uncertainty relation for a fixed B system.
Definition 3.2.1 (Metric uncertainty relation). LetA andB be Hilbert spaces. We say that a
set {U1, . . . , Ut} of unitary transformations on AB satisfies an -metric uncertainty relation
on A if for all states |ψ〉 ∈ AB,
1
t
t∑
k=1
∆
(
pAUk|ψ〉, unif([dA])
) ≤ . (3.4)
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Remark. Observe that this implies that (3.4) also holds for mixed states: for any ψ ∈
S(A⊗B), 1
t
∑t
k=1 ∆
(
pA
UkψU
†
k
, unif([dA])
)
≤ .
Note that there is a reason we are looking at the average over the different values of k
rather that some other quantity. In fact we can rewrite the condition (3.4) as
∆
(
q|ψ〉, unif([dA])× unif([t])
) ≤ , (3.5)
where q|ψ〉 is the distribution on [dA]× [t] of the random variable (X,K), where X refers to
the outcome of the computational basis measurement when it is performed on state UK |ψ〉.
This means that even given the measurement K that was performed, the outcome of the
measurement is still -close to uniform.
Metric uncertainty relations imply entropic uncertainty relations In the next
proposition, we show that a metric uncertainty relation implies an entropic uncertainty
relation.
Proposition 3.2.2. Let  ∈ (0, 1/2) and {U1, . . . , Ut} be a set of unitaries on AB satisfying
an -metric uncertainty relation on A:
1
t
t∑
k=1
∆
(
pAUk|ψ〉, unif([dA])
) ≤ .
Then
1
t
t∑
k=1
H(pUk|ψ〉) ≥ (1− 8) log dA − 2h2(2).
where h2() = − log − (1− ) log(1− ) is the binary entropy function.
Proof Recall that the distribution pAUk|ψ〉 (see equation (3.4) for a definition) on [dA] is a
marginal of the distribution pUk|ψ〉. Thus H(pUk|ψ〉) ≥ H(pAUk,|ψ〉). Using Fannes’ inequality
(a special case of the Alicki-Fannes inequality 2.2.5), we have for all k
H(pAUk,|ψ〉) ≥ log dA − 8∆
(
pAUk|ψ〉, unif([dA])
)
log dA − 2h2
(
2∆
(
pAUk|ψ〉, unif([dA])
))
.
By averaging over k, and using the concavity of h2, we obtain the desired result. uunionsq
Explicit link to low-distortion embeddings Even though we do not explicitly use the
link to low-distortion embeddings, we describe the connection as it might have other
applications. In the definition of metric uncertainty relations, the distance between
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distributions was computed using the trace distance. The connection to low-distortion metric
embeddings is clearer when we measure closeness of distributions using the fidelity. We
have
F
(
pAUk|ψ〉, unif([dA])
)
=
1√
dA
dA∑
a=1
√
pAUk|ψ〉(a)
=
1√
dA
dA∑
a=1
√√√√ dB∑
b=1
|〈a|A〈b|BUk|ψ〉|2
=
1√
dA
‖Uk|ψ〉‖`A1 (`B2 )
where the norm `A1 (`
B
2 ) is defined by
Definition 3.2.3 (`1(`2) norm). For a state |ψ〉 =
∑
a,b αa,b|a〉A|b〉B,∥∥|ψ〉∥∥
`A1 (`
B
2 )
=
∑
a
∥∥{αa,b}b∥∥2 = ∑
a
√∑
b
|αa,b|2.
We use ‖ · ‖12 def= ‖ · ‖`A1 (`B2 ) when the systems A and B are clear from the context.
Observe that this definition of norm depends on the choice of the computational basis.
The `A1 (`
B
2 ) norm will always be taken with respect to the computational bases.
For {U1, . . . , Ut} to satisfy an uncertainty relation, we want
1
t
∑
k
1√
dA
‖Uk|ψ〉‖`A1 (`B2 ) ≥ 1− .
This expression can be rewritten by introducing a new register K that holds the index k. We
get for all |ψ〉 ∥∥∥∥∥ 1√t∑
k
Uk|ψ〉C |k〉K
∥∥∥∥∥
`AK1 (`
B
2 )
≥ (1− )
√
t · dA. (3.6)
Using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have that for all |ψ〉,∥∥∥∥∥ 1√t∑
k
Uk|ψ〉C |k〉K
∥∥∥∥∥
`AK1 (`
B
2 )
≤
√
t · dA
∥∥∥∥∥ 1√t∑
k
Uk|ψ〉C |k〉K
∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
√
t · dA. (3.7)
Rewriting (3.6) and (3.7) as
(1− ) ≤ 1√
t · dA
·
∥∥∥ 1√
t
∑
k Uk|ψ〉C |k〉K
∥∥∥
`AK1 (`
B
2 )∥∥∥ 1√
t
∑
k Uk|ψ〉C |k〉K
∥∥∥
2
≤ 1,
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we see that the image of C by the linear map |ψ〉 7→ 1√
t
∑
k Uk|ψ〉 ⊗ |k〉 is an almost
Euclidean subspace of (A ⊗ K ⊗ B, `AK1 (`B2 )). In other words, as the map |ψ〉 7→
1√
t
∑
k Uk|ψ〉 ⊗ |k〉 is an isometry (in the `2 sense), it is an embedding of (C, `2) into
(AKB, `AK1 (`
B
2 )) with distortion 1/(1− ).
Observe that a general low-distortion embedding of (C, `2) into (AKB, `AK1 (`
B
2 )) does
not necessarily give a metric uncertainty relation as it need not be of the form |ψ〉 7→
1√
t
∑
k Uk|ψ〉 ⊗ |k〉. When t = 2, a metric uncertainty relation is related to the notion
of Kashin decomposition [Kashin, 1977]; see also [Pisier, 1989, Szarek, 2006].
A remark on the composition of metric uncertainty relations There is a natural
way of building an uncertainty relation for a Hilbert space from uncertainty relations on
smaller Hilbert spaces. This composition property is also important for the cryptographic
applications of metric uncertainty relations presented in Chapter 4, in which setting it
ensures the security of parallel composition of locking schemes.
Proposition 3.2.4. Consider Hilbert spaces A1, A2, B1, B2. For i ∈ {1, 2}, let {U (i)ki }ki∈[ti]
be a set of unitary transformations of Ai⊗Bi satisfying an -metric uncertainty relation on
Ai. Then, {U (1)k1 ⊗ U
(2)
k2
}k1,k2∈[t1]×[t2] satifies a 2-metric uncertainty relation on A1 ⊗ A2.
Proof Let |ψ〉 ∈ (A1 ⊗B1)⊗ (A2 ⊗B2) and let pk1,k2 denote the distribution obtained by
measuring U (1)k1 ⊗ U
(2)
k2
|ψ〉 in the computational basis of A1 ⊗ A2. Our objective is to show
that
1
t1t2
∑
k1∈[t1],k2∈[t2]
∆(pk1,k2 , unif([dA1 ]× [dA2 ])) ≤ 2. (3.8)
We have
∆(pk1,k2 , unif([dA1 ]× [dA2 ])) (3.9)
=
1
2
∑
a1,a2
∣∣∣∣pk1,k2(a1, a2)− 1dA1dA2
∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
2
∑
a1,a2
∣∣∣∣∣pk1,k2(a1, a2)− p
A1
k1,k2
(a1)
dA2
∣∣∣∣∣+ 12 ∑
a1,a2
∣∣∣∣∣p
A1
k1,k2
(a1)
dA2
− 1
dA1dA2
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
∑
a1
pA1k1,k2(a1)
∑
a2
∣∣∣∣∣pk1,k2(a1, a2)pA1k1,k2(a1) − 1dA2
∣∣∣∣∣+ 12 ∑
a1
∣∣∣∣pA1k1,k2(a1)− 1dA1
∣∣∣∣ (3.10)
where pA1k1,k2(a1)
def
=
∑
a2
pk1,k2(a1, a2) is the outcome distribution of measuring the A1
system of U (1)k1 ⊗ U
(2)
k2
|ψ〉. The distribution pk1,k2 can also be seen as the outcome of
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measuring the mixed state
U
(1)
k1
ψA1B1U
(1)
k1
†
in the computational basis {|a1〉}. Thus, we have for any k2 ∈ [t2],
1
t1
∑
k1
∆
(
pA1k1,k2 , unif([dA1 ])
) ≤ .
Moreover, for a1 ∈ [dA1 ], the distribution on [dA2 ] defined by pk1,k2 (a1,a2)pA1k1,k2 (a1)
is the outcome
distribution of measuring in the computational basis of A2 the state
U
(2)
k2
ψA2B2k1,a1 U
(2)
k2
†
where ψA2B2k1,a1 is the density operator describing the state of the system A2B2 given that the
outcome of the measurement of the A1 system is a1. We can now use the fact that {U (2)k2 }
satisfies a metric uncertainty relation. Taking the average over k1 and k2 in equation (3.10),
we get
1
t1t2
∑
k1,k2
∆(pk1,k2 , unif([dA1 ]× [dA2 ])) ≤ 2.
uunionsq
This observation is in the same spirit as [Indyk and Szarek, 2010, Proposition 1], and
can in fact be used to build large almost Euclidean subspaces of `A1 (`
B
2 ).
3.3 Metric uncertainty relations: existence
In this section, we prove the existence of families of unitary transformations satisfying
strong uncertainty relations. The proof proceeds by showing that choosing random unitaries
according to the Haar measure defines a metric uncertainty relation with positive probability.
The techniques used are quite standard and date back to Milman’s proof of Dvoretzky’s
theorem [Figiel et al., 1977, Milman, 1971]. A version of Dvoretzky’s theorem states that
for any norm ‖·‖ overCd, there exists a “large” subspaceE ⊆ Cd which is almost Euclidean,
i.e., for all x ∈ E, (1− )‖x‖2 ≤ s‖x‖ ≤ (1 + )‖x‖2 for some constant  > 0 and scaling
factor s. Using the connection between uncertainty relations and embeddings of `2 into
`1(`2) presented in the previous section, Theorem 3.3.2 can be viewed as a strengthening of
Dvoretzky’s theorem for the `1(`2) norm [Milman and Schechtman, 1986].
General techniques from asymptotic geometric analysis have recently found many
applications in quantum information theory. For example, Aubrun et al. [2010] show that the
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existence of large subspaces of highly entangled states follows from Dvoretzky’s theorem
for the Schatten p-norm2 for p > 2. This in turns shows the existence of channels that
violate additivity of minimum output p-Re´nyi entropy as was previously demonstrated by
Hayden and Winter [2008]. Using a more delicate argument, Aubrun et al. [2011] were also
able to recover Hastings’ counterexample to the additivity conjecture [Hastings, 2009]. The
general strategy that is used to prove such results is to define a distribution over the set of
objects one is looking for and use concentration of measure tools to prove that the desired
properties can be satisfied with positive probability.
For Theorem 3.3.2, we need to introduce the Haar measure over the unitary group
U(d). A natural way of defining a uniform measure over a group is to ask the measure
of a subset to be invariant under multiplication by elements of the group. In particular, for
the unitary group, consider measures µ on the unitary transformations of Cd that satisfy
µ(S) = µ({U ·M : M ∈ S}) for all measurable sets S ⊆ U(d) and unitaries U ∈ U(d).
It follows from Haar’s theorem that there is a unique probability measure that satisfies this
condition.
Definition 3.3.1 (Haar measure). The Haar measure µd on the set of unitary transformations
on Cd is the unique probability measure that is invariant under multiplication by a unitary
operation.
We can then define a rotation invariant probability measure on pure states of Cd by
considering the distribution of U |0〉 where U ∼ µd and |0〉 is any unit vector in Cd. We say
that U |0〉 is a random pure state.
We need another definition before stating the theorem. For some applications,3
we require an additional property for {U1, . . . , Ut}. A set of unitary transformations
{U1, . . . , Ut} of Cd is said to define γ-approximately mutually unbiased bases (γ-MUBs)
if for all elements |x〉 and |y〉 of the computational basis and all k 6= k′, we have
|〈x|U †kUk′|y〉| ≤
1
dγ/2
. (3.11)
1-MUBs correspond to the usual notion of mutually unbiased bases.
Theorem 3.3.2 (Existence of metric uncertainty relations). Let c = 9pi2 and  ∈ (0, 1). Let
A and B be Hilbert spaces with dimB ≥ 9/2 and d def= dimA⊗B ≥ 9c·162pi
2
. Then, for all
t > 4·18c·ln(9/)
2
, there exists a set {U1, . . . , Ut} of unitary transformations of AB satisfying
2The Schatten p-norm of a matrix M is defined as the `p norm of a vector of singular values of M .
3Quantum hiding fingerprints studied in Section 4.1.5
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an -metric uncertainty relation on A: for all states |ψ〉 ∈ AB,
1
t
t∑
k=1
∆
(
pAUk|ψ〉, unif([dA])
) ≤ .
Moreover, for γ ∈ (0, 1) and d such that 4t2d2 exp (−d1−γ) < 1/2, the unitaries
{U1, . . . , Ut} can be chosen to also form γ-MUBs.
Remark. The proof proceeds by choosing a set of unitary transformations at random. See
(3.15) and (3.16) for a precise bound on the probability that such a set does not form a metric
uncertainty relation or a γ-MUB.
Proof The first step is to evaluate the expected value of ∆
(
pAU |ψ〉, unif([dA])
)
for a fixed
state |ψ〉 when U is a random unitary chosen according to the Haar measure. Then, we
use a concentration of measure argument to show that with high probability, this distance
is close to its expected value. After this step, we show that the additional averaging
1
t
∑t
k=1 ∆
(
pAUk|ψ〉, unif([dA])
)
of t independent copies results in additional concentration
at a rate that depends on t. We conclude by showing the existence of a family of unitaries
that makes this expression small for all states |ψ〉 using a union bound over a δ-net. The four
main ingredients of the proof are precisely stated here but only proved in Appendix A.1.
We start by computing the expected value of the fidelity E
{
F
(
pAU |ψ〉, unif([dA])
)}
,
which can be seen as an `1(`2) norm.
Lemma 3.3.3 (Expected value of `A1 (`B2 ) over the sphere). Let |ϕ〉AB be a random pure state
on AB. Then,
E
{
F
(
pA|ϕ〉, unif([dA])
)} ≥√1− 1
dB
.
We then use the inequality ∆(ρ, σ) ≤
√
1− F (ρ, σ)2 to get
E
{
∆
(
pA|ϕ〉, unif([dA])
)} ≤ E{√1− F(pA|ϕ〉, unif([dA]))2
}
.
By the concavity of the function x 7→ √1− x2 on the interval [0, 1],
E
{
∆
(
pA|ϕ〉, unif([dA])
)} ≤√1− E{F(pA|ϕ〉, unif([dA]))}2
≤
√
1−
(
1− 1
dB
)
≤ /3.
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The last inequality comes from the hypothesis of the theorem that dB ≥ 9/2. In other
words, for any fixed |ψ〉, the average over U of the trace distance between pAU |ψ〉 and the
uniform distribution is at most /3. The next step is to show that this trace distance is close
to its expected value with high probability. For this, we use a version of Le´vy’s lemma
presented in Milman and Schechtman [1986].
Lemma 3.3.4 (Le´vy’s lemma). Let f : Cd → R and η > 0 be such that for all pure states
|ϕ1〉, |ϕ2〉 in Cd,
|f(|ϕ1〉)− f(|ϕ2〉)| ≤ η‖|ϕ1〉 − |ϕ2〉‖2.
Let |ϕ〉 be a random pure state in dimension d. Then for all 0 ≤ δ ≤ η,
Pr {|f(|ϕ〉)− E {f(|ϕ〉)} | ≥ δ} ≤ 4 exp
(
−δ
2d
cη2
)
where c is a constant. We can take c = 9pi2.
We apply this concentration result to f : |ϕ〉AB 7→ ∆
(
pA|ϕ〉, unif([dA])
)
. We start by
finding an upper bound on the Lipshitz constant η. For any pure states |ϕ1〉AB and |ϕ2〉AB,
we have
|f(|ϕ1〉)− f(|ϕ2〉)| ≤ ∆
(
pAϕ1 , p
A
ϕ2
)
≤ 1
2
∑
a,b
∣∣∣∣∣|〈a|A〈b|B|ϕ1〉|2 −∑
b
|〈a|A〈b|B|ϕ2〉|2
∣∣∣∣∣
= ∆
(
p|ϕ1〉, p|ϕ2〉
)
≤
√
1− F(p|ϕ1〉, p|ϕ2〉)2
≤
√
2
(
1− F(p|ϕ1〉, p|ϕ2〉))
=
√
2− 2
∑
a,b
|〈a|〈b||ϕ1〉| · |〈a|〈b||ϕ2〉|
=
√∑
a,b
∣∣|〈a|〈b||ϕ1〉| − |〈a|〈b||ϕ2〉|∣∣2
≤ ‖|ϕ1〉 − |ϕ2〉‖2. (3.12)
The first two inequalities follow from the triangle inequality. The third inequality is an
application of (2.1). The fourth inequality follows from the fact that 1− x2 ≤ 2(1− x) for
all x ∈ [0, 1]. The last inequality follows again from the triangle inequality. Thus, applying
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Lemma 3.3.4, we get for all 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1,
Pr
{∣∣∆(pA|ϕ〉, unif([dA]))− µ∣∣ ≥ δ} ≤ 4 exp(−δ2dc
)
(3.13)
where µ = E
{
∆
(
pA|ϕ〉, unif([dA])
)}
. The following lemma bounds the tails of the average
of independent copies of a random variable.
Lemma 3.3.5 (Concentration of the average). Let a, b ≥ 1, δ ∈ (0, 1) and t be a positive
integer. Suppose X is a random variable with 0 mean satisfying the tail bounds
Pr {X ≥ η} ≤ ae−bη2 and Pr {X ≤ −η} ≤ ae−bη2 .
Let X1, . . . Xt be independent copies of X . Then if δ2b ≥ 16a2pi,
Pr
{∣∣∣∣∣1t
t∑
k=1
Xk
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ δ
}
≤ exp
(
−δ
2bt
2
)
.
We apply the above Lemma with Xk = ∆
(
pAUk|ψ〉, unif([dA])
)
− µ which satisfies the
bound (3.13) in addition to being bounded in absolute value by 1. Taking δ = /3 and using
Lemma 3.3.5 (which we can apply because we have (/3)2 · d
c
≥ 16 · 42 · pi), we get
Pr
{∣∣∣∣∣1t
t∑
k=1
∆
(
pAUk|ψ〉, unif([dA])
)− µ∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ /3
}
≤ exp
(
−1
2
(/3)2td
c
)
.
Using this together with Lemma 3.3.3, we have
Pr
{
1
t
t∑
k=1
∆
(
pAUk|ψ〉, unif([dA])
) ≥ 2/3} ≤ exp(−2td
18c
)
. (3.14)
We would like to have the event described in (3.14) hold for all |ψ〉 ∈ AB. For
this, we construct a finite set N of states (a δ-net) for which we can ensure that
1
t
∑t
k=1 ∆
(
pAUk|ψ〉, unif([dA])
)
< 2/3 for all |ψ〉 ∈ N holds with high probability.
Lemma 3.3.6 (δ-net). Let δ ∈ (0, 1). There exists a set N of pure states in Cd with
|N | ≤ (3/δ)2d such that for every pure state |ψ〉 ∈ Cd (i.e., ‖|ψ〉‖2 = 1), there exists
|ψ˜〉 ∈ N such that
‖|ψ〉 − |ψ˜〉‖2 ≤ δ.
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Let N be the /3-net obtained by applying this lemma to the space AB with δ = /3.
We have
Pr
{
∃|ψ〉 ∈ N : 1
t
t∑
k=1
∆
(
pAUk|ψ〉, unif([dA])
) ≥ 2/3}
≤ |N | · exp
(
−
2td
18c
)
≤ exp
(
−d
(
2t
18c
− 2 ln(9/)
))
.
Now for an arbitrary state |ψ〉 ∈ AB, we know that there exists |ψ˜〉 ∈ N such that
‖|ψ〉 − |ψ˜〉‖2 ≤ /3. As a consequence, for any unitary transformation U ,
∆
(
pAU |ψ〉, unif([dA])
) ≤ ∆(pA
U |ψ˜〉, unif([dA])
)
+ ∆
(
pA
U |ψ˜〉, p
A
U |ψ〉
)
≤ ∆
(
pA
U |ψ˜〉, unif([dA])
)
+ ‖U |ψ˜〉 − U |ψ〉‖2
≤ ∆
(
pA
U |ψ˜〉, unif([dA])
)
+ /3.
In the first inequality, we used the triangle inequality and the second inequality can be
derived as in (3.12). Thus,
Pr
{
∃|ψ〉 ∈ AB : 1
t
t∑
k=1
∆
(
pUk|ψ〉, unif([dA])
) ≥ } ≤ exp(−d( 2t
18c
− 2 ln(9/)
))
.
(3.15)
If t > 4·18c·ln(9/)
2
, this bound is strictly smaller than 1/2 and the result follows.
To prove that we can suppose that {U1, . . . , Ut} define γ-MUBs, consider the function
f : |ϕ〉 7→ 〈ψ|ϕ〉 for some fixed vector |ψ〉. Then, if |ϕ〉 is a random pure state, we have
E {f(|ϕ〉)} = 0. Moreover, using Levy’s Lemma with δ = d−γ/2
Pr
{|〈ψ|ϕ〉| ≥ d−γ/2} ≤ 4 exp(−d1−γ
c
)
.
Thus,
Pr
{
∃k 6= k′, x, y ∈ [d], |〈x|U †kUk′ |y〉| ≥ d−γ
}
≤ 4t2d2 exp
(
−d
1−γ
c
)
(3.16)
which completes the proof. uunionsq
Corollary 3.3.7 (Existence of entropic uncertainty relations). Let C be a Hilbert space of
dimension d > 2. There exists a constant c′ ≥ 1 such that for any integer t > 2 such that
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9·162t
5·18 log t ≤ d, there exists a set {U1, . . . , Ut} of unitary transformations of C satisfying the
following entropic uncertainty relation: for any state |ψ〉,
1
t
t∑
k=1
H(pUk|ψ〉) ≥
(
1− 8
√
c′ log t
t
)
log d− log
(
18t
c′ log t
)
− 2h2
(
2
√
c′ log t
t
)
.
In particular, in the limit d → ∞, we obtain the existence of a sequence of sets of t bases
satisfying
lim
d→∞
1
t
∑t
k=1H(pUk|ψ〉)
log d
≥ 1−
√
c′ log t
t
.
Remark. Recall that the bases (or measurements) that constitute the uncertainty relation are
defined as the images of the computational basis by U †k . Note that for any set of unitaries
{U1, . . . , Ut}, we have
1
t
t∑
k=1
H(pUk|ψ〉) ≤
(
1− 1
t
)
log d.
It is an open question whether there exists uncertainty relations matching this bound, even
asymptotically as d → ∞ [Wehner and Winter, 2010]. Wehner and Winter [2010] ask
whether there even exists a growing function f such that
lim
d→∞
1
t
∑t
k=1H(pUk|ψ〉)
log d
≥ 1− 1
f(t)
.
The corollary answers this question in the affirmative with f(t) =
√
t
c′ log t .
Proof Define c′ = 5 · 18c where c comes from Le´vy’s Lemma 3.3.4,  =
√
c′ log t
t
and
decompose C = A⊗B with dB = d9/2e. As d ≥ 9c·1622 and
4 · 18c log(9/)
2
= 4 · 18c log
(√
t
c′ log t
)
· t
5 · 18c log t ≤ t,
we get a family U1, . . . , Ut of unitary transformations that satisfies
1
t
t∑
k=1
∆
(
pAUk|ψ〉, unif([dA])
) ≤ .
By Proposition 3.2.2, these unitary transformations also satisfy an entropic uncertainty
relation:
1
t
t∑
k=1
H(pAUk|ψ〉) ≥ (1− 8) log
(
d
d9/2e
)
− 2h2(2)
≥ (1− 8) log d− log(18/2)− 2h2(2).
uunionsq
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3.4 Metric uncertainty relations: explicit construction
In this section, we are interested in obtaining families {U1, . . . , Ut} of unitaries satisfying
metric uncertainty relations where U1, . . . , Ut are explicit and efficiently computable using
a quantum computer. For this section, we consider for simplicity a Hilbert space composed
of qubits, i.e., of dimension d = 2n for some integer n. This Hilbert space is of the form
A ⊗ B where A describes the states of the first log dA qubits and B the last log dB qubits.
Note that we assume that both dA and dB are powers of two.
We construct a set of unitaries by adapting an explicit low-distortion embedding of
(Rd, `2) into (Rd
′
, `1) with d′ = d1+o(1) by Indyk [2007]. Indyk’s construction has two
main ingredients: a set of mutually unbiased bases and an extractor. Our construction uses
the same paradigm while requiring additional properties of both the mutually unbiased bases
and the extractor.
In order to obtain a locking scheme that only needs simple quantum operations, we
construct sets of approximately mutually unbiased bases from a restricted set of unitaries
that can be implemented with single-qubit Hadamard gates. Moreover, we impose three
additional properties on the extractor: we need our extractor to be strong, to define a
permutation and to be efficiently invertible. We want the extractor to be strong because we
are constructing metric uncertainty relations as opposed to a norm embedding. The property
of being a permutation extractor is needed to ensure that the induced transformation on
(C2)⊗n preserves the `2 norm. We also require the efficient invertibility condition to be able
to build an efficient quantum circuit for the permutation. See Definition 3.4.4 for a precise
formulation.
The intuition behind Indyk’s idea is as follows. Let V1, . . . , Vr be unitaries defining
(approximately) mutually unbiased bases (see equation (3.17)) and let {Py}y∈S be a
permutation extractor (Definition 3.4.4). The role of the mutually unbiased bases is to
guarantee that for all states |ψ〉 and for most values of j ∈ [r], most of the mass of the
state Vj|ψ〉 is “well spread” in the computational basis. This spread is measured in terms
of the min-entropy of the distribution pVj |ψ〉. Then, the extractor {Py}y will ensure that on
average over y ∈ S, the masses∑b |〈a|〈b|PyVj|ψ〉|2 are almost equal for all a ∈ [dA]. More
precisely, the distribution pAPyVj |ψ〉 is close to uniform.
We start by recalling the definition of mutually unbiased bases. A set of unitary
transformations V1, . . . , Vr is said to define γ-approximately mutually unbiased bases (or
γ-MUBs) if for i 6= j and any elements |x〉 and |y〉 of the computational basis, we have
|〈x|V †i Vj|y〉| ≤
1
dγ/2
. (3.17)
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As shown in the following lemma, there is a construction of mutually unbiased bases
that can be efficiently implemented [Wootters and Fields, 1989].
Lemma 3.4.1 (Quantum circuits for MUBs). Let n be a positive integer and d = 2n. For any
integer r ≤ d+1, there exists a family V1, . . . , Vr of unitary transformations ofCd that define
mutually unbiased bases. Moreover, there is a randomized classical algorithm with runtime
O(n2 polylog n) that takes as input j ∈ [r] and outputs a binary vector αj ∈ {0, 1}2n−1, and
a quantum circuit of size O(n polylog n) that when given as input the vector αj (classical
input) and a quantum state |ψ〉 ∈ Cd outputs Vj|ψ〉.
Remark. The randomization in the algorithm is used to find an irreducible polynomial of
degree n over F2[X]. It could be replaced by a deterministic algorithm that runs in time
O(n4 polylog n). Observe that if n is odd and r ≤ (d + 1)/2, it is possible to choose the
unitary transformations to be real (see Heath et al. [2006]).
Proof We define V1 = id, and the remaining unitaries are indexed by binary vectors
u ∈ {0, 1}n, for example the binary representations of integers from 0 to r − 2. The
construction is based on operations in the finite field F2n . The field F2n can be seen as
an n-dimensional vector space over F2. Choose θ ∈ F2n such that 1, θ, . . . , θn−1 form a
basis of F2n . For any x, y ∈ [n], θx · θy ∈ F2n can be decomposed in our chosen basis
as θx · θy = ∑n−1`=0 m`(x, y)θ` for some m`(x, y) ∈ F2. We can thus define the matrices
M0,M1, . . . ,Mn−1 from the multiplication table
1
θ
...
θn−1
 ·
(
1 θ . . . θn−1
)
= M0 +M1θ + · · ·+Mn−1θn−1.
where M` = (m`(x, y))x,y∈[n]. For a given u ∈ {0, 1}n, we define the matrix
Nu =
n−1∑
`=0
u`M`.
Notice that as θx · θy = θx+y, the entry Nu(x, y) of Nu only depends on x + y, i.e.,
Nu(x, y) = Nu(x
′, y′) if x + y = x′ + y′. So we can represent this matrix by a vector
αu(x+ y) = Nu(x, y) of length 2n− 1. We then define a Z4-valued quadratic form by: for
v ∈ {0, 1}n,
Tu(v) = v
TNuv mod 4.
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Note that the operations vTNuv are not performed in F2 but rather in Z. Using the vector
αu, we can write
Tu(v) =
∑
x,y∈[n]
vxNu(x, y)vy mod 4 =
2n−2∑
z=0
(
z∑
x=0
vxvz−x
)
αu(z) mod 4
if we define vx = 0 for x ≥ n. We then define the diagonal matrix Du = diag
(
iTu(v)
)
v∈Fn2
.
Finally, we define for 2 ≤ j ≤ r,
Vj = Dbin(j−2)H⊗n
where bin(j) ∈ {0, 1}n is the binary representation of length n of the integer j.
The fact that these unitaries define mutually unbiased bases was proved in Wootters and
Fields [1989]. We now analyse how fast these unitary transformations can be implemented.
Note that we want a circuit that takes as input a state |ψ〉 together with the index j of the
unitary transformation and outputs Vj|ψ〉.
Given the index j as input, we show it is possible to compute u = bin(j − 2) and
compute the vector αj
def
= αu in time O(n2 polylog n). In fact, we start by computing a
representation of the field F2n by finding an irreducible polynomial Q of degree n in F2[X],
so that F2n = F2[X]/Q. This can be done in expected time O(n2 polylog n) (Corollary
14.43 in the book von zur Gathen and Gerhard [1999]). There also exists a deterministic
algorithm for finding an irreducible polynomial in time O(n4 polylog n) [Shoup, 1990]. We
then take θ = X . Computing the polynomial Xx ·Xy = Xx+y mod Q can be done in time
O(n polylog n) using the fast Euclidean algorithm (see Corollary 11.8 in von zur Gathen
and Gerhard [1999]). As x+y ∈ [0, 2n−2], we can explicitly represent all the polynomials
Xz for 0 ≤ z ≤ 2n− 2 in time O(n2 polylog n). It is then simple to compute the vector αu
using the vector u in time O(n2).
To build the quantum circuit, we first observe that applying a Hadamard transform only
takes n single-qubit Hadamard gates. Then, to design a circuit performing the unitary
transformation Dbin(j−2), we start by building a classical circuit that computes
Tu(v) =
2n−2∑
z=0
(
z∑
x=0
vxvz−x
)
αu(z) mod 4
on inputs v and αu. Observing that
∑z
x=0 vxvz−x is the coefficient of Y
z in the polynomial(∑n−1
x=0 vxY
x
)2
, we can use fast polynomial multiplication to compute Tu(v) in time
O(n polylog n) (Corollary 8.27 in von zur Gathen and Gerhard [1999]). This circuit can be
transformed into a reversible circuit with the same size (up to some multiplicative constant)
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that takes as input (v, αj, g) where v ∈ {0, 1}n, αj ∈ {0, 1}2n−1 and g ∈ Z4, and outputs
(v, αj, g + Tu(v) mod 4).
This reversible classical circuit can be readily transformed into a quantum circuit that
computes the unitary transformation defined by W : |v〉|g〉 7→ |v〉|g + Tu(v) mod 4〉.
Recall that we want to implement the transformation Du : |v〉 7→ iTu(v)|v〉 efficiently. This
is simple to obtain using the quantum circuit for W . In fact, if we use a catalyst state
|φ〉 = |0〉 − i|1〉 − |2〉+ i|3〉, we have
W |v〉|φ〉 = iTu(v)|v〉|φ〉 = Dbin(j−2)|v〉|φ〉.
Finally, Dbin(j−2)H⊗n can be implemented by a quantum circuit of size O(n polylog n). uunionsq
It is also possible to obtain approximately mutually unbiased bases that use smaller
circuits. In fact, the following lemma shows that we can construct large sets of
approximately mutually unbiased bases defined by unitaries in the restricted set
H = {Hv def= Hv1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Hvn , v ∈ {0, 1}n},
where H is the Hadamard transform on C2 defined by
H =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
.
In our construction of metric uncertainty relations (Theorem 3.4.6), we could use the 1-
MUBs of Lemma 3.4.1 or the (1/2 − δ)-MUBs of Lemma 3.4.2. As the construction of
approximate MUBs is simpler and can be implemented with simpler circuits, we will mostly
be using Lemma 3.4.2.
Lemma 3.4.2 (Approximate MUBs inH). Let n′ be a positive integer and n = 2n′ .
1. For any integer r ≤ n, there exists a family V1, . . . , Vr ∈ H that define 1/2-MUBs.
2. For any δ ∈ (0, 1/2), there exists a constant c > 0 independent of n such that for any
r ≤ 2cn there exists a family V1, . . . , Vr of unitary transformations in H that define
(1/2− δ)-MUBs.
Moreover, in both cases, given an index j ∈ [r], there is a polynomial time (classical)
algorithm that computes the vector v ∈ {0, 1}n that defines the unitary Vj = Hv.
Proof Observe that for any v ∈ {0, 1}n and any y ∈ {0, 1}n, we have
Hv (|y1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |yn〉) = Hv1|y1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗Hvn|yn〉 =
∑
y′i∈{0,1} for vi=1
y′i=yi for vi=0
(−1)v·y′
√
2
w(v) |y′1 . . . y′n〉,
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where w(v) is the number of non-zero components of v. Thus,
|〈x|HvHv′|y〉| = |〈x|Hv+v′ |y〉| ≤ 1
2dH(v,v′)/2
, (3.18)
where dH(v, v′) = {i : vi 6= v′i} is the Hamming distance between the two vectors v and
v′. Using this observation, we see that a binary code C ⊆ {0, 1}n with minimum distance
γn defines a set of γ-MUBs in H. It is now sufficient to find binary codes with minimum
distance as large as possible. For the first construction, we use the Hadamard code that
has minimum distance n/2. The Hadamard codewords are indexed by x ∈ {0, 1}n′; the
codeword corresponding to x is the vector v ∈ {0, 1}n whose coordinates are vz = x · z for
all z ∈ {0, 1}n′ . This code has the largest possible minimum distance for a non-trivial binary
code but its shortcoming is that the number of codewords is only n. For our applications, it
is sometimes desirable to have r larger than n (this is useful to allow the error parameter 
of our metric uncertainty relation to be smaller than n−1/2).
For the second construction, we use families of linear codes with minimum distance
(1/2− δ)n with a number of codewords that is exponential in n. For this, we can use Reed-
Solomon codes concatenated with linear codes on {0, 1}Θ(n′) that match the performance
of random linear codes; see for example Appendix E in Goldreich [2008]. For a simpler
construction, note that we can also get 2Ω(
√
n) codewords by using a Reed-Solomon code
concatenated with a Hadamard code. uunionsq
The next lemma shows that for any state |ψ〉, for most values of j, the distribution pVj |ψ〉
is close to a distribution with large min-entropy provided {Vj} define γ-MUBs. This result
might be of independent interest. In fact, Damga˚rd et al. [2007] prove a lower bound close
to n/2 on the min-entropy of a measurement in the computational basis of the state U |ψ〉
where U is chosen uniformly from the full set of the 2n unitaries of H. They leave as an
open question the existence of small subsets ofH that satisfy the same uncertainty relation.
When used with the γ-MUBs of Lemma 3.4.2, the following lemma partially answers this
question by exhibiting such sets of size polynomial in n but with a min-entropy lower bound
close to n/4 instead. This can be used to reduce the amount of randomness needed for many
protocols in the bounded and noisy quantum storage models.
Lemma 3.4.3. Let n ≥ 1, d = 2n and  ∈ (0, 1) and consider a set of r = ⌈ 2
2
⌉
unitary
transformations V1, . . . , Vr of Cd defining γ-MUBs. For all |ψ〉 ∈ Cd,∣∣∣{j ∈ [r] : ∃qj,∆(pVj |ψ〉, qj) ≤  and Hmin(qj) ≥ γn2 − log(8/2)}∣∣∣ ≥ (1− )r.
Proof This proof proceeds along the lines of [Indyk, 2007, Lemma 4.2]. Similar results
can also be found in the sparse approximation literature; see [Tropp, 2004, Proposition 4.3]
and references therein.
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Consider the rd × d matrix V obtained by concatenating the rows of the matrices
V1, . . . , Vr. For S ⊆ [rd], VS denotes the submatrix of V obtained by selecting the rows
in S. The coordinates of the vector V |ψ〉 ∈ Crd are indexed by z ∈ [rd] and denoted by
(V |ψ〉)z.
Claim. We have for any set S ⊆ [rd] of size at most dγ/2 and any unit vector |ψ〉,
‖(V |ψ〉)S‖22 ≤ 1 +
|S|
dγ/2
. (3.19)
To prove the claim, we want an upper bound on the operator 2-norm of the matrix (VS),
which is the square root of the largest eigenvalue of G = V †SVS . As two distinct rows of
V have an inner product bounded by 1
dγ/2
, the non-diagonal entries of G are bounded by
1
dγ/2
. Moreover, the diagonal entries of G are all 1. By the Gershgorin circle theorem, all the
eigenvalues of G lie in the disc centered at 1 of radius |S|−1
dγ/2
. We conclude that (3.19) holds.
Now pick S to be the set of indices of the dγ/2 largest entries of the vector
{|(V |ψ〉)z|2}z∈[rd]. Using the previous claim, we have ‖(V |ψ〉)S‖22 ≤ 2. Moreover,
since S contains the dγ/2 largest entries of {|(V |ψ〉)z|2}z, we have that for all z /∈ S,
|(V |ψ〉)z|2dγ/2 ≤ ‖V |ψ〉‖22 =
∑r
j=1 ‖Vj|ψ〉‖22 = r. Thus, for all z /∈ S, |(V |ψ〉)z|2 ≤ rdγ/2 .
We now build the distributions qj . For every j ∈ [r], define
wj =
∑
z∈S∩{(j−1)d+1,...,jd}
|(V |ψ〉)z|2,
which is the total weight in S of Vj|ψ〉. Defining T = {j : wj > }, we have
|T| ≤ ‖(V |ψ〉)S‖22 ≤ 2. Thus,
|T| ≤ 2/ ≤ r.
We define the distribution qj for j ∈ [r] by
qj(x) =
{
|〈x|Vj|ψ〉|2 + wjd if (j − 1)d+ x /∈ S
wj
d
if (j − 1)d+ x ∈ S.
Since ∑
x
qj(x) = wj +
∑
x∈[d]:(j−1)d+x/∈S
|〈x|Vj|ψ〉|2 =
∑
x∈[d]
|〈x|Vj|ψ〉|2 = 1,
qj is a probability distribution. Moreover, we have that for j /∈ T
∆
(
pVj |ψ〉, qj
) ≤ 1
2
 ∑
x:(j−1)d+x/∈S
wj
d
+
∑
x:(j−1)d+x∈S
(wj
d
+ |〈x|Vj|ψ〉|2
) = wj ≤ .
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The distribution qj also has the property that for all x ∈ [d], qj(x) ≤ rdγ/2 + 1d ≤ 2rdγ/2 . In
other words, Hmin(qj) ≥ γn2 − log(8/2). uunionsq
We now move to the second building block in Indyk’s construction: randomness
extractors. Randomness extractors are functions that extract uniform random bits from weak
sources of randomness.
Definition 3.4.4 (Strong permutation extractor). Let n and m ≤ n be positive integers,
` ∈ [0, n] and  ∈ (0, 1). A family of permutations {Py}y∈S of {0, 1}n where each
permutation Py is described by two functions PEy : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m (the first m output
bits of Py) and PRy : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n−m (the last n−m output bits of Py) is said to be an
explicit (n, `)→ m strong permutation extractor if:
• For any random variable X on {0, 1}n such that Hmin(X) ≥ `, and an independent
seed US uniformly distributed over S, we have
∆
(
p(
US ,P
E
US
(X)
), unif(S × {0, 1}m)
)
≤ ,
which is equivalent to
1
|S|
∑
y∈S
∆
(
pPEy (X), unif({0, 1}m)
)
≤ . (3.20)
• For all y ∈ S, both the function Py and its inverse P−1y are computable in time
polynomial in n.
Remark. A similar definition of permutation extractors was used in Reingold et al. [2000]
in order to avoid some entropy loss in an extractor construction. Here, the reason we use
permutation extractors is different; it is because we want the induced transformation Py on
C2n to preserve the `2 norm.
We can adapt an extractor construction of Guruswami et al. [2009] to obtain a
permutation extractor with the following parameters. The details of the construction are
presented in Appendix A.2.
Theorem 3.4.5 (Explicit strong permutation extractors). For all (constant) δ ∈ (0, 1), all
positive integers n, all ` ∈ [c log(n/), n] (c is a constant independent of n and ), and all
 ∈ (0, 1/2), there is an explicit (n, `) → (1 − δ)` strong permutation extractor {Py}y∈S
with log |S| ≤ O(log(n/)). Moreover, the functions (x, y) 7→ Py(x) and (x, y) 7→ P−1y (x)
can be computed by circuits of size O(n polylog(n/)).
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A permutation P on {0, 1}n defines a unitary transformation on (C2)⊗n that we also call
P . The permutation extractor {Py} will be seen as a family of unitary transformations over
n qubits. Moreover, just as we decomposed the space {0, 1}n into the first m bits and the
last n−m bits, we decompose the space (C2)⊗n into A⊗B, where A represents the first m
qubits and B represents the last n−m qubits. The properties of {PEy } will then be reflected
in the system A.
Combining Theorem 3.4.5 and Lemma 3.4.3, we obtain a set of unitaries satisfying a
metric uncertainty relation.
Theorem 3.4.6 (Explicit uncertainty relations: key optimized). Let δ > 0 be a constant, n
be a positive integer,  ∈ (2−c′n, 1) (c′ is a constant independent of n). Then, there exist
t ≤ (n

)c (for some constant c independent of n and ) unitary transformations U1, . . . , Ut
acting on n qubits such that: if A represents the first (1− δ)n/4− O(log(1/)) qubits and
B represents the remaining qubits, then for all |ψ〉 ∈ AB,
1
t
t∑
k=1
∆
(
pAUk|ψ〉, unif([dA])
) ≤ .
Moreover, the mapping that takes the index k ∈ [t] and a state |ψ〉 as inputs and outputs
the state Uk|ψ〉 can be performed by a classical computation with polynomial runtime and
a quantum circuit that consists of single-qubit Hadamard gates on a subset of the qubits
followed by a permutation in the computational basis. This permutation can be computed
by (classical or quantum) circuits of size O(n polylog(n/)).
Remark. Observe that in terms of the dimension d of the Hilbert space, the number of
unitaries t is polylogarithmic.
Proof Let ′ = /6. Lemma 3.4.2 gives r = d2/′2e unitary transformations V1, . . . , Vr
that define γ-mutually unbiased bases with γ = 1/2 − δ/4. Moreover, all theses unitaries
can be performed by a quantum circuit that consists of single-qubit Hadamard gates on a
subset of the qubits. Theorem 3.4.5 with ` = (1 − δ/2)n/4 − log(8/′2) and error ′ gives
|S| ≤ 2c log(n/′) permutations {Py}y∈S of {0, 1}n that define an (n, `) 7→′ (1 − δ/2)`
extractor and are computable by classical circuits of size O(n polylog(n/)). We now argue
that this classical circuit can be used to build a quantum circuit of size O(n polylog(n/))
that computes the unitaries Py.
Given classical circuits that compute P and P−1, we can construct reversible circuits
CP and CP−1 for P and P−1. The circuit CP when given input (x, 0) outputs the binary
string (x, P (x)), so that it keeps the input x. Such a circuit can readily be transformed into
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a quantum circuit that acts on the computational basis states as the classical circuit. We also
call these circuits CP and CP−1 . Observe that we want to compute the unitary P , so we
have to erase the input x. For this, we combine the circuits CP and CP−1 as described in
Figure 3.1. Note that the size of this quantum circuit is the same as the size of the original
classical circuit up to some multiplicative constant. Thus, this quantum circuit has size
O(n polylog(n/)).
|x〉
|0〉
|0〉
CP
|x〉
|0〉
|P (x)〉
|0〉
|0〉
|P (x)〉
(CP−1)
−1
|P (x)〉
|x〉
Figure 3.1: Quantum circuit to compute the permutation P using quantum circuits CP for
P and CP−1 for P−1. (CP−1)−1 is simply the circuit CP−1 taken backwards. The bottom
register is an ancilla register.
The unitaries {U1, . . . , Ut} are obtained by taking all the possible products PyVj for
j ∈ [r], y ∈ S. Note that t = r|S|. We now show that the set {U1, . . . , Ut} satifies the
uncertainty relation property. Using Lemma 3.4.3, for any state |ψ〉, the set
T|ψ〉
def
=
{
j : ∃qj,∆
(
pVj |ψ〉, qj
) ≤ ′ and Hmin(qj) ≥ (1− δ/2)n/4− log(8/′2)}
has size at least (1 − ′)r. Moreover, for all a ∈ [dA], pAPyVi|ψ〉(a) =
∑
b |〈a|〈b|PyVi|ψ〉|2 =
Pr
{
PEy (X) = a
}
where X has distribution pVi|ψ〉. By definition, for i ∈ T|ψ〉, we have
∆
(
pVi|ψ〉, qi
) ≤ ′ with Hmin(qi) ≥ (1− δ/2)n/4− log(8/′2). Using the fact that {PEy } is
a strong extractor (see (3.20)) for min-entropy (1− δ/2)n/4− log(8/′2), it follows that
1
|S|
∑
y∈S
∆
(
pAPyVi|ψ〉, unif([dA])
)
≤ 2′
for all i ∈ T|ψ〉. As |T|ψ〉| ≥ (1− ′)r, we obtain
1
t
t∑
k=1
∆
(
pAUk|ψ〉, unif([dA])
) ≤ 3′ = /2.
To conclude, we show that t can be taken to be a power of two at the cost of multiplying the
error by at most two. In fact, let p be the smallest integer satisfying t ≤ 2p, so that 2p ≤ 2t.
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By repeating 2p− t unitaries, it is easily seen that we obtain an -metric uncertainty relation
with 2p unitaries from an /2-metric uncertainty relation with t unitaries. uunionsq
Note that theB system we obtain is quite large and to get strong uncertainty relations, we
want the systemB to be as small as possible. For this, it is possible to repeat the construction
of the previous theorem on the B system. The next theorem gives a construction where the
A system is composed of n − O(log log n) − O(log(1/)) qubits. Of course, this is at the
expense of increasing the number of unitaries in the uncertainty relation.
Theorem 3.4.7 (Explicit uncertainty relation: message length optimized). Let n be a
positive integer and  ∈ (2−c′n, 1) where c′ is a constant independent of n. Then, there
exist t ≤ (n

)c logn (for some constant c independent of n and ) unitary transformations
U1, . . . , Ut acting on n qubits that are all computable by quantum circuits of size
O(n polylog(n/)) such that: ifA represents the first n−O(log log n)−O(log(1/)) qubits
and B represents the remaining qubits, then for all |ψ〉 ∈ AB,
1
t
t∑
k=1
∆
(
pAUk|ψ〉, unif([dA])
) ≤ . (3.21)
Moreover, the mapping that takes the index k ∈ [t] and a state |ψ〉 as inputs and outputs the
state Uk|ψ〉 can be performed by a classical precomputation with polynomial runtime and a
quantum circuit of size O(n polylog(n/)). The number of unitaries t can be taken to be a
power of two.
Proof Using the construction of Theorem 3.4.6, we obtain a system A over which we have
some uncertainty relation and a system B that we do not control. In order to decrease the
dimension of the system B, we can apply the same construction to that system. The system
B then gets decomposed into A2B2, and we know that the distribution of the measurement
outcomes of systemA2 in the computational basis is close to uniform. As a result, we obtain
an uncertainty relation on the system AA2 (see Figure 3.2).
More precisely, we start by demonstrating a simple property about the composition of
metric uncertainty relations. Note that this composition is different from the one described
in (3.8), but the proof is quite similar.
Claim. Suppose the set {U (1)1 , . . . , U (1)t1 } of unitaries on A1B1 satisfies a (t1, 1)-metric
uncertainty relation on system A1 and the {U (2)1 , . . . , U (2)t2 } of unitaries on B1 =
A2B2 satisfies a (t2, 2)-metric uncertainty relation on A2. Then the set of unitaries
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A1
B1 = A2B2
A2
B2
U
(1)
k1 U
(2)
k2
B0
Figure 3.2: Composition of the construction of Theorem 3.4.6: In order to reduce the
dimension of the B system, we can re-apply the uncertainty relation to the B system.
{
(idA1 ⊗ U (2)k2 ) · U
(1)
k1
}
k1,k2∈[t1]×[t2]
satisfies a (t1t2, 1 + 2)-metric uncertainty relation on
A1A2: for all |ψ〉 ∈ A1A2B2,
1
t1t2
∑
k1,k2∈[t1]×[t2]
∆
(
p
U
(2)
k2
U
(1)
k1
|ψ〉, unif([dA1dA2 ])
)
≤ 1 + 2.
For a fixed value of k1 ∈ [t1] and a1 ∈ [dA1 ], we can apply the second uncertainty
relation to the state 〈a1|
A1Uk1 |ψ〉
‖〈a1|A1Uk1 |ψ〉‖2
= 1√
p
A1
Uk1
|ψ〉(a1)
∑
b1
(〈a1|〈b1|Uk1|ψ〉) |b1〉 ∈ B1 = A2B2.
As {|b1〉}b1 = {|a2〉|b2〉}a2,b2 , we have
1
t2
∑
k2
∑
a2
∣∣∣∣∣ 1pA1Uk1 |ψ〉(a1)
∑
b2
|〈a1|A1〈a2|A2〈b2|B2(idA1 ⊗ Uk2)Uk1|ψ〉|2 −
1
dA2
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2.
We can then calculate, in the same vein as (3.10)
1
t1t2
∑
k1,k2
∑
a1,a2
∣∣∣∣∣∑
b2
|〈a1|A1〈a2|A2〈b2|B2(idA1 ⊗ Uk2)Uk1|ψ〉|2 −
1
dA1dA2
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
t1t2
∑
k1,k2
∑
a1
∣∣∣∣∣∑
b2
|〈a1|A1〈a2|A2〈b2|B2(idA1 ⊗ Uk2)Uk1|ψ〉|2 −
pA1Uk1 |ψ〉
(a1)
dA2
∣∣∣∣∣
+
1
t1
∑
k1
∑
a1,a2
∣∣∣∣∣p
A1
Uk1 |ψ〉
(a1)
dA2
− 1
dA1dA2
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
t1
∑
k1
∑
a1
pA1Uk1 |ψ〉
(a1)2 + 1
≤ 2 + 1.
This completes the proof of the claim.
To obtain the claimed dimensions, we compose the construction of Theorem 3.4.6 h
times with an error parameter ′ = /h and δ = 1/8. Starting with a space of n qubits, the
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dimension of the B system (after one step) can be bounded by
7
8
n−O(log(1/′)) ≤ log dB ≤ 7
8
n.
So after h steps, we have
(7/8)h n−O(log(1/′)) · 8(1− (7/8)h) ≤ log dBh ≤ (7/8)h n.
Thus,
(7/8)h n−O(log(1/′)) ≤ log dBh ≤ (7/8)h n.
Note that h cannot be arbitrarily large: in order to apply the construction of Theorem 3.4.6
on a system of m qubits with error ′, we should have ′ ≥ 2−c′m. In other words, if
log dBh ≥
1
c′
log(h/), (3.22)
then we can apply the construction h times. Let c′′ be a constant to be chosen later and
h =
⌊
1
log(8/7)
(log n− log(c′′ log log n+ c′′ log(1/)))
⌋
. This choice of h satisfies (3.22). In
fact,
log dBh ≥ c′′ log log n+ c′′ log(1/)−O(log(h/))
≥ 1
c′
log(h/)
if c′′ is chosen large enough. Moreover, we get
log dBh = 2
− logn · 2logO(log logn+log(1/)) · n = O(log log n+ log(1/))
as stated in the theorem.
Each unitary of the obtained uncertainty relation is a product of h unitaries each obtained
from Theorem 3.4.6. The overall number of unitaries is the product of the number of
unitaries for each of the h steps. As a result, we have t ≤ (n

)c logn for some constant
c. t can be taken to be a power of two as the number of unitaries at each step can be
taken to be a power of two. As for the running time, every unitary transformation of
the uncertainty relation is a product of O(log n) unitaries each computed by a quantum
circuit of size O(n polylog(n/)) and can thus be computed by a quantum circuit of size
O(n polylog(n/)). uunionsq
It is of course possible to obtain a trade-off between the key size and the dimension of
the B system by choosing the number of times the construction of Theorem 3.4.6 is applied.
In the next corollary, we show how to obtain an explicit entropic uncertainty relation whose
average entropy is (1− )n.
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Corollary 3.4.8 (Explicit entropic uncertainty relations). Let n ≥ 100 be an integer, and
 ∈ (10n−1/2, 1). Then, there exists t ≤ (n

)c log(1/) (for some constant c independent of
n and ) unitary transformations U1, . . . , Ut acting on n qubits that are all computable by
quantum circuits of size O(n polylog n) satisfying an entropic uncertainty relation: for all
pure states |ψ〉 ∈ (C2)⊗n,
1
t
t∑
k=1
H(pUk|ψ〉) ≥ (1− 9)n− 2h2(2).
Moreover, the mapping that takes the index k ∈ [t] and a state |ψ〉 as inputs and outputs the
state Uk|ψ〉 can be performed by a classical precomputation with polynomial runtime and
a quantum circuit of size O(n polylog n). The number of unitaries t can be taken to be a
power of two.
Proof The proof is basically the same as the proof of Theorem 3.4.7, except that we repeat
the construction h = dlog(1/)/ log(8/7)e times. We thus have
log dBh ≤ (7/8)h n ≤ n.
We obtain a set of t ≤ (n

)c log(1/) unitary transformations. Applying Proposition 3.2.2, we
get
1
t
t∑
i=1
H(pUk|ψ〉) ≥ (1− 8)(1− )n− 2h2(2)
≥ (1− 9)n− 2h2(2).
uunionsq
Chapter 4
Uncertainty relations for quantum
measurements: Applications
Outline of the chapter In this chapter, we give several applications of uncertainty
relations. We start in Section 4.1 with applications related to information locking which
all have a cryptographic flavour. In Section 4.2, we consider the communication problem
called quantum identification.
4.1 Locking classical information in quantum states
Outline of the section We apply the results on metric uncertainty relations of the previous
chapter to obtain locking schemes. After an introductory section on locking classical
correlations (Section 4.1.1), we show how to obtain a locking scheme using a metric
uncertainty relation in Section 4.1.2. Using the constructions of the previous chapter, this
leads to locking schemes presented in Corollaries 4.1.5 and 4.1.7. Section 4.1.4 discusses
the existence of error tolerant locking schemes. In Section 4.1.5, we show how to construct
quantum hiding fingerprints by locking a classical fingerprint. In Section 4.1.6, we observe
that these locking schemes can be used to construct efficient string commitment protocols.
Section 4.1.7 discusses the link to locking entanglement of formation.
4.1.1 Background
Locking of classical correlations was first described by DiVincenzo et al. [2004] as a
violation of the incremental proportionality of the maximal classical mutual information that
can be obtained by local measurements on a bipartite state. More precisely, for a bipartite
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state ωAB, the maximum classical mutual information Ic is defined by
Ic(A;B)ω = max
{MAi },{MBi }
I(IA; IB),
where {MAi } and {MBi } are measurements on A and B, and IA, IB are the (random)
outcomes of these measurements on the state ωAB. Incremental proportionality is the
intuitive property that ` bits of communication between two parties can increase their mutual
information by at most ` bits. DiVincenzo et al. [2004] considered the states
ωXKC =
1
2d
2∑
k=1
d∑
x=1
|x〉〈x|X ⊗ |k〉〈k|K ⊗ (Uk|x〉〈x|U †k)C (4.1)
where U1 = id and U2 is the Hadamard transform. It was shown by DiVincenzo et al. [2004]
that the classical mutual information Ic(XK;C)ω = 12 log d. However, if the holder of the
C system also knows the value of k, then we can represent the global state by the following
density operator
ωXKCK
′
=
1
2d
2∑
k=1
d∑
x=1
|x〉〈x|X ⊗ |k〉〈k|K ⊗ (Uk|x〉〈x|U †k)C ⊗ |k〉〈k|K
′
.
It is easy to see that Ic(XK;CK ′)ω = 1 + log d. This means that with only one bit of
communication (represented by the register K ′), the classical mutual information between
systems XK and C jumped from 1
2
log d to 1+log d. In other words, it is possible to unlock
1
2
log d bits of information (about X) from the quantum system C using a single bit.
Hayden et al. [2004] proved an even stronger locking result. They generalize the state in
equation (4.1) to
ωXKCK
′
=
1
td
d∑
x=1
t∑
k=1
|x〉〈x|X ⊗ |k〉〈k|K ⊗ (Uk|x〉〈x|U †k)C ⊗ |k〉〈k|K
′
(4.2)
where Uk are chosen independently at random according to the Haar measure. They show
that for any  > 0, by taking t = (log d)3 and if d is large enough,
Ic(X;C)ω ≤  log d and Ic(XK;CK ′)ω = log d+ log t
with high probability. Note that the size of the key measured in bits is only log t =
O(log log d) and it should be compared to the (1 − ) log d bits of unlocked (classical)
information. It should be noted that their argument is probabilistic, and it does not say
how to construct the unitary transformations Uk. Standard derandomization techniques are
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not known to work in this setting. For example, unitary t-designs use far too many bits of
randomness [Dankert et al., 2009]. Moreover, using a δ-biased subset of the set of Pauli
matrices fails to produce a locking scheme unless the subset has a size of the order of the
dimension d [Ambainis and Smith, 2004, Desrosiers and Dupuis, 2010] (see Section 4.1.3).
Here, we view locking as a cryptographic task in which a message is encoded into a
quantum state using a key whose size is much smaller than the message. Having access to
the key, one can decode the message. However, an eavesdropper who does not have access
to the key and has complete uncertainty about the message can extract almost no classical
information about the message.
Definition 4.1.1 (-locking scheme). Let n be a positive integer, ` ∈ [0, n] and  ∈ [0, 1].
An encoding E : [2n]× [t]→ S(C) is said to be (`, )-locking for the quantum system C if:
• For all x 6= x′ ∈ [2n] and all k ∈ [t], ∆(E(x, k), E(x′, k)) = 1.
• Let X (the message) be a random variable on [2n] with min-entropy Hmin(X) ≥ `,
and K (the key) be an independent uniform random variable on [t]. For any
measurement {Mi} on C and any outcome i,
∆
(
pX|[I=i], pX
) ≤  , (4.3)
where I is the outcome of measurement {Mi} on the (random) quantum state
E(X,K).
When the min-entropy bound ` is not specified, it should be understood that ` = n
meaning that X is uniformly distributed on [2n]. The state E(x, k) for x ∈ [2n] and
k ∈ [t] is referred to as the ciphertext.
Remark. The relevant parameters of a locking scheme are: the number of bits n of the
(classical) message, the dimension d of the (quantum) ciphertext, the number t of possible
values of the key and the error . Strictly speaking, a classical one-time pad encryption, for
which t = 2n, is (0, 0)-locking according to this definition. However, here we seek locking
schemes for which t is much smaller than 2n, say polynomial in n. This cannot be achieved
using a classical encryption scheme.
In the remainder of this section, we comment on the definition. We should stress first
that this is not a composable cryptographic task, namely because an eavesdropper could
choose to store quantum information about the message instead of measuring. In fact, as
shown by Ko¨nig et al. [2007], using the communicated message X as a key for a one-time
pad encryption might not be secure; see also [Dupuis et al., 2010b].
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Thus, a locking map destroys almost all classical correlations with the message, but
it is impossible to erase all quantum correlations with a key significantly smaller than the
message. For example, consider a map E : {0, 1}n × [t]→ S(C) such that the requirement
(4.3) is replaced by I(X;C)ω ≤ δ, where I is the quantum mutual information computed
for the state ωXKC = 1
t2n
∑
x,k |x〉〈x|X ⊗ |k〉〈k|K ⊗ E(x, k)C . We have
H(X) = H(X) +H(CK)−H(CK)
≤ H(X) +H(C) +H(K)−H(CK).
Now we use the fact for all k, the states {E(x, k)}x are perfectly distinguishable. Thus, there
exists an isometry that maps ωCK to ωCKX . Hence, H(CK)ω = H(CKX)ω. As a result,
H(X) ≤ H(X) +H(C) +H(K)−H(CKX)
≤ H(K) +H(X) +H(C)−H(CX)
= H(K) + I(X;C). (4.4)
This argument shows that if the key is much smaller than the message, then the quantum
mutual information between the message and the ciphertext is large, it is in fact at least
the size of the message minus the size of the key. It is basically the same argument that
Shannon used to prove that any perfect encryption scheme has to use a key of size at least
the message size [Shannon, 1949]. The reason this argument fails for the classical mutual
information Ic is that the measurement to be made on the ciphertext to decode correctly
depends on the value taken by the key. So replacing the system C by the outcome I of some
fixed measurement on C, the inequality H(IK) ≥ H(IKX) does not hold.
One could compare a locking scheme to an entropically secure encryption scheme
[Dodis and Smith, 2005, Russell and Wang, 2002]. These two schemes achieve the same
task of encrypting a high entropy message using a small key. The security definition of a
locking scheme is strictly stronger. In fact, for a classical eavesdropper (i.e., an eavesdropper
that can only measure) an -locking scheme is secure in a strong sense. This additional
security guarantee comes at the cost of upgrading classical communication to quantum
communication. With respect to quantum entropically secure encryption [Desrosiers, 2009,
Desrosiers and Dupuis, 2010], the security condition of a locking scheme is also more
stringent (see Section 4.1.3 for an example of an entropically secure encryption scheme that
is not -locking). However, a quantum entropically secure scheme allows the encryption of
quantum states.
We mentioned that if the adversary has no quantum storage, then a message that is
transmitted using a locking scheme can be used in subsequent protocols. In the following
4.1. Locking classical information in quantum states 48
proposition, we show that it is still safe to re-use the transmitted message provided the
adversary is only allowed to have a small quantum memory. We follow the same technique
as in [Hallgren et al., 2010, Corollary 2].
Proposition 4.1.2. Let E be an -locking scheme and F : C → Y Q be a (eavesdropping)
completely positive trace preserving map that sends all states E(x, k) to states on Y Q that
are classical on Y . Then, we have
∆
(
ωXYQ, ωX ⊗ ωY Q) ≤  · c√dQ ,
where ωXKYQ = 1
dXdK
∑
x,k |x〉〈x| ⊗ |k〉〈k| ⊗ F(E(x, k)) and c is a constant.
Proof The idea is to use the fact that there exists a measurement that can be used
to distinguish any pair of states reasonably well. More precisely, we use a result of
Ambainis and Emerson [2007, Theorem 4] that states that there exists a measurement map
N : L(Q)→ L(Z) such that for any ω1, ω2,
‖N (ω1)−N (ω2)‖1 ≥ cd−1/2Q ‖ω1 − ω2‖1 , (4.5)
for some constant c; see also Radhakrishnan et al. [2009]. We will need a slightly more
general statement that applies to non-normalized states: for any p1 ≥ p2 ≥ 0,
‖p1N (ω1)− p2N (ω2)‖1 ≥ c/4 · d−1/2Q ‖ω1 − ω2‖1. (4.6)
In order to prove this, we proceed as in [Hallgren et al., 2010, Corollary 2]. We denote by
{µ1(z)}z and {µ2(z)}z the outcome distributions for measurement N on the states ω1 and
ω2. We have
‖p1N (ω1)− p2N (ω2)‖1 =
∑
z
|p1µ1(z)− p2µ2(z)|
=
∑
z
|p1(µ1(z)− µ2(z)) + (p1 − p2)µ2(z)| .
We now lower bound this expression in two different ways. First, we have∑
z
|p1(µ1(z)− µ2(z)) + (p1 − p2)µ2(z)| ≥
∑
z:µ1(z)≥µ2(z)
|p1(µ1(z)− µ2(z))|
= p1
‖µ1 − µ2‖1
2
,
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using the fact that µ1 and µ2 are probability distributions. Second, we have∑
z
|p1(µ1(z)− µ2(z)) + (p1 − p2)µ2(z)| ≥
∣∣∣∣∣∑
z
p1(µ1(z)− µ2(z)) + (p1 − p2)µ2(z)
∣∣∣∣∣
= |p1 − p2|.
Thus,
‖p1N (ω1)− p2N (ω2)‖1 ≥ |p1 − p2|
2
+
p1‖N (ω1)−N (ω2)‖1
4
≥ ‖(p1 − p2)ω2‖1
2
+
p1cd
−1/2
Q ‖ω1 − ω2‖1
4
≥ cd−1/2Q /4 · ‖p1ω1 − p2ω2‖1.
In the second inequality, we used the property (4.5) of the measurement N and in the third
inequality, we used the triangle inequality. This proves property (4.6).
We are now in a position to prove the desired result. Let ωXYQ = 1
dX
∑
x,y |x〉〈x| ⊗
pY |X(y|x)|y〉〈y| ⊗ ωQx,y. We have
∆
(
ωXYQ, ωX ⊗ ωY Q)
= ∆
(∑
x,y
|x〉〈x|
dX
⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗ pY |X(y|x)ωx,y, id
X
dX
⊗
∑
x,y
pY |X(y|x)
dX
|y〉〈y| ⊗ ωx,y
)
.
Letting ωy = 1pY (y)
∑
x
pY |X(y|x)
dX
ωx,y, we can write
∆
(
ωXYQ, ωX ⊗ ωY Q)
=
1
dX
∑
x,y
∆
(
pY |X(y|x)ωx,y, pY (y)ωy
)
≤ 1
dX
∑
x,y
4d
1/2
Q
c
∆
(
pY |X(y|x)N (ωx,y), pY (y)N (ωy)
)
=
4d
1/2
Q
c
∆
(∑
x,y
|x〉〈x|
dX
⊗ pY |X(y|x)|y〉〈y| ⊗ N (ωx,y), id
X
dX
⊗
∑
y
|y〉〈y| ⊗ pY (y)N (ωy)
)
=
4d
1/2
Q
c
∆(pXY Z , pX × pY Z) ,
where Y, Z are obtained by performing the measurement defined by (idY ⊗ NQ→Z) ◦
F on the state E(X,K). We conclude by using the fact that E is -locking so that
∆(pXY Z , pX × pY Z) ≤ . uunionsq
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Proposition 4.1.2 is interesting for the scheme presented in Corollary 4.1.7 below, for
which the sender and the receiver do not use any quantum memory. One could then use such
a scheme for key distribution in the bounded quantum storage model, where the adversary is
only allowed to have a quantum memory of logarithmic size in n but can have an arbitrarily
large classical memory. Note that even though this is a strong assumption compared to
the unconditional security of BB84 [Bennett and Brassard, 1984], one advantage of such a
protocol for key distribution is that it only uses one-way communication between the two
parties. In contrast, the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol needs interaction between
the two parties.
Another remark about Definition 4.1.1 is that we used the statistical distance between
pX|[I=i] and pX instead of the mutual information between X and I to measure the
information gained about X from a measurement. Using the trace distance is a stronger
requirement as demonstrated by the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1.3. Let  ∈ [0, 1/2] and E : [2n] × [t] → S(C) be an -locking scheme.
Define the state
ωXKCK
′
=
1
td
t∑
k=1
2n∑
x=1
|x〉〈x|X ⊗ |k〉〈k|K ⊗ E(x, k)C ⊗ |k〉〈k|K′ .
Then,
Ic(X;C)ω ≤ 8n+ 2h2(2) and Ic(XK;CK ′)ω = n+ log t.
Proof First, we can suppose that the measurement performed on the system X is in the
basis {|x〉}x. In fact, the outcome distribution of any measurement on the X system can be
simulated classically using the values of the random variables X .
Now let I be the outcome of a measurement performed on the C system. Using Fannes’
inequality (a special case of Lemma 2.2.5), we have for any i
H(X)−H(X|I = i) ≤ 8∆(pX , pX|[I=i])− 2h2 (2∆(pX , pX|[I=i]))
≤ 8n+ 2h2(2)
using the fact that E defines an -locking scheme. Thus,
I(X; I) = H(X)−
∑
i
Pr {I = i}H(X|I = i)
≤ 8n+ 2h2(2).
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As this holds for any measurement, we get Ic(X;C)ω ≤ 8n+ 2h2(2). uunionsq
The trace distance was also used in Dupuis [2010], Dupuis et al. [2010b] to define a
locking scheme. To measure the leakage of information about X caused by a measurement,
they used the probably more natural trace distance between the joint distribution of p(X,I)
and the product distribution pX × pI . Note that our definition is stronger, in that for all
outcomes of the measurement i, ∆
(
pX|[I=i], pX
) ≤  whereas the definition of Dupuis et al.
[2010b] says that this only holds on average over i. The condition of Dupuis et al. [2010b]
is probably sufficient for most applications but our techniques naturally achieve the stronger
form without degrading the parameters. We should finally note that the trace distance
condition cannot be much stronger than the condition on the classical mutual information.
In fact, using Pinsker’s inequality, we can upper bound the trace distance using the mutual
information:
∆
(
p(X,I), pX × pI
) ≤√I(X; I)/2.
For a survey on locking classical correlations, see Leung [2009].
Other related work
In a cryptographic setting, Damga˚rd et al. [2004] used ideas related to locking to develop
quantum ciphers that have the property that the key used for encryption can be recycled. In
Damga˚rd et al. [2005], they construct a quantum key recycling scheme (see also Oppenheim
and Horodecki [2005]) with near optimal parameters by encoding the message together with
its authentication tag using a full set of mutually unbiased bases.
4.1.2 Locking using a metric uncertainty relation
The following theorem shows that a locking scheme can easily be constructed using a metric
uncertainty relation.
Theorem 4.1.4. Let  ∈ (0, 1) and {U1, . . . , Ut} be a set of unitary transformations ofA⊗B
that satisfies an -metric uncertainty relation on A, i.e., for all states |ψ〉 ∈ AB,
1
t
t∑
k=1
∆
(
pAUk|ψ〉, unif([dA])
) ≤ .
Assume dA = 2n. Then, the mapping E : [2n]× [t]→ S(AB) defined by
E(x, k) = 1
dB
dB∑
b=1
U †k
(|x〉〈x|A ⊗ |b〉〈b|B)Uk.
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is -locking. Moreover, for all ` ∈ [0, n] such that 2`−n > , it is (`, 2
2`−n−)-locking.
Remark. Figure 4.1 illustrates the locking scheme. The state that the encoder inputs in the
B system is simply private randomness. The encoder chooses a uniformly random b ∈ [dB]
and sends the quantum state U †k |x〉A|b〉B. Note that b does not need to be part of the key
(i.e., shared with the receiver). This makes the dimension d = dAdB of the ciphertext larger
than the number of possible messages 2n. If one insists on having a ciphertext of the same
size as the message, it suffices to consider b as part of the message and apply a one-time pad
encryption to b. The number of possible values taken by the key increases to t · dB.
U†k
B
A
Encoding
x ∈ {0, 1}n
b ∈u [dB]
Message
E(x,k)
k ∈ [t]
Key
Private randomness (not shared) Uk
B
A
Decoding
x
Figure 4.1: Illustration of the locking scheme described in Theorem 4.1.4.
Proof First, it is clear that different messages are distinguishable. In fact, for x 6= x′ and
any k,
∆(E(x, k), E(x′, k)) = 1
2
tr
√|x〉〈x|A ⊗ idB
d2B
− |x′〉〈x′|A ⊗ id
B
d2B
 = 1.
We now prove the locking property. LetX be the random variable representing the message.
Assume that X is uniformly distributed over some set S ⊆ [dA] of size |S| ≥ 2`. Let K
be a uniformly random key in [t] that is independent of X . Consider a POVM {Mi} on
the system AB. Without loss of generality, we can suppose that the POVM elements Mi
have rank 1. Otherwise, by writing Mi in its eigenbasis, we could decompose outcome i
into more outcomes that can only reveal more information. So we can write the elements
as weighted rank one projectors: Mi = ξi|ei〉〈ei| where ξi > 0. Our objective is to show
that the outcome I of this measurement on the state E(X,K) is almost independent of X .
More precisely, for a fixed measurement outcome I = i, we want to compare the conditional
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distribution pX|[I=i] with pX . The trace distance between these distributions can be written
as
1
2
dA∑
x=1
∣∣Pr {X = x|I = i} −Pr {X = x} ∣∣. (4.7)
Towards this objective, we start by computing the distribution of the measurement
outcome I , given the value of the message X = x (note that the receiver does not know
the key):
Pr {I = i|X = x} = ξi
tdB
t∑
k=1
dB∑
b=1
tr
[
Uk|ei〉〈ei|U †k · |x〉〈x|A ⊗ |b〉〈b|B
]
=
ξi
tdB
t∑
k=1
dB∑
b=1
〈x|A〈b|BUk|ei〉〈ei|U †k |x〉A|b〉B
=
ξi
tdB
t∑
k=1
dB∑
b=1
∣∣〈x|A〈b|BUk|ei〉∣∣2
=
ξi
dB
1
t
t∑
k=1
pAUk|ei〉(x).
Since X is uniformly distributed over S, we have that for all x ∈ S
Pr {X = x|I = i} = Pr {X = x}Pr {I = i|X = x}∑
x′∈S Pr {X = x′}Pr {I = i|X = x′}
=
(1/t) ·∑k pAUk|ei〉(x)
(1/t) ·∑x′∈S∑k pAUk|ei〉(x′) . (4.8)
Observe that in the case where X is uniformly distributed over [2n] (S = [2n]), it is simple
to obtain directly that
∆
(
pX|[I=i], pX
)
=
1
2
dA∑
x=1
∣∣∣∣∣1t
t∑
k=1
pAUk|ei〉(x)−
1
2n
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 
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using the fact that {Uk} satisfies a metric uncertainty relation on A. Now let S be any set of
size at least 2` and let α = 1
t
∑
x′∈S
∑
k p
A
Uk|ei〉(x
′). We then bound
1
2
dA−1∑
x=0
∣∣Pr {X = x|I = i} −Pr {X = x} ∣∣
=
1
2
∑
x∈S
∣∣∣∣∣(1/t) ·
∑
k p
A
Uk|ei〉(x)
α
− 1|S|
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
2α
·
∑
x∈S
∣∣∣∣∣1t
t∑
k=1
pAUk|ei〉(x)−
α
|S|
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
2α
· 1
t
∑
k
(∑
x∈S
∣∣∣∣pAUk|ei〉(x)− 12n
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ 12n − α|S|
∣∣∣∣
)
.
We now use the fact that {Uk} satisfies a metric uncertainty relation on A: we get
1
t
∑
k
1
2
∑
x∈S
∣∣∣∣pAUk|ei〉(x)− 12n
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1t∑
k
1
2
∑
x∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣pAUk|ei〉(x)− 12n
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 
and
1
2
∣∣∣∣ |S|2n − α
∣∣∣∣ = 12
∣∣∣∣∣ |S|2n − 1t ∑
x′∈S
t∑
k=1
pAUk|ei〉(x
′)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ . (4.9)
As a result, we have
∆
(
pX|[I=i], pX
) ≤ 2
α
.
Using (4.9), we have α ≥ |S|2−n −  ≥ 2`−n − . If  < 2`−n, we get
∆
(
pX|[I=i], pX
) ≤ 2
2`−n − .
In the general case when X has min-entropy `, the distribution of X can be seen as a
mixture of uniform distributions over sets of size at least 2`. So there exist independent
random variables J ∈ N and {Xj} uniformly distributed on sets of size at least 2` such that
X = XJ . One can then write
1
2
∑
x
|Pr {X = x|I = i} −Pr {X = x}|
=
1
2
∑
x,j
|Pr {J = j} (Pr {Xj = x|I = i, J = j} −Pr {Xj = x|J = j})|
≤ 2
2`−n − .
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uunionsq
Using Theorem 4.1.4 together with the existence of metric uncertainty relations
(Theorem 3.3.2), we show the existence of -locking schemes whose key size depends only
on  and not on the size of the encoded message.
Corollary 4.1.5 (Existence of locking schemes). Let n be a large enough integer and
 ∈ (0, 1). Then there exists an -locking scheme encoding an n-bit message using a key of
at most 2 log(1/) +O(log log(1/)) bits into at most n+ 2 log(18/) qubits.
Remark. Observe that in terms of number of bits, the size of the key is only a factor of two
larger (up to smaller order terms) than the lower bound of log(1/( + 2−n)) bits that can
be obtained by guessing the key. In fact, consider the strategy of performing the decoding
operation corresponding to the key value 0. In this case, we have Pr {X = i|I = i} ≥
Pr {K = 0} = 1/t. Thus, ∆(pX|I=i, pX) ≥ 1/t− 2−n.
Recall that we can increase the size of the message to be equal to the number of qubits of
the ciphertext at the cost of increasing the key size to at most 4 log(1/) +O(log(log(1/)).
Proof Use the construction of Theorem 3.3.2 with dA = 2n and dB = 2q such
that 2q−1 < 9/2 ≤ 2q and d = dAdB. Take t = 2p to be the power of two with
2p−1 ≤ 4·18c log(9/)
2
< 2p. uunionsq
To construct (`, )-locking schemes with ` < n, it suffices to use Theorem 3.3.2 with
say ′ = 2`−n/4. In this case, we obtain a key of size O((n− `) + log(1/)). We note that
this increase in the key size is unavoidable because of the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1.6. Assume E defines an (`, )-locking scheme with  ≤ 1/4 and a key of
size log t. Then log t ≥ n− `− 2.
Proof We proceed as in the proofs of lower bounds on the key size in entropic security
[Dodis and Smith, 2005]. The idea is to show that if E is an (`, )-locking scheme, then it
can be used to build an encryption scheme for messages of n− ` bits that has the following
properties. Given the secret key, the encryption of w and w′ are perfectly distinguishable,
but without the key, the encryption of w and w′ are almost indistinguishable. For such a
scheme, we show in Proposition A.3.1 that the key size is at least the size of the message
log t ≥ n− `− 2.
Define the random variables Xw for w ∈ {0, 1}n−` which are uniformly distributed on
{w} × {0, 1}`. Our encryption scheme encrypts w using the key k into E(Xw, k). First,
clearly a decoder having the key can determine w using E(Xw, k). Second, we show that
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the ciphertexts corresponding to w and w′ 6= w are almost indistinguishable:
∆(ρw, ρw′) ≤ 2, (4.10)
where ρw = 1k2`
∑
k∈[t],y∈{0,1}` E(w · y, k). To show this we let Λ be a positive operator such
that ∆(ρw, ρw′) = tr[Λ(ρw − ρw′)] (see equation (2.5)).
We then have
tr[Λ(ρw − ρw′)] ≤
∣∣∣∣tr [Λ(ρw + ρw′2 − ρw′
)]∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣tr [Λ(ρw + ρw′2 − ρw
)]∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
2`
∑
y
∣∣∣∣∣∣tr
Λ
ρw + ρw′
2
− 1
k
∑
k∈[t]
E(w′ · y, k)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
1
2`
∑
y
∣∣∣∣∣∣tr
Λ
ρw + ρw′
2
− 1
k
∑
k∈[t]
E(w · y, k)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= 2
1
2`+1
∑
z∈{w,w′}×{0,1}`
∣∣∣∣∣∣tr
Λ
ρw + ρw′
2
− 1
k
∑
k∈[t]
E(z, k)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= 2
∑
z∈{w,w′}×{0,1}`
Pr {Z = z} |Pr {I = 0} −Pr {I = 0|Z = z}|
= 2∆(pZI , pZ × pI) ,
where Z is uniformly distributed on {w,w′} × {0, 1}` and I is the outcome of the
measurement {Λ, id − Λ} performed on the state E(Z,K). Inequality (4.10) follows from
the fact that E is an (`, )-locking scheme.
Using Proposition A.3.1, we conclude that log t ≥ n− `− 2. uunionsq
The following corollary gives explicit locking schemes. We mention the constructions
based on Theorems 3.4.6 and 3.4.7. Of course, one could obtain a tradeoff between the key
size and the dimension of the quantum system.
Corollary 4.1.7 (Explicit locking schemes). Let δ > 0 be a constant, n be a positive integer,
 ∈ (2−c′n, 1) (c′ is a constant independent of n).
• Then, there exists an efficient -locking scheme encoding an n-bit message in a
quantum state of n′ ≤ (4 + δ)n+O(log(1/)) qubits using a key of size O(log(n/))
bits. In fact, both the encoding and decoding operations are computable using a
classical computation with polynomial running time and a quantum circuit with only
Hadamard gates and preparations and measurements in the computational basis.
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• There also exists an efficient -locking scheme E ′ encoding an n-bit message in a
quantum state of n qubits using a key of sizeO(log(n/) · log n) bits. E ′ is computable
by a classical algorithm with polynomial runtime and a quantum circuit of size
O(n polylog(n/)).
Proof For the first result, we observe that the construction of Theorem 4.1.4 encodes the
message in the computational basis. Recall that the untaries Uk of Theorem 3.4.6 are of the
form Uk = PkVk where Pk is a permutation of the computational basis. Hence, it is possible
to classically compute the label of the computational basis element P †k |x〉|b〉. One can then
prepare the state P †k |x〉|b〉 and apply the unitary V †k to obtain the ciphertext. The decoding is
performed in a similar way. One first applies the unitary Vk, measures in the computational
basis and then applies the permutation Pk to the n-bit string corresponding to the outcome.
For the second construction, we apply Theorem 3.4.7 with n′ = n+c′ dlog log n+ log(1/)e
for some large enough constant c′. We can then use a one-time pad encryption on the input
to theB system. This increases the size of the key by only c′ dlog log n+ log(1/)e bits. uunionsq
As mentioned earlier (see equation (4.1)), explicit states that exhibit locking behaviour
have been presented in DiVincenzo et al. [2004]. However, this is the first explicit
construction of states ω that achieves the following strong locking behaviour: for any δ > 0,
for n large enough, the state ωXCK verifies Ic(X;C)ω ≤ δ and Ic(X;CK)ω = n + log dK
where K is a classical O(log(n/δ))-bit system. This is a direct consequence of Corollary
4.1.7 taking  = δ/(20n), and Proposition 4.1.3. We should also mention that Ko¨nig et al.
[2007] explicitly construct a state exhibiting some weak locking behaviour. We summarize
the different locking schemes in Table 4.1.
4.1.3 Impossibility of locking using Pauli operators
The objective of this section is to give an example of a construction that is not a locking
scheme to illustrate what is needed to obtain a locking scheme. The 2× 2 Pauli matrices are
the four matrices {id, σx, σz, σxσz} where
σx =
(
0 1
1 0
)
and σz =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
.
For bit strings u, v ∈ {0, 1}n, we define the unitary operation σuxσvz on (C2)⊗n by
σuxσ
v
z = σ
u1
x σ
v1
z ⊗ · · · ⊗ σunx σvnz .
It was shown by Ambainis et al. [2000] that one can encrypt an n-qubit state |ψ〉 perfectly
using a key (U, V ) of 2n bits. To encrypt |ψ〉, one simply applies σUx σVz to |ψ〉, where U
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Table 4.1: Comparison of different locking schemes. n is the number of bits of the message.
The information leakage and the size of the key are measured in bits and the size of
the ciphertext in qubits. Efficient locking schemes have encoding and decoding quantum
circuits of size polynomial in n. The locking schemes of the first and next to last actually
have encoding circuits that are in principle implementable with current technology; they
only use classical computations and simple single-qubit transformations. It should be noted
that our locking definition is stronger than all the previous definitions. Note that the variable
 can depend on n. For example, one can take  = η/n to make the information leakage
arbitrarily small. The symbol O(·) refers to constants independent of  and n, but there is a
dependence on δ for the next to last row. The symbol ll(·) refers to O(log log(·)).
Inf. leak. Key Ciphertext Efficient?
DiVincenzo et al. n/2 1 n yes
Hayden et al. 3 4 log(n) n no
Dupuis et al. n 2 log(n/2) +O(1) n no
Corollary 4.1.5 n 2 log(1/) + ll(1/) n+ 2 dlog(9/)e no
Corollary 4.1.5 n 4 log(1/) + ll(1/) n no
Corollary 4.1.7 n Oδ(log(n/)) (4 + δ) · n yes
Corollary 4.1.7 n O(log(n/) log(n)) n yes
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and V are uniformly distributed on {0, 1}n. This can be thought of as a quantum version
of one-time pad encryption. Of course, this encryption scheme also defines a (0, 0)-locking
scheme, but the size of the key is 2n bits. Recall that we want to use the assumption that the
message is random to reduce the key size to O(polylog(n)) bits.
Ambainis and Smith [2004] showed that to achieve approximate encryption, it is
sufficient to choose the key uniformly at random from a well-chosen subset S ⊆ {0, 1}2n of
size only O(n22n). Such pseudorandom subsets are called δ-biased sets and have also been
used to construct entropically secure encryption schemes [Desrosiers and Dupuis, 2010,
Dodis and Smith, 2005]. For example, Desrosiers and Dupuis [2010] showed that it is
possible to encrypt a uniformly random state by applying σUx σ
V
z where (U, V ) is chosen
uniformly from a set S ⊂ {0, 1}n of size O(n2) (see [Desrosiers and Dupuis, 2010, Dodis
and Smith, 2005] for a precise definition of entropic security). Such a set of transformations
can seem like a good candidate for a locking scheme. The following proposition shows
that this scheme is far from being -locking. Note that this also shows that the notion of
entropic security defined in [Desrosiers, 2009, Desrosiers and Dupuis, 2010] is weaker than
the definition of locking.
Proposition 4.1.8. Consider an -locking scheme E of the form E(x, k = (u, v)) = σuxσvy |x〉
where the message x ∈ {0, 1}n and the key u, v ∈ {0, 1}n (see Definition 4.1.1). Suppose
the secret key K is chosen uniformly from a set S ⊆ {0, 1}2n. Then |S| ≥ (1− )2n.
Proof Let X be the message (X is uniformly distributed over {0, 1}n) and (U, V ) be
the key. The key is uniformly distributed on S. We show that a measurement in the
computational basis gives a lot of information about X . Let I be the outcome of measuring
E(X,K) in the computational basis. We have for x, i ∈ {0, 1}n,
Pr {X = x|I = i} = Pr {I = i|X = x}
=
1
|S|
∑
(u,v)∈S
|〈i|σuxσvz |x〉|2 .
Observing that the term |〈i|σuxσvz |x〉|2 ∈ {0, 1}, we have that for any fixed i, there are
at most |S| different values of x for which Pr {X = x|I = i} > 0. Thus, defining
T = {x ∈ {0, 1}n : Pr {X = x|I = i} = 0}, we have
∆
(
pX|[I=i], pX
) ≥ Pr {X ∈ T} −Pr {X ∈ T |I = i} = |T |
2n
≥ 1− |S|
2n
.
By the definition of a locking scheme, we should have
∆
(
pX|[I=i], pX
) ≤ 
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which concludes the proof. uunionsq
4.1.4 Error-tolerant information locking
The first protocol in Corollary 4.1.7 can in principle be implemented using current
technology. We say “in principle” because a locking scheme as defined here does not allow
for any error in the transmission of the ciphertext. Can we construct a locking scheme that
can tolerate a reasonable rate of errors?
One simple approach to build a protocol that tolerates errors is to use a quantum error
correcting code (QECC) to encode the ciphertext. Depending on the properties of the code,
this would allow the receiver to correct some fraction of errors. Moreover, the security
is preserved because an eavesdropper could perform an encoding into a QECC as part of
his attack. Thus, it is possible to make any locking scheme error-tolerant provided we can
perform encoding and decoding operations for a good QECC. Unfortunately, the encoding
and decoding maps of interesting quantum error correcting codes are beyond the reach of
current technology. But note that our objective is not necessarily to recover the quantum
ciphertext correctly, we only want to be able to recover the classical message. Can we
construct a locking scheme that can tolerate a reasonable rate of errors and that can be
implemented with current technology?
In the remainder of this section, we show that some natural class of error tolerant
protocols cannot be good locking schemes. Consider a locking scheme of the following
form. The key is written as k ∈ [t] and the message x ∈ {0, 1}n is locked in the following
way:
• A classical (possibly randomized) function determined by the key k is applied to x .
x is mapped to Pk(x, r) ∈ {0, 1}n′ , where r is a random string private to Alice.
• The bitstring Pk(x, r) is then encoded in a code Ck possibly depending on the key k.
The codes Ck are assumed to have minimum distance α for all k. This bitstring is
denoted z = Ck(Pk(x, r)) ∈ {0, 1}m. We denote by Ck the set of bitstrings in this
code.
• A quantum encoding of the form Hvk where vk ∈ {0, 1}m is performed on the
computational basis element |Ck(Pk(x, z))〉.
We start with a lemma that says that given a set of vectors that are almost orthogonal,
they can be well approximated by orthogonal vectors. It was first proven by Scho¨nemann
[1966]; see also [Kempe and Vidick, 2010, Claim 20].
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Lemma 4.1.9. Let s ≤ d and |u1〉, . . . , |us〉 ∈ Cd be unit vectors such that
1
s
∑
i 6=j |〈ui|uj〉|2 ≤ . Then there exist orthogonal unit vectors |v1〉, . . . , |vs〉 such that
1
s
∑
i ‖|ui〉 − |vi〉‖22 ≤ .
Proof We start by fixing a set of orthonormal vectors |w1〉, . . . , |ws〉 such that the span
of |u1〉, . . . , |us〉 is included in the span of |w1〉, . . . , |ws〉. We then define the matrix X
whose columns represent the vectors |ui〉 using the vectors |w1〉, . . . , |ws〉. Write the SVD
decomposition of X as X = UΣV † and let the singular values of X be σ1, . . . , σs. We have∑
i∈[s]
(1− σ2i )2 = ‖id− Σ†Σ‖22 = ‖id−X†X‖22 =
∑
i 6=j
|〈ui|uj〉|2 +
∑
i∈[s]
(1− 〈ui|ui〉)2
≤ s
by assumption. We now define Y = UV †, look at the columns of this matrix and call these
vectors |vi〉 (of course the underlying basis used is still |wi〉). We have by writing the desired
expression in the basis |wi〉 and then multiplying by U † on the left and V on the right:∑
i
‖|ui〉 − |vi〉‖22 = ‖X − Y ‖22 = ‖Σ− id‖22 =
∑
i
(σi − 1)2
≤
∑
i
(1− σi)2(1 + σi)2 ≤ s.
uunionsq
Proposition 4.1.10. For any encoding of the form above such that the random variable
(Z, V ) = (PK(X,R), vK) is uniformly distributed on its support, there exists a
measurement on the ciphertext that gives an outcome I such that
I(I;X) ≥ (1− 16 · t2−α+1)n− log t− 2,
provided t2−α+1 ≤ 1.
Remark. Recall that we want t to be sub-exponential (even polynomial) in n. Moreover, to
be able to correct a constant fraction of errors, we want the minimum distance α to be linear
in n′. In this case, t2−α+1  1 and the measurement given by the proposition completely
breaks the locking scheme. uunionsq
Proof We will apply Lemma 4.1.9 to the set of vectors {Hv|z〉 : (z, v) ∈ S} with
S = {(z, v) : ∃k : z ∈ Ck, v = vk}. Note that a pair (z, v) that appears for different
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values of k is counted only once. Fix any z′ and v′ (not necessarily in S). We have∑
(z,vk)∈S,(z,vk) 6=(z′,v′)
|〈z′|Hv′Hvk |z〉|2 =
∑
vk=v′,z 6=z′
|〈z′|z〉|2 +
∑
vk 6=v′,z∈Ck
|〈z′|Hv′+vk |z〉|2
= 0 +
∑
vk 6=v′,z∈Ck∩Bvk+v′ (z′)
|〈z′|Hv′+vk |z〉|2 (4.11)
where Bvk+v′(z
′) = {y ∈ {0, 1}m : yi = z′i whenever (vk + v′)i = 0}. Observe that for
all z and v, |Bv(z)| ≤ 2w(v) and in this case w(vk + v′) = dH(vk, v′). We now fix some k
such that vk 6= v′ and bound the size of Ck ∩Bvk+v′ assuming that Ck is a code of minimum
distance α. The strings of Ck ∩ Bvk+v′ agree on 2n−dH(vk,v′) bits. This means it induces a
code of minimum distance α on strings of length dH(vk, v′). Using the Singleton bound, we
get
|Ck ∩Bvk+v′| ≤ 2dH(vk,v
′)−α+1.
To bound the expression in (4.11), we observe that |〈z′|Hv′+vk |z〉|2 ≤ 2−dH(vk,v′). Thus, for
a fixed vk, ∑
z∈Ck∩Bvk+v′ (z′)
|〈z′|Hv′+vk |z〉|2 ≤ 2−dH(vk,v′) · 2dH(vk,v′)−α+1
≤ 2−α+1.
As a result, we can bound the average over (z′, v′) ∈ S
1
|S|
∑
(z′,v′)∈S
∑
(z,v)∈S,(z,v)6=(z′,v′)
|〈z′|Hv′+v|z〉|2 ≤ t · 2−α+1.
Using Lemma 4.1.9 for the set of vector {Hv|z〉 : (z, v) ∈ S}, we obtain a set of
orthonormal vectors |wz,v〉 for (z, v) ∈ S such that 1|S|
∑
(z,v)∈S ‖Hv|z〉−|wz,v〉‖22 ≤ t2−α+1.
We can rewrite this inequality as
1
|S|
∑
(z,v)∈S
Re〈wz,v|Hv|z〉 ≥ 1− t2−α+1.
Using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we get (
∑
z,v Re〈wz,v|Hv|z〉)2 ≤ |S| ·∑
z,v(Re〈wz,v|Hv|z〉)2. It follows that
1
|S|
∑
(z,v)∈S
|〈wz,v|Hv|z〉|2 ≥ 1|S| ·
1
|S| ·
 ∑
(z,v)∈S
Re〈wz,v|Hv|z〉
2
≥ (1− t2−α+1)2. (4.12)
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The attack on the locking scheme is defined by the projective measurement of the
orthonormal set {|wz,v〉}(z,v)∈S . Note that this is a valid attack because this set does not
depend on the private randomness r and only uses the description of the protocol (the codes
Ck and the bitstrings vk). Let I be the outcome of the measurement (only the z part, so more
precisely we perform the projective measurement whose elements are {∑v |wz,v〉〈wz,v|}z).
We have
Pr {I = Z} = Ex,r,k
 ∑
v′:(Ck(Pk(x,r)),v′)∈S
|〈wCk(Pk(x,r)),v′ |Hvk |Ck(Pk(x, r))〉|2

=
∑
z,v
Pr {Z = z, V = v}
∑
v′:(z,v′)∈S
|〈wz,v′ |Hv|z〉|2
≥
∑
z,v
Pr {Z = z, V = v} |〈wz,v|Hv|z〉|2
=
1
|S|
∑
(z,v)∈S
|〈wz,v|Hv|z〉|2
≥ (1− t2−α+1)2.
Here, we used the assumption that Z, V is uniformly distributed on its support so that
Pr {Z = z, V = v} = 1/|S|. This condition is satisfied for example by the scheme of
Corollary 4.1.7. It follows that 1
2
‖pXI − pXZ‖1 ≤ 2t2−α+1.
I(I;X) = H(X)−H(X|I)
≥ H(X)−H(X|Z)− 4 · 4t2−α+1n− 2h2(4t2−α+1)
≥ n− 16t2−α+1n− (H(X|ZK) +H(K))− 2h2(4t2−α+1)
= n− 16t2−α+1n− log t− 2h2(4t2−α+1).
In the first inequality, we used the Alicki-Fannes inequality (Lemma 2.2.5). For the second
inequality, we used the fact that H(X|Z) ≤ H(X|ZK) + H(K) and for the last equality,
we used the fact that given Z and K, we can decode X so that H(X|ZK) = 0. uunionsq
This result says that if we want to build a locking scheme with a small key that can
be implemented with current technology and that tolerates some errors, we should look for
schemes that do not lie in the class described above. However, if a key of size cn for some
constant c < 1 is acceptable (where n is the size of the message), it is possible to construct
a locking scheme that is tolerant to errors. In fact, we could for instance after applying the
permutation to the n-bit message together with the private random string obtaining a bit
string z of length roughly 4n, compute some parities of z. Let y denote the string of parities
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obtained. As in the first protocol of Corollary 4.1.7, Alice then encodes z by performing
some Hadamard gates according to the key and sends this ciphertext to Bob. In addition,
Alice uses another part of the key to encrypt y (using a one-time pad) and sends it to Bob.
Using the key, Bob can recover z′ a noisy version of z and can recover y perfectly (as it is
sent through a classical channel). Using z′ and y, Bob can recover z provided z′ didn’t have
too many errors.
To obtain a smaller key size, one idea is to use the method described above as a key
expansion procedure and repeat it many times. Typically the number of times we would
like to expand the key is O(log n), and it is thus possible to choose independently the
permutation and Hadamard that are be applied at each step. But it seems difficult to analyse
how these protocols compose. It is not clear what kind of information can be obtained from
a measurement that acts on the big protocol.
4.1.5 Quantum hiding fingerprints
In this section, we show that the locking scheme of Corollary 4.1.5 can be used to build
mixed state quantum hiding fingerprints as defined by Gavinsky and Ito [2010]. A quantum
fingerprint encodes an n-bit string into a quantum state ρx of n′  n qubits such that given
y ∈ {0, 1}n and the fingerprint ρx, it is possible to decide with small error probability
whether x = y [Buhrman et al., 2001]. The additional hiding property ensures that
measuring ρx leaks very little information about x. Gavinsky and Ito [2010] used the
accessible information1 as a measure of the hiding property. Here, we strengthen this
definition by imposing a bound on the total variation distance instead (see Proposition 3.2.2).
Definition 4.1.11 (Quantum hiding fingerprint). Let n be a positive integer, δ,  ∈ (0, 1) and
C be a Hilbert space. An encoding f : {0, 1}n → S(C) together with a set of measurements
{My, id−My} for each y ∈ {0, 1}n is a (δ, )-hiding fingerprint if
1. (Fingerprint property) For all x ∈ {0, 1}n, tr [Mxf(x)] = 1 and for y 6= x,
tr [Myf(x)] ≤ δ.
2. (Hiding property) Let X be uniformly distributed on {0, 1}n. Then, for any POVM
{Ni} on the system C whose outcome on f(X) is denoted I , we have for all possible
outcomes i,
∆
(
pX|[I=i], pX
) ≤ .
1The accessible information aboutX in a quantum system C refers to the maximum over all measurements
of the system C of I(X; I) where I is the outcome of that measurement.
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We usually want the Hilbert space C to be composed of O(log n) qubits. Gavinsky and
Ito [2010] proved that for any constant c, there exist efficient quantum hiding fingerprinting
schemes for which the number of the qubits in system C is O(log n) and both the error
probability δ and the accessible information are bounded by 1/nc. Here, we prove that the
same result can be obtained by locking a classical fingerprint. The general structure of our
quantum hiding fingerprint for parameters n, δ and  is as follows:
1. Choose a random prime p ∈ Pn,,δ uniformly from the set Pn,,δ.
2. Set t = dc log(1/)−2e, dA = p and dB = dc′/2e and generate t random unitaries
Up1 , . . . , U
p
t acting on A⊗B.
3. The fingerprint consists of the random prime p and the state (Upk )
†|x mod p〉A|b〉B
where k ∈ [t] and b ∈ [dB] are chosen uniformly and independently. The density
operator representing this state is denoted f(x) def= 1
tdB
∑
k,b(U
p
k )
†|x mod p〉〈x mod
p|A ⊗ |b〉〈b|BUpk .
Observe that even though this protocol is randomized because the unitaries are chosen at
random, it is possible to implement it with resources polynomial in n as the size of the
message to be locked is O(log n) bits. In fact, one can approximately sample a random
unitary in dimension 2O(logn) using a polynomial number of public random bits. The mixed
state protocol of Gavinsky and Ito [2010] achieves roughly the same parameters. Their
construction is also randomized but it uses random codes instead of random unitaries. For
this reason, the protocol of Gavinsky and Ito [2010] would probably be more efficient in
practice.
Theorem 4.1.12. There exist constants c, c′ and c′′, such that for all positive integer n,
δ,  ∈ (0, 1/4) if we define Pn,δ, to be the set of primes in the interval [l, u] where
l =
(
c′′
δ
· log
2(1/)
8
)1/0.9
+ 10n and u = l + (2n/δ)2
and provided u ≤ 2n−2, the scheme described above is a (δ, )-hiding fingerprint with
probability 1− 2−Ω(n) over the choice of random unitaries.
The proof of this result involves two parts. First, we need to show that the fingerprint of
a uniformly distributed X ∈ {0, 1}n does not give away much information about X . This
follows easily from Theorem 3.3.2 and Theorem 4.1.4. We also need to show that for every
y ∈ {0, 1}n, there is a measurement that Bob can apply to the fingerprint to determine with
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high confidence whether it corresponds to a fingerprint of y or not. In order to prove this we
use Lemma 4.1.9 that gives a way of approximating a set of almost orthogonal vectors by a
set of orthogonal vectors.
Lemma 4.1.13. Let {U1, . . . , Ut} be a set of unitary transformations on AB that define γ-
MUBs and d
def
= dAdB. Define for y ∈ [dA] the subspace Fy = span{U †k |y〉|b〉, k ∈ [t], b ∈
[dB]}. Then for any x ∈ [dA], y 6= x, k0 ∈ [t] and b0 ∈ [dB],
tr
[
ΠFyU
†
k0
|x〉|b0〉
]
≤ 3(tdB)2d−γ.
where ΠF is the projector on the subspace F .
Proof Consider the set of vectors {U †k |y〉|b〉}k∈[t],b∈[dB ]. We have for all (k, b) 6= (k′, b′),
|〈y|〈b′|Uk′U †k |y〉|b〉| ≤ d−γ/2,
and as a result,
1
tdB
∑
(k,b)6=(k′,b′)
|〈y|〈b′|Uk′U †k |y〉|b〉|2 ≤ tdBd−γ.
Using Lemma 4.1.9, we obtain a set of orthonormal vectors {|ek,b(y)〉}k,b such that
1
tdB
∑
k,b
‖|ek,b(y)〉 − U †k |y〉|b〉‖22 ≤ tdBd−γ.
Note that {|ek,b(y)〉}k,b is an orthonormal basis for Fy so we can write ΠFy =∑
k,b |ek,b(y)〉〈ek,b(y)|. Now observe that, using the Cauchy Schwarz inequality and the
fact that the vectors have unit norm, we have |〈ek,b(y)|U †k0|x〉|b0〉| ≤ |〈y|〈b|UkU †k0|x〉|b0〉|+
‖|ek,b(y)〉 − U †k |y〉|b〉‖2. As a result, we have
tr
[
ΠFyU
†
k0
|x〉|b0〉
]
=
∑
k,b
|〈ek,b(y)|U †k0|x〉|b0〉|2
≤
∑
k,b
∣∣∣|〈y|〈b|UkU †k0|x〉|b0〉|+ ‖|ek,b(y)〉 − U †k |y〉|b〉‖2∣∣∣2
≤ tdBd−γ + (tdB)2d−γ +
∑
k,b
|〈y|〈b|UkU †k0|x〉|b0〉| · ‖|ek,b(y)〉 − U †k |y〉|b〉‖2
≤ 2(tdB)2d−γ + d−γ/2
√
tdB
√∑
k,b
‖|ek,b(y)〉 − U †k |y〉|b〉‖22
≤ 3(tdB)2d−γ.
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uunionsq
Proof [of Theorem 4.1.12] We start by proving the hiding property. For any fixed p,
the random variable Z def= X mod p is almost uniformly distributed on {0, . . . , p − 1}.
In fact, we have for any z ∈ {0, . . . , p − 1}, Pr {Z = z} ≤ 2n/p+1
2n
. In other words,
Hmin(Z) ≥ log p− log(1 + p2−n). Thus, using Theorem 3.3.2 and Theorem 4.1.4, we have
that except with probability exponentially small in n (on the choice of the random unitary),
the fingerprinting scheme satisfies for any measurement outcome i
∆
(
pZ|[I=i], pZ
) ≤ 21
1+p2−n − 
≤ 4
where I denotes the outcome of a measurement on the state f(X). Recall that we are
interested in the information leakage about X not Z. For this, we note that the random
variables X,Z, I form a Markov chain. Thus,
∆
(
pX|[I=i], pX
)
=
∑
x∈{0,1}n
∣∣∣∑
z
Pr {Z = z|I = i}Pr {X = x|I = i, Z = z}
−Pr {Z = z}Pr {X = x|Z = z}
∣∣∣
=
∑
x∈{0,1}n
∣∣∣∑
z
Pr {Z = z|I = i}Pr {X = x|Z = z}
−Pr {Z = z}Pr {X = x|Z = z}
∣∣∣
≤
∑
z
|Pr {Z = z|I = i} −Pr {Z = z}|
∑
x∈{0,1}n
Pr {X = x|Z = z}
= ∆
(
pZ|[I=i], pZ
) ≤ 4.
This proves the hiding property.
We now analyse the fingerprint property. Let x, y ∈ [2n] and p be the random prime
of the fingerprint. We define the measurements by My = ΠFy for all y ∈ {0, 1}n where
ΠFy is the projector onto the subspace Fy = span{Upk †|y mod p〉|b〉, k ∈ [t], b ∈ [dB]}. If
x = y, then f(x) is a mixture of states in span{Upk †|y mod p〉|b〉, k ∈ [t], b ∈ [dB]}. Thus
tr[Myf(x)] = 1.
We now suppose that x 6= y. First, we have for a random choice of prime p ∈ Pn,,δ,
Pr {x mod p = y mod p} = Pr {x− y mod p = 0} ≤ δ/2 as the number of distinct
prime divisors of x − y is at most n and the number of primes in [l, u] is at least 2n/δ
for n large enough. Then, whenever x mod p 6= y mod p, Lemma 4.1.13 with γ = 0.9
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gives
tr
[
ΠFyf(x)
] ≤ 3(tdB)2(dAdB)−0.9
≤ 3 · 4c2c′2 log
2(1/)
8
· δ
8
c′′ log2(1/)
≤ δ/2
for c′′ large enough with probability 1 − 2−Ω(dAdB) = 1 − 2−Ω(n) over the choice of the
random unitaries (using Theorem 3.3.2). Finally, we get tr
[
ΠFyf(x)
] ≤ δ with probability
1− 2−Ω(n). uunionsq
4.1.6 String commitment
In this section, we show how to use a locking scheme to obtain a weak form of
bit commitment [Buhrman et al., 2006]. Bit commitment is an important two-party
cryptographic primitive defined as follows. Consider two mutually distrustful parties Alice
and Bob who are only allowed to communicate over some channel. The objective is to be
able to achieve the following: Alice secretly chooses a bit x and communicates with Bob
to convince him that she fixed her choice, without revealing the actual bit x. This is the
commit stage. At the reveal stage, Alice reveals the secret x and enables Bob to open the
commitment. Bob can then check whether Alice was honest.
Using classical or quantum communication, unconditionally secure bit commitment
is known to be impossible [Lo and Chau, 1997, Mayers, 1997]. However, commitment
protocols with weaker security guarantees do exist [Buhrman et al., 2006, 2008, Damga˚rd
et al., 2005, Spekkens and Rudolph, 2001]. Here, we consider the string commitment
scenario studied in [Buhrman et al., 2008, Section III]. In a string commitment protocol,
Alice commits to an n-bit string. Alice’s ability to cheat is quantified by the number
of strings she can reveal successfully. The ability of Bob to cheat is quantified by the
information he can obtain about the string to be committed. One can formalize these notions
in many ways. We use a security criterion that is similar to the one of Buhrman et al. [2008]
except that we use the statistical distance between the outcome distribution and the uniform
distribution, instead of the accessible information. Our definition is slightly stronger by
virtue of Proposition 4.1.3. For a detailed study of string commitment in a more general
setting, see [Buhrman et al., 2008].
Definition 4.1.14. An (n, α, β)-quantum bit string commitment is a quantum communica-
tion protocol between Alice (the committer) and Bob (the receiver) which has two phases.
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When both players are honest the protocol takes the following form.
• (Commit phase) Alice chooses a string X ∈ {0, 1}n uniformly. Alice and Bob
communicate, after which Bob holds a state ρX .
• (Reveal phase) Alice and Bob communicate and Bob learns X .
The parameters α and β are security parameters.
• If Alice is honest, then for any measurement performed by Bob on her state ρX , we
have ∆
(
pX , pX|[I=i]
) ≤ β
n
where I is the outcome of the measurement.
• If Bob is honest, then for all commitments of Alice: ∑x∈{0,1}n px ≤ 2α, where px is
the probability that Alice successfully reveals x.
Following the strategy of Buhrman et al. [2008], the following protocol for string
commitment can be defined using a locking scheme E .
• Commit phase: Alice has the stringX ∈ {0, 1}n and chooses a keyK ∈ [t] uniformly
at random. She sends the state E(X,K) to Bob.
• Reveal phase: Alice announces both the string X and the key K. Using the key, Bob
decodes some value X ′. He accepts if X = X ′.
A protocol is said to be efficient if both the communication (in terms of the number of qubits
exchanged) is polynomial in n and the computations performed by Alice and Bob can be
done in polynomial time on a quantum computer. The protocol presented in Buhrman et al.
[2008] is not efficient in terms of computation and is efficient in terms of communication
only if the cost of communicating a (random) unitary in dimension 2n is disregarded. Using
the efficient locking scheme of Corollary 4.1.7, we get
Corollary 4.1.15. Let n be a positive integer and β ∈ (n2−cn, n) (c is a constant
independent of n). There exists an efficient (n, c log(n2/β), β)-quantum bit string
commitment protocol for some constant c independent of n and β.
Proof We use the first construction of Corollary 4.1.7 with  = β/n. If Bob is honest,
the security analysis is exactly the same as in Buhrman et al. [2008]. If Alice is honest, the
security follows directly from the definition of the locking scheme. uunionsq
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4.1.7 Locking entanglement of formation
The entanglement of formation is a measure of the entanglement in a bipartite quantum state
that attempts to quantify the number of singlets required to produce the state in question
using only local operations and classical communication [Bennett et al., 1996]. For a
bipartite state ρXY , the entanglement of formation is defined as
Ef (X;Y )ρ = min{pi,|ψi〉}
∑
i
piH(X)ψi . (4.13)
where the minimization is taken over all possible ways to write ρXY =
∑
i pi|ψi〉〈ψi| with∑
i pi = 1. Entanglement of formation is related to the following quantity:
I←(X;Y ′)ρ = max{Mi}
I(X; I)
where the maximization is taken over all measurements {Mi} performed on the system
Y ′ and I is the outcome of this measurement. This quantity is sometimes referred to as
a classical correlations between X and Y [Henderson and Vedral, 2001]. As mentioned
previously, when the system X is classical, this correlation measure is called accessible
information. Koashi and Winter [2004] showed that for a pure state |ρ〉XY Y ′ , a simple
identity holds:
Ef (X;Y )ρ + I
←(X;Y ′)ρ = H(X)ρ. (4.14)
Let {U1, . . . , Ut} be a set of unitary transformations of A⊗B ' C and define
|ρ〉ABCA′K = 1√
tdAdB
∑
k∈[t],a∈[dA],b∈[dB ]
|a〉A|b〉B
(
U †k |a〉 ⊗ |b〉
)C
|a〉A′|k〉K .
If {U1, . . . , Ut} satisfies an -metric uncertainty relation, then we get a locking effect using
Theorem 4.1.4 and Proposition 4.1.3. In fact, we have I←(A;C)ρ ≤ 8 log dA + 2h2(2)
and I←(A;CK) = log dA. Thus, using (4.14), we get
Ef (A;A
′BK)ρ = H(A)ρ − I←(A;C)ρ ≥ (1− 8) log dA − 2h2(2)
and discarding the system K of dimension t we obtain a separable state
Ef (A;A
′B)ρ = 0.
Explicit states exhibiting weak locking behaviour of the entanglement of formation have
been presented in Horodecki et al. [2005a]. Strong but non-explicit instances of locking
the entanglement of formation were derived in Hayden et al. [2006]. Here, using Theorem
3.4.6, we obtain explicit examples of strong locking behaviour.
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One could also consider other quantities related to classical correlations, such as the
popular quantum discord [Ollivier and Zurek, 2001], and they would exhibit a similar
locking behaviour.
4.2 Quantum identification codes
Consider the following quantum analogue of the equality testing communication problem.
Alice is given an n-qubit state |ψ〉 ∈ C and Bob is given |ϕ〉 ∈ C. Namely, Bob wants to
output 1 with probability in the interval [|〈ψ|ϕ〉|2 − , |〈ψ|ϕ〉|2 + ] and 0 with probability
in the interval [1 − |〈ψ|ϕ〉|2 − , 1 − |〈ψ|ϕ〉|2 + ]. This task is referred to as quantum
identification [Winter, 2004]. Note that communication only goes from Alice to Bob. There
are many possible variations to this problem. One of the interesting models is when Alice
receives the quantum state |ψ〉 and Bob gets a classical description of |ϕ〉. An -quantum-
ID code is defined by an encoder, which is a quantum operation that maps Alice’s quantum
state |ψ〉 to another quantum state which is transmitted to Bob, and a family of decoding
POVMs {Dϕ, id−Dϕ} for all |ϕ〉 that Bob performs on the state he receives from Alice.
Definition 4.2.1 (Quantum identification [Winter, 2004]). Let H1,H2, C be Hilbert spaces
and  ∈ (0, 1). An -quantum-ID code for the space C using the channel N : S(H1) →
S(H2) consists of an encoding map E : S(C)→ S(H1) and a set of POVMs {Dϕ, id−Dϕ}
acting on S(H2), one for each pure state |ϕ〉 such that
∀|ψ〉, |ϕ〉 ∈ C,
∣∣∣ tr [DϕN (E(ψ))]− |〈ϕ|ψ〉|2∣∣∣ ≤ .
Here we consider channels N transmitting noiseless qubits and noiseless classical bits.
We also say that -quantum identification of n-qubit states can be performed using ` bits
and m qubits when there exists an -quantum-ID code for the space C = (C2)⊗n using the
channel N = id⊗`2 ⊗ id⊗m2 , where id2 and id2 are the noiseless bit and qubit channels.
Hayden and Winter [2012] showed that classical communication alone cannot be used
for quantum identification. However, a small amount of quantum communication makes
classical communication useful. Using our metric uncertainty relations, we prove better
bounds on the number of qubits of communication and give an efficient encoder for this
problem.
Our protocol is based on a duality between quantum identification and approximate
forgetfulness of a quantum channel demonstrated in [Hayden and Winter, 2012, Theorem 7].
Specialized to our setting, the direction of the duality we use states that if V : C → A⊗ B
defines a low-distortion embedding of (C, `2) into (AB, `A1 (`
B
2 )), then the maps Γa : C → B
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for a ∈ [dA] defined by |ψ〉 7→
∑
b∈dB(〈a|〈b|V |ψ〉)|b〉 approximately preserve inner
products on average. The following lemma gives a precise statement. We give an elementary
proof in the interest of making the presentation self-contained.
Lemma 4.2.2. Let V : C → A⊗B be an isometry, i.e., for all |ψ〉 ∈ C, ‖V |ψ〉‖2 = ‖|ψ〉‖2.
For any vector |ψ〉 ∈ C, we define the vectors |ψa〉 ∈ B by V |ψ〉 =
∑
a∈[dA] |a〉|ψa〉. Assume
that V satisfies the following property:
∀|ψ〉 ∈ C
∑
a∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣‖|ψa〉‖22 − ‖|ψ〉‖22dA
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ‖|ψ〉‖22. (4.15)
Then we have for all unit vectors |ψ〉, |ϕ〉 ∈ C with V |ψ〉 = ∑a∈[dA] |a〉|ψa〉 and
V |ϕ〉 = ∑a∈[dA] |a〉|ϕa〉
1
dA
∑
a∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣ |〈ψa|ϕa〉|2‖|ψa〉‖2‖|ϕa〉‖2 − |〈ψ|ϕ〉|2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 12+ 2√. (4.16)
Proof Let |ψ〉 and |ϕ〉 be unit vectors in C. We use the triangle inequality to get
1
dA
∑
a∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣ |〈ψa|ϕa〉|2‖|ψa〉‖2‖|ϕa〉‖2 − |〈ψ|ϕ〉|2
∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
a∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣ |〈ψ|ϕ〉|2dA − |〈ψa|ϕa〉|2
∣∣∣∣+ ∑
a∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣|〈ψa|ϕa〉|2 − |〈ψa|ϕa〉|2dA‖|ψa〉‖2‖|ϕa〉‖2
∣∣∣∣ . (4.17)
We start by dealing with the first term in (4.17). Observe that∣∣∣∣|〈ψa|ϕa〉|2 − |〈ψ|ϕ〉|2dA
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣(Re〈ψa|ϕa〉)2 − (Re〈ψ|ϕ〉)2dA
∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣(Im〈ψa|ϕa〉)2 − (Im〈ψ|ϕ〉)2dA
∣∣∣∣
≤ 2
∣∣∣∣Re〈ψa|ϕa〉 − Re〈ψ|ϕ〉dA
∣∣∣∣+ 2 ∣∣∣∣Im〈ψa|ϕa〉 − Im〈ψ|ϕ〉dA
∣∣∣∣ .
(4.18)
In the last inequality, we used the fact that |x2 − y2| ≤ 2|x − y| whenever |x + y| ≤ 2.
To bound these terms, we apply the assumption about V (equation (4.15)) to the vector
|ψ〉 − |ϕ〉: ∑
a∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣‖|ψa〉 − |ϕa〉‖22 − ‖|ψ〉 − |ϕ〉‖22dA
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ‖|ψ〉 − |ϕ〉‖22 ≤ 4.
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By expanding ‖|ψa〉 − |ϕa〉‖22 and ‖|ψ〉 − |ϕ〉‖22, we obtain using the triangle inequality∑
a∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣2Re〈ψa|ϕa〉 − 2Re〈ψ|ϕ〉dA
∣∣∣∣
≤ 4+
∑
a∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣‖|ψa〉‖22 − ‖|ψ〉‖22dA
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣‖|ϕa〉‖22 − ‖|ϕ〉‖22dA
∣∣∣∣
≤ 6.
In the last inequality, we used equation (4.15) for |ψ〉 and |ϕ〉. The same argument can be
applied to i|ψ〉 and |ϕ〉 to get
2
∑
a∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣Im〈ψa|ϕa〉 − Im〈ψ|ϕ〉dA
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 6
Thus, substituting in equation (4.18) we obtain∣∣∣∣|〈ψa|ϕa〉|2 − |〈ψ|ϕ〉|2dA
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 12.
We now consider the second term in (4.17). We have, using the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality,∑
a∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣|〈ψa|ϕa〉|2 − |〈ψa|ϕa〉|2dA‖|ψa〉‖2‖|ϕa〉‖2
∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
a∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣‖|ψa〉‖2‖|ϕa〉‖2 − 1dA
∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
a∈[dA]
‖|ψa〉‖2
∣∣∣∣‖|ϕa〉‖2 − 1√dA
∣∣∣∣+ ∑
a∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣‖|ψa〉‖2√dA − 1dA
∣∣∣∣
≤
√∑
a∈[dA]
‖|ψa〉‖22
√√√√∑
a∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣‖|ϕa〉‖2 − 1√dA
∣∣∣∣2 +
√√√√∑
a∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣‖|ψa〉‖2 − 1√dA
∣∣∣∣2
≤
√√√√∑
a∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣‖|ϕa〉‖22 − 1dA
∣∣∣∣+
√√√√∑
a∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣‖|ψa〉‖22 − 1dA
∣∣∣∣
≤ 2√.
For the third inequality, we used once again the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and for the
fourth inequality, we used the fact that
∑
a∈[dA] ‖|ψa〉‖22 = ‖V |ψ〉‖22 = 1 and the inequality
|x − y|2 ≤ |x − y||x + y| = |x2 − y2| for all nonnegative x, y. Plugging this bound into
equation (4.17), we obtain the desired result. uunionsq
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|ψ〉
1√
t
∑
k |k〉
Uk
Classical description of |ϕ〉
Dk,aϕ
B
A
K
k, a
Outcome
Figure 4.2: Quantum identification based on a metric uncertainty relation. The system K
is prepared in a uniform superposition state 1√
t
∑
k |k〉. Then, controlled by system K, the
unitary Uk is applied to C = A ⊗ B, where the unitary transformations {Uk} satisfy a
metric uncertainty relation. The KA system is then measured in its computational basis.
The outcome k, a of this measurement is sent through the classical channel. The system B
is sent using the noiseless quantum channel. The receiver constructs a POVMDk,aϕ based on
a classical description of the state |ϕ〉 he wishes to test for and the classical communication
k, a he receives.
Theorem 4.2.3 (Quantum identification using classical communication). Let n be a positive
integer and  ∈ (2−c′n, 1) where c′ is a constant independent of n. Then for some
m = O(log(1/)), -quantum identification of n-qubit states can be performed using a
single message of n bits and m qubits.
Moreover, for somem = O(log(n/) · log(n)), -quantum identification of n-qubit states
can be performed using a single message of n bits and m qubits with an encoding quantum
circuit of polynomial size.
Proof Let {U1, . . . , Ut} be a set of unitaries on n qubits verifying an ′- metric uncertainty
relation with ′ = 1/2 · (/28)2. We start by preparing the uniform superposition
1√
t
∑t
k=1 |k〉K and apply the unitary Uk on system C controlled by the register K. We get
the state 1√
t
∑
k |k〉K(Uk|ψ〉)AB =
∑
k,a |k〉K |a〉A|ψk,a〉B for some non-normalized vectors
|ψk,a〉 ∈ B. Alice then measures the system KA in the computational basis obtaining an
outcome k, a and sends k, a and |ψˆk,a〉 to Bob, where |ψˆk,a〉 = |ψk,a〉/‖|ψk,a〉‖2. Observe
that
∑
k,a ‖|ψk,a〉‖22 = 1 and ‖|ψk,a〉‖22 = 1t · pAUk|ψ〉(a) so that the metric uncertainty relation
property can be written as
1
2
∑
k,a
∣∣∣∣‖|ψk,a〉‖22 − 1tdA
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ′. (4.19)
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This shows that the isometry |ψ〉 7→ 1√
t
∑
k |k〉K(Uk|ψ〉)AB satisfies the condition (4.15) of
Lemma 4.2.2.
The decoding POVMs for received classical information k, a and state |ϕ〉 are defined
by Dk,aϕ = |ϕˆk,a〉〈ϕˆk,a| where 1√t
∑
k |k〉K(Uk|ϕ〉)AB =
∑
k,a |k〉K |a〉A|ϕk,a〉B and |ϕˆk,a〉 =
|ϕk,a〉/‖ϕk,a‖2. The protocol is illustrated in Figure 4.2.
We now analyse the probability that Bob outputs 1. Recall that outcome 1 corresponds
to the projector |ϕ〉〈ϕ|. The probability that the protocol in Figure 4.2 outputs 1 is∑
k,a
‖|ψk,a〉‖22 · tr
[
Dk,aϕ |ψˆk,a〉〈ψˆk,a|
]
=
∑
k,a
‖|ψk,a〉‖22|〈ψˆk,a|ϕˆk,a〉|2.
Applying Lemma 4.2.2, we have
1
tdA
∑
k,a
∣∣∣|〈ψˆk,a|ϕˆk,a〉|2 − |〈ψ|ϕ〉|2∣∣∣ ≤ 14√2′ = /2. (4.20)
Using the triangle inequality, equations (4.20) and (4.19), we obtain∑
k,a
‖|ψk,a〉‖22
∣∣∣|〈ψˆk,a|ϕˆk,a〉|2 − |〈ψ|ϕ〉|2∣∣∣
≤
∑
k,a
1
tdA
∣∣∣|〈ψˆk,a|ϕˆk,a〉|2 − |〈ψ|ϕ〉|2∣∣∣+∑
k,a
∣∣∣∣‖|ψk,a〉‖22 − 1tdA
∣∣∣∣ · 2
≤ /2 + 4′ ≤ .
Thus, the probability of obtaining outcome 1 is in the interval [|〈ψ|ϕ〉|2 − , |〈ψ|ϕ〉|2 + ].
We conclude by using the metric uncertainty relations of Theorems 3.3.2 and 3.4.7. For
the explicit construction, we still need to argue that the encoding can be computed by a
quantum circuit of size O(n2 polylog(n/)) and depth O(n polylog(n/)) using classical
precomputations. To obtain this running time, we actually use the 1-MUBs of Lemma
3.4.1 in the construction of Theorem 3.4.7. The only thing we need to precompute is an
irreducible polynomial of degree n over F2[X]. Then, using the same argument as in the
proof of Lemma 3.4.1, we can compute the unitary operation that takes as input the state
|j〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 and outputs the state |j〉 ⊗ Vj|ψ〉 using a circuit of size O(n2 polylog n) and depth
O(n polylog n). Since the permutation extractor we use can be implemented by a quantum
circuit of sizeO(n polylog(n/)), the unitary transformation |k〉⊗|ψ〉 7→ |k〉⊗Uk|ψ〉 can be
computed by a quantum circuit of size O(n2 polylog(n/)) and depth O(n polylog(n/)).
uunionsq
This result can be thought of as an analogue of the well-known fact that the public-coin
randomized communication complexity of equality is O(log(1/)) for an error probability 
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[Kushilevitz and Nisan, 1997]. Quantum communication replaces classical communication
and classical communication replaces public random bits. Classical communication can be
thought of as an extra resource because on its own it is useless for quantum identification
[Hayden and Winter, 2012, Theorem 11].
Chapter 5
Uncertainty relations in the presence of
quantum side information
Outline of the chapter. In the previous chapters, it was assumed that the adversary trying
to predict the outcome of the measurement is not entangled with the quantum system being
measured. In Section 5.1, we explain what it means for an uncertainty relation to hold
when the adversary has quantum side information. After that, in Section 5.2, we introduce
metric uncertainty relations with quantum side information that we call QC-extractors. We
also give several efficient constructions of QC-extractors. We finally show how using such
uncertainty relations, we can relate the security of two-party computations to the quantum
capacity of the quantum storage of the adversary (Section 5.4).
5.1 Introduction
Let us consider uncertainty relations in the form of a game, called the uncertainty game by
Berta et al. [2010]. Bob prepares a system called A and sends it to Alice. Alice chooses
a projective measurement i at random from a set of possible measurements to perform on
system A. She obtains an outcome that we denote X . She then sends i to Bob whose goal
is to predict X . In Chapter 3, we saw several constructions of measurements for which
Bob has a lot of uncertainty about X . But in a fully quantum world, Bob might keep a
quantum system E that is entangled with A that could help him in predicting X . As an
example, imagine that Bob prepares the maximally entangled state |Φ〉 = 1√
dA
∑
j |j〉A|j〉E .
Assume the measurements that Alice performs on A are obtained by first applying a unitary
transformation Ui on A followed by a measurement in the computational basis. It is simple
to see that if Bob, upon receiving the index i, applies U∗i on his system E and performs a
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measurement in the computational basis will get the exact same outcome as Alice. Thus,
if Alice and Bob share a maximally entangled state, then Bob can perfectly predict the
outcome that Alice obtains: there is no uncertainty at all. This makes it clear that the amount
of uncertainty depends on the information available for the adversary Bob. In the previous
two chapters, we considered the case where Bob prepares a quantum state and sends it
completely to Alice, i.e., the E system is not present. In this chapter, we will construct
uncertainty relations that hold even when Bob holds a quantum system.
As was discussed above, when the systems A and E are maximally entangled, all the
measurement outcomes can be predicted perfectly. Thus, any uncertainty relation should
take into account the amount of entanglement between A and the adversary E. After being
conjectured by Renes and Boileau [2009], it was proven by Berta et al. [2010] that for any
state ρ on AB, the following inequality holds:
1
2
(H(X|E)ρ1 +H(X|E)ρ2) ≥ log(1/c) + 1
2
H(A|E)ρ (5.1)
where ρiXE = MA→X(UiρAEU †i ) for i ∈ {1, 2} is the state obtained when measuring the
system A of the state UiρAEU
†
i in the computational basis and c is the maximum overlap
between the vectors defined by U1 and U2, c = maxa,a′ |〈a|U1U †2 |a′〉|. MA→X refers to
the measurement in the computational basis map: MA→X(σ) =
∑
a〈a|σ|a〉|a〉〈a|. Note
that the reason we renamed the system X after the measurement is simply to emphasize
that it is a classical system. If the state ρAE is a pure state on A, we have H(A|E) = 0
and recover the uncertainty relation of Maassen and Uffink [1988] in (3.1). In the case
where ρAE is maximally entangled, then H(A|E) = − log dA, and c cannot be smaller
than 1/
√
dA.1 This implies that the lower bound in (5.1) is nonpositive, which as discussed
earlier is unavoidable. For cryptographic applications, the most interesting case is usually
when ρAE is entangled but not maximally so, i.e., − log dA < H(A|E) < 0.
We should mention that quantum side information is usually much harder to handle
than classical side information. This is due to the fact that it is not clear how to describe
a conditional state. Consider the example of the study of randomness extractors. It is
not hard to prove that an extractor can handle any classical adversary as long as it can
handle a classical adversary holding a trivial system;2 see e.g., [Ko¨nig and Terhal, 2008,
Proposition 1]. The situation is quite different for quantum adversaries. In fact, Gavinsky
et al. [2007] gave an example of an extractor that completely fails when quantum side
1To see this, just write one of the vector of basis 1 in basis 2: one of the squared coefficients has to be at
least as large as the average of 1/dA.
2Provided the conditional entropy is the same of course.
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information is available. This is not to say that quantum adversaries can break any extractor,
but that quantum side information can behave in unexpected ways. We now know of
many constructions of extractors that do work even when the adversary holds a quantum
memory [De et al., 2009, Ko¨nig and Terhal, 2008, Renner and Ko¨nig, 2005, Ta-Shma, 2009,
Tomamichel et al., 2011].
As was mentioned in Chapter 3, if we want a larger average measurement entropy,
we need to consider more measurements. Unfortunately, up to this day, we only
know of uncertainty relations that hold in the presence of quantum memory for two
measurements [Berta et al., 2010, Christandl and Winter, 2005, Coles et al., 2011a,b,
2012, Renes and Boileau, 2009, Tomamichel and Renner, 2011]. For two measurements,
the incompatibility is directly related to a simple function of the pairwise inner products
between vectors in the two bases. For more measurements, controlling the pairwise inner
products between the different bases elements is not sufficient to guarantee a good lower
bound on the uncertainty [Ballester and Wehner, 2007]. In this chapter, we will give several
constructions of strong uncertainty relations for many measurements.
Our strategy will be to follow the idea introduced in Chapter 3 of quantifying the
uncertainty in a set of measurement outcomes by the distance to the uniform distribution. In
order to account for the possible side information that the adversary E has, we also require
the output to be independent of the adversary. More precisely, the condition for a set of
unitaries U1, . . . , Ut will be of the form
1
t
t∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥TA→A1(UiρAEU †i )− idA1dA1 ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤  , (5.2)
where the map T performs a measurement in the computational basis and then discards the
subsystem A2 while keeping A1:
T (.)A→A1 =
∑
a1a2
〈a1a2|(.)|a1a2〉|a1〉〈a1| , (5.3)
where {|a1〉}, {|a2〉} are the computational bases of A1, A2 respectively. Here, A1 plays
the role of the hard to predict outcome called X in the earlier discussion. Equation (5.2) is
analogous to Definition 3.2.1, except that we also require that the outcome A1 be decoupled
from the adversary E. Motivated by the similarity between equation (5.2) and randomness
extractors (already introduced in Definition 3.4.4), we call such a set of unitaries a QC-
extractor. More details on randomness extractors and related constructions are given in
Section 5.2, where we also give constructions of QC-extractors. We will show in Section
5.3 that if U1, . . . , Ut satisfy (5.2), they also satisfy an entropic uncertainty relation, as was
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done in Chapter 3. Section 5.4 is devoted to cryptographic applications of these uncertainty
relations.
5.2 Quantum to Classical randomness extractors (QC-
extractors)
Randomness extractors3 were introduced by Nisan and Zuckerman [1996] in the context
of derandomization. An extractor is a function that transforms a weak source of
randomness into almost uniform random bits. The initial motivating applications were
related to complexity theory, e.g., derandomization of space-bounded computations [Nisan
and Zuckerman, 1996], simulating randomized algorithms with a weak random source
[Zuckerman, 1996b] or also as a tool for proving hardness of approximation [Zuckerman,
1996a]. The definition of randomness extractors was actually predated by the similar idea
of privacy amplification introduced in a cryptographic context, more precisely for quantum
key distribution [Bennett et al., 1988, 1995]. There, the setting is as follows. Suppose
Alice and Bob share a bitstring X about which Eve might have some information E. They
want to extract a secret key about which Eve has almost no information. Here X viewed
from the point of view of E is a weak source of randomness from which we want to distill
almost perfect random bits. It is particularly clear in this picture that an extractor should
work subject only to the assumption that the source contains some randomness, and not
make any assumption on where this randomness is. The reason is that depending on her
attack, Eve can obtain information about different parts of X . In Chapters 3 and 4, we saw
yet other applications of randomness extractors to uncertainty relations and low-distortion
norm embeddings. For more background on extractors, their constructions and applications,
see the surveys [Shaltiel, 2002, Vadhan, 2007].
Classical sources of randomness are described by probability distributions and the
randomness extractors are families of (deterministic) functions taking each possible value
of the source to a binary string. To understand the definition of quantum extractors, it is
convenient to see a classical extractor as a family of permutations acting on the possible
values of the source. This family of permutations should satisfy the following property: for
any probability distribution on input bit strings with high min-entropy, applying a typical
permutation from the family to the input induces an almost uniform probability distribution
on a prefix of the output; see 3.4.4 for a definition. We define a quantum to quantum
3Throughout this thesis, we will only deal with what are known as seeded extractors. For an overview of
the different kinds of extractors for different kinds of sources, see [Shaltiel, 2002].
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extractor in a similar way by allowing the operations performed to be general unitary
transformations and the input to the extractor to be quantum.
Definition 5.2.1 (QQ-Extractors). Let A = A1A2 with n = log dA.
For k ∈ [−n, n] and  ∈ [0, 1], a (k, )-QQ-extractor is a set {U1, . . . , Ut} of unitary
transformations on A such that for all states ρAE ∈ S(AE) satisfying Hmin(A|E)ρ ≥ k, we
have
1
t
t∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥trA2 [UiρAEU †i ]− idA1dA1 ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤  . (5.4)
log t is called the seed size of the QQ-extractor.
Before making a few remarks on the definition, we recall the definition of CC-extractors
which are simply randomness extractors that work in the presence of a quantum adversary.
Definition 5.2.2 (CC-Extractors). For k ∈ [0, n] and  ∈ [0, 1], a (k, )-CC-extractor is a
set {f1, . . . , ft} of functions from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}m such that for all states ρXE ∈ S(XE)
satisfying Hmin(X|E)ρ ≥ k, we have
1
t
t∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥ρfi(X)E − idZdZ ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤  , (5.5)
where the system fi(X) is obtained by applying the function fi to the system X .
First, we should stress that the same set of unitaries should satisfy (5.4) for all states
ρAE that meet the conditional min-entropy criterion Hmin(A|E)ρ ≥ k. In particular, the
system E can have arbitrarily large dimension. The quantity Hmin(A|E)ρ measures the
uncertainty that an adversary has about the system A. As it is usually impossible to model
the knowledge of an adversary, a bound on the conditional min-entropy is often all one can
get. A notable difference with the classical setting is that the conditional min-entropy k can
be negative when the systems A and E are entangled.
A statement of the form of equation (5.4) is more commonly known as a decoupling
result [Abeyesinghe et al., 2009, Dupuis, 2010, Dupuis et al., 2010a, Hayden et al., 2008,
Horodecki et al., 2005b, 2006]. Such statements play an important role in quantum
information theory and many coding theorems amount to proving a decoupling theorem.
In fact, it was shown that a set of unitaries forming a unitary 2-design (see Definition 5.2.4)
define a (k, )-QQ-extractor as long as the output size log dA1 ≤ (n+ k)/2− log(1/). The
decoupling theorem of Dupuis [2010], Dupuis et al. [2010a] is actually more general than
this: it holds even if we replace trA2 by any completely positive trace preserving map T . Of
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course, then the value of  depends on an entropic quantity that is a function of the map T
in addition to the term Hmin(A|E)ρ, which was already present for QQ-extractors.
A definition of quantum extractors was also proposed in [Ben-Aroya et al., 2010,
Definition 5.1]. A set of unitaries {U1, . . . , Ut} acting on A is a (k, )-quantum extractor
if for all ρ ∈ S(A) with Hmin(A)ρ ≥ k, we have∥∥∥∥∥1t
t∑
i=1
UiρU
†
i −
idA
dA
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ . (5.6)
First we note that in their definition, the extractor outputs the whole system (nothing is
discarded). This is only possible because they measure the distance between the randomized
state 1
t
∑
i UiρU
†
i and the maximally mixed state (this condition refers to weak extractors),
whereas in our definition we ask for the average of the trace distances to be small (strong
extractors). It is easy to see that by the triangle inequality, a strong extractor is also a weak
extractor. For strong extractors, the seed can be made public, i.e., even conditioned on the
value of the random seed, the outcome is close to random. This is not the case for weak
extractors. In cryptography, weak extractors are usually not good enough because the seed
i is made public during the protocol (see for example Section 5.4). Our definition is also
stronger in another respect, we require the extractor to decouple the A system from any
quantum side information held in the system E.
Ben-Aroya et al. [2010] introduced their definition in the context of studying quantum
expanders. In fact, they obtain extractors for high min-entropy sources using their
construction of quantum expanders4 as well as the construction of Ambainis and Smith
[2004]; see also [Desrosiers and Dupuis, 2010, Theorem 3] where the construction based
on Ambainis and Smith [2004] is studied the language of approximately randomizing maps
[Hayden et al., 2004]. Ben-Aroya et al. [2010] applied their extractor construction to prove
that the quantum entropy difference problem is in the complexity class QSZK; see the paper
for more details.
In the context of cryptography, a QQ-extractor is often more than one needs. In fact, it is
usually sufficient to extract random classical bits, which is in general easier to obtain than
random qubits. This motivates the following definition, which differs from a QQ-extractor
in that the output system A1 is measured in the computational basis. In particular, any
(k, )-QQ-extractor is also a (k, )-QC-extractor.
Definition 5.2.3 (QC-Extractors). Let A = A1A2 with n = log dA, and let TA→A1 be the
measurement map defined in equation (5.3).
4In general, an expander can always be used to construct an extractor for very high entropy sources.
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For k ∈ [−n, n] and  ∈ [0, 1], a (k, )-QC-extractor is a set {U1, . . . , Ut} of unitary
transformations on A such that for all states ρAE ∈ S(AE) satisfying Hmin(A|E) ≥ k, we
have
1
t
t∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥TA→A1(UiρAEU †i )− idA1dA1 ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤  . (5.7)
log t is called the seed size of the QC-extractor.
Observe that Definition 5.2.3 only allows a specific form of measurements obtained by
applying a unitary transformation followed by a measurement in the computational basis of
A1. The reason we restrict the measurements to be of this form is that we want the output
of the extractor to be perfectly determined by the source and the choice of the seed. In the
classical setting, an extractor is a family of deterministic functions of the source and the
seed. In the quantum setting, a natural way of translating this requirement is by imposing
that an adversary holding a system that is maximally entangled with the source can perfectly
predict the output. This condition is satisfied by the form of measurements dictated by
Definition 5.2.3. Allowing generalized measurements (POVMs) already (implicitly) allows
the use of randomness for free. Note also, that in the case where the system E is trivial, a
(0, )-QC-extractor is the same as an /2-metric uncertainty relation (Definition 3.2.1).
Our definition of QC-extractors has some connections with some recent work on device
independent randomness generation [Acı´n et al., 2012, Colbeck, 2006, Colbeck and Kent,
2011, Fehr et al., 2011, Pironio and Massar, 2011, Pironio et al., 2010, Vazirani and Vidick,
2011]. The objective of this line of work is to build protocols to generate bits that are
certified to be random. The setting is as follows. The system we consider has a special
structure: it is composed of two parts A and B that are spatially separated. Using a small
random seed, a pair of measurements is chosen to be performed on A and B obtaining
outcomes X and Y . Then, statistical tests are performed on X and Y to record a Bell
inequality violation. Such a violation is then evidence that the systems A and B are
entangled, which implies in particular that say Hmax(A|B) is significantly smaller than
log dA. But this means that if the adversary holds a purification of the system AB, we
have Hmin(A|E) = −Hmax(A|B)  − log dA. Thus, by applying a QC-extractor, one
can generate almost perfect random bits. The challenge in that context is to detect Bell
inequality violations with a small number of measurements.
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5.2.1 Examples and limitations of QC-extractors
Universal (or two-independent) hashing is probably one of the most important extractor
constructions, which even predates the general definition of extractors [Impagliazzo et al.,
1989]. Unitary 2-designs can be seen as a quantum generalization of two-independent hash
functions.
Definition 5.2.4. A set of unitaries {U1, . . . , Ut} acting on A is said to be a 2-design if for
all M ∈ L(A), we have
1
t
t∑
i=1
U⊗2i M(U
†
i )
⊗2 =
∫
U⊗2M(U †)⊗2dU (5.8)
where the integration is with respect to the Haar measure on the unitary group.
Many efficient constructions of unitary 2-designs are known [Dankert et al., 2009, Gross
et al., 2007], and in an n-qubit space, such unitaries can typically be computed by circuits
of size O(n2). However, observe that the number of unitaries of a 2-design is at least
t ≥ d4A−2d2A+2 [Gross et al., 2007]. The following is immediate using a general decoupling
result of Dupuis [2010], Dupuis et al. [2010a] (see Lemma A.3.2).
Corollary 5.2.5. Let A = A1A2 with n = log dA. For all k ∈ [−n, n] and all  > 0, a
unitary 2-design {U1, . . . , Ut} on A is a (k, )-QC-extractor with output size
log dA1 = min(n, n+ k − 2 log(1/)). (5.9)
Similar results also hold for almost unitary 2-designs; see [Szehr et al., 2011]. Using the
results of Harrow and Low [2009], this shows for instance that random quantum circuits of
size O(n2) are QC-extractors with basically the same parameters as in Corollary 5.2.5.
Proposition 5.2.7 below shows that the output size of these QC-extractors is basically
optimal. In fact, even if we are looking for a QC-extractor that works for a particular state
ρAE , the output size is at most n + H
√

min(A|E)ρ, where n denotes the size of the input. In
order to do that, we start by proving that when we measure a quantum system A, the min-
entropy increases by at most the logarithm of the dimension of the system being measured.
Lemma 5.2.6. Let ρAB ∈ S(AB),  ≥ 0, and {Px}dXx=1 be a projective rank-one
measurement on A. Then
Hmin(X|B)ρ ≤ Hmin(A|B)ρ + log dX .
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Proof Let VA→XX′ be an isometric purification of {Px} and ρXX′BB′ a purification
of ρXX′B = V ρABV †. By the invariance of the min-entropy under local
isometries [Tomamichel et al., 2010, Lemma 13] and the duality between the min- and
max-entropy (Lemma 2.2.3), the proposition becomes equivalent to
Hmax(XX
′|B′)ρ ≤ Hmax(X|X ′B′)ρ + log dX .
By the definition of the smooth max-entropy (equations (2.15)-(2.16)), there exists ρˆXX′B′ ∈
B(ρXX′B′) and σˆX′B′ ∈ S(X ′B′) such that
Hmax(X|X ′B′)ρ = logF (ρˆXX′B, idX ⊗ σˆX′B′)2 ,
as well as ρ¯XX′B′ ∈ B(ρXX′B′) and σ¯B ∈ S(B) such that
Hmax(XX
′|B′)ρ = logF (ρ¯XX′B, idXX′ ⊗ σ¯B′)2 .
Now observe that
Hmax(XX
′|B′)ρ ≤ log
(
dX · F (ρˆXX′B′ , idX ⊗ idX′
dX
⊗ σ¯B′)2
)
≤ max
σX′B′
logF (ρˆXX′B′ , idX ⊗ σX′B′)2 + log dX
= Hmax(X|X ′B′)ρ + log dX .
uunionsq
Proposition 5.2.7 (Upper bound on the output size). Let A = A1A2, ρAE ∈ S(AE),
{U1, . . . , Ut} a set of unitaries on A, and TA→A1 defined as in equation (5.3), such that
1
t
t∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥TA→A1 (UiρAEU †i )− idA1dA1 ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤  . (5.10)
Then,
log dA1 ≤ log dA +H
√

min(A|E)ρ .
Proof Consider the projective rank-one measurements {P ix} obtained by performing Ui
followed by a measurement in the computational basis of A. As a result, we can apply
Lemma 5.2.6 and obtain for all i ∈ {1, . . . , t}
H
√

min(A|E)ρ + log dA ≥ H
√

min(Xi|E)ρ ,
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where Xi denotes the outcome of the measurement {P ix}. But condition (5.10) implies that
there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , t} such that∥∥∥∥TA→A1 (UiρAEU †i )− idA1dA1 ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ .
In other words, idA1
dA1
⊗ρE ∈ B
√

(
TA→A1
(
UiρAEU
†
i
))
. By monotonicity of the min-entropy
for classical registers [Berta et al., 2011c, Lemma C.5], we have that
H
√

min(Xi|E)ρ ≥ H
√

min(A1|E)TA→A1(UiρAEU†i ) ≥ log dA1 ,
which proves the desired result. uunionsq
We now study the seed size property. We prove that choosing a reasonably small set of
unitaries at random defines a QC-extractor with high probability. The seed size in this case
is of the same order as the output size of the extractor. We expect that a much smaller seed
size would be sufficient. However, as will be proved in Proposition 5.2.10 below, different
methods would have to be used in order to prove that.
Theorem 5.2.8. Let A = A1A2 with n = log dA and TA→A1 be the measurement map
defined in equation (5.3). Let  > 0, c be a sufficiently large constant,
log dA1 ≤ n+ k − 4 log(1/)− c and log t ≥ log dA1 + log n+ 4 log(1/) + c .
Then, choosing t unitaries {U1, . . . , Ut} independently according to the Haar measure
defines a (k, )-QC-extractor with high probability. See (5.15) for a probability bound.
Proof The proof uses one-shot decoupling techniques [Dupuis, 2010, Dupuis et al., 2010a,
Szehr et al., 2011] combined with an operator Chernoff bound [Ahlswede and Winter, 2002]
(see Lemma A.3.5).
Let U be a unitary on A. We use the Ho¨lder-type inequality (see e.g., [Bhatia, 1997,
Corollary IV.2.6])
‖αβγ‖1 ≤ ‖|α|r‖1/r1 ‖|β|s‖1/s1 ‖|γ|r
′‖1/r′1
where 1/r+1/s+1/r′ = 1. We use it with r = r′ = 4, s = 2, and α = γ = (idA1⊗ρE)1/4,
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β = (idA1 ⊗ ρE)−1/4
(
T (UρAEU †)− idA1dA1 ⊗ ρE
)
(idA1 ⊗ ρE)−1/4 to get that5∥∥∥∥T (UρAEU †)− idA1dA1 ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ d1/4A1
√
tr
[
(idA1 ⊗ ρE)−1/4
(
T (UρAEU †)− idA1
dA1
⊗ ρE
)
(idA1 ⊗ ρE)−1/4
]2
d
1/4
A1
= d
1/2
A1
∥∥∥∥(idA1 ⊗ ρE)−1/4(T (UρAEU †)− idA1dA1 ⊗ ρE
)
(idA1 ⊗ ρE)−1/4
∥∥∥∥
2
= d
1/2
A1
∥∥∥∥T (Uρ˜AEU †)− idA1dA1 ⊗ ρ˜E
∥∥∥∥
2
,
where ρ˜AE = (idA ⊗ ρE)−1/4ρAE(idA ⊗ ρE)−1/4. Together with the concavity of the square
root function, this implies
1
t
t∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥T (UiρAEU †i )− idA1dA1 ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤
√√√√1
t
t∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥T (UiρAEU †i )− idA1dA1 ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥2
1
≤
√√√√dA1 1t
t∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥T (Uiρ˜AEU †i )− idA1dA1 ⊗ ρ˜E
∥∥∥∥2
2
=
√√√√dA1 1t
t∑
i=1
tr
[
T
(
Uiρ˜AEU
†
i
)
− idA1
dA1
⊗ ρ˜E
]2
. (5.11)
We continue with
1
t
t∑
i=1
tr
[
T
(
Uiρ˜AEU
†
i
)
− idA1
dA1
⊗ ρ˜E
]2
=
1
t
t∑
i=1
tr
[
T
(
Uiρ˜AEU
†
i
)]2
− 2 tr
[
T
(
Uiρ˜AEU
†
i
)( idA1
dA1
⊗ ρ˜E
)]
+ tr
[
idA1
dA1
⊗ ρ˜E
]2
(5.12)
and first compute the cross term
tr
[
T
(
Uiρ˜AEU
†
i
)( idA1
dA1
⊗ ρ˜E
)]
=
1
dA1
tr
[
trA1
[
T
(
Uiρ˜AEU
†
i
)
(idA1 ⊗ ρ˜E)
]]
=
1
dA1
tr
[
ρ˜2E
]
.
5The inverses are generalized inverses.
5.2. Quantum to Classical randomness extractors (QC-extractors) 88
Going back to equation (5.12), we obtain
1
t
t∑
i=1
tr
[
T
(
Uiρ˜AEU
†
i
)
− idA1
dA1
⊗ ρ˜E
]2
=
1
t
t∑
i=1
tr
[
T
(
Uiρ˜AEU
†
i
)]2
− 1
dA1
tr
[
ρ˜2E
]
.
(5.13)
Let FAA′ denote the swap operator FAA′ =
∑
aa′ |aa′〉〈a′a|. We now compute the first term
using the “swap trick” (Lemma A.3.4)
tr
[T (Uρ˜AEU †)]2
= tr
[∑
a1a2
〈a1a2|Uρ˜AEU †|a1a2〉|a1〉〈a1|
]2
= tr
 ∑
a1a2a′1a
′
2
〈a1a2a′1a′2|U⊗2ρ˜⊗2AE(U⊗2)†|a1a2a′1a′2〉|a1a′1〉〈a1a′1|
(
FA1A′1 ⊗ FEE′
)
=
∑
a1a2a′1a
′
2
tr
[
ρ˜⊗2AE(U
⊗2)†|a1a2a′1a′2〉〈a1a′1|
(
FA1A′1 ⊗ FEE′
) |a1a′1〉〈a1a2a′1a′2|U⊗2] .
In the last equality, we used the fact that |a1a′1〉 commutes with the scalar
〈a1a2a′1a′2|U⊗2ρ˜⊗2AE(U⊗2)†|a1a2a′1a′2〉 and the cyclicity of the trace. Taking the average over
the set {U1, . . . , Ut}, we get
1
t
t∑
i=1
tr
[
T
(
Uiρ˜AEU
†
i
)]2
=
∑
a1a2a′1a
′
2
tr
[
ρ˜⊗2AE
1
t
t∑
i=1
{(
U⊗2i
)† |a1a2a′1a′2〉〈a1a′1|FA1A′1|a1a′1〉〈a1a2a′1a′2|U⊗2i }⊗ FEE′
]
= tr
ρ˜⊗2AE 1t
t∑
i=1
(U †i )⊗2 ∑
a1a2a′2,a
′
1=a1
|a1a2a′1a′2〉〈a1a2a′1a′2|U⊗2i
⊗ FEE′
 . (5.14)
Using for example [Dupuis et al., 2010a, Lemma 3.4], if U is distributed according to the
Haar measure on the group of unitaries acting on A, then
EU
(U †)⊗2 ∑
a1a2a′2
|a1a2a1a′2〉〈a1a2a1a′2|U⊗2

=
(
dAdA2 − 1
d2A − 1
)
idAA′ +
dA − dA2
d2A − 1
FAA′ .
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We use the shorthand ΓAA′ for the expression above. Now we note that
dAdA2−1
d2A−1
≥ 1
2dA1
, and
apply the operator Chernoff bound (Lemma A.3.5) to get
Pr
1t
t∑
i=1
(U †i )
⊗2 ∑
a1a2a′2
|a1a2a1a′2〉〈a1a2a1a′2|U⊗2i ≤ (1 + η)Γ

≥ 1− dA exp
(
− tη
2
dA14 ln 2
)
. (5.15)
This shows that if t ≥ 2 · 4 ln 2 · dA1 log dA/η2, the unitaries U1, . . . , Ut satisfy the above
operator inequality with high probability. In the rest of the proof, we show that such unitaries
define QC-extractors. Putting these unitaries in equation (5.14), we get
1
t
t∑
i=1
tr
[
T
(
Uiρ˜AE (Ui)
†
)]2
≤ (1 + η)
(
dAdA2 − 1
d2A − 1
tr
[
ρ˜2E
]
+
dA − dA2
d2A − 1
tr
[
ρ˜2AE
])
.
Plugging this expression in equation (5.13) and then in equation (5.11), we get
1
t
t∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥T (UiρAE (Ui)†)− idA1dA1 ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤
√
(1 + η)
(
d2A − dA1
d2A − 1
)
tr [ρ˜2E] + (1 + η)
(
dA1dA − dA
d2A − 1
)
tr [ρ˜2AE]− tr [ρ˜2E]
≤
√
η + (1 + η)
dA1
dA + 1
tr [ρ˜2AE] ,
since tr [ρ˜2E] = tr
[
trA
[(
idA ⊗ ρ−1/4E
)
ρAE
(
idA ⊗ ρ−1/4E
)]2]
= tr [ρE] = 1. By the
definition of the conditional collision entropy (equation (2.17)) and Lemma 2.2.4, it follows
that,
1
t
t∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥T (UiρAE (Ui)†)− idA1dA1 ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤
√
η + (1 + η)
dA1
dA + 1
2−H2(A|E)ρ|ρ
≤
√
η + (1 + η)
dA1
dA + 1
2−Hmin(A|E)ρ|ρ . (5.16)
Now let ρ′AE ∈ Bδ+δ′(ρAE) be such that Hδ+δ
′
min (A|E)ρ|ρ = Hmin(A|E)ρ′|ρ′ . Since we have
‖ρ′AE − ρAE‖1 ≤ 2(δ + δ′) (by equation (2.7)), we know that by the triangle inequality and
the monotonicity of the trace distance,∣∣∣∣‖T (UρAEU †)− idA1dA1 ⊗ ρE‖1 − ‖T (Uρ′AEU †)− idA1dA1 ⊗ ρE‖1
∣∣∣∣
≤ ‖T (UρAEU †)− T (Uρ′AEU †)‖1
≤ ‖ρ′AE − ρAE‖1 ≤ 2(δ + δ′) ,
5.2. Quantum to Classical randomness extractors (QC-extractors) 90
and hence applying (5.16) to ρ′AB, we get
1
t
t∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥T (UiρAE (Ui)†)− idA1dA1 ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤
√
η + (1 + η)
dA1
dA + 1
2−H
δ+δ′
min (A|E)ρ|ρ + 2(δ + δ′) .
We then use Lemma 2.2.2 about the equivalence of the different conditional min-entropies
to get
1
t
t∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥T (UiρAE (Ui)†)− idA1dA1 ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤
√
η + (1 + η)
dA1
dA + 1
2−Hδmin(A|E)ρ+z + 2(δ + δ′) , (5.17)
with z = log(2/δ′2 + 1/(1 − δ)). Setting η = 2/4, δ = 0, δ′ = /4, and assuming
log dA1 ≤ n + k − 4 log(1/) − c with k = Hmin(A|E)ρ, we can upper bound equation
(5.17) for large enough c by
/2 +
√
2/4 + 2 · 2k−4 log(1/)−c−k+log(8/2+1)
≤ /2 +
√
2/4 + 2 · 21−c+4 ≤  .
uunionsq
The following simple argument shows that the number of unitaries of a QC-extractor has
to be at least 1/.
Proposition 5.2.9 (Lower bound on seed size). Let A = A1A2. Any (k, )-QC-extractor
with k ≤ log dA − 1 is composed of a set of unitaries on A of size at least t ≥ 1/.
Proof Let S ⊆ [dA1 ] be an arbitrary subset of dA1/2 basis elements of A1. Then consider
the state
ρA =
2
dA
·
∑
a1∈S,a2∈[dA2 ]
U †1 |a1a2〉〈a1a2|U1 .
Note that T (U1ρAU †1) = 2dA1
∑
a1∈S |a1〉〈a1| and thus ‖T (U1ρAU †1) −
idA1
dA1
‖1 = 1. This
implies the claim. uunionsq
Observe that in the case where the system E is trivial (or classical), we showed in
Theorem 3.3.2 that there exists QC-extractors composed of t = O(log(1/)−2) unitaries.
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This is a difference with classical extractors, for which the number of possible values of the
seed has to be at least Ω((n−k)−2) [Radhakrishnan and Ta-Shma, 2000] and a probabilistic
construction shows that this is tight. It is not clear whether this is an important difference or
whether it simply comes from the fact that the analogue for (0, )-QC-extractors should be
(n, )-CC-extractors. An interesting question in this regard is to see whether one can prove
an analogous lower bound on the seed size for (k, )-QC-extractors with negative k.
Observe that in the analysis of Theorem 5.2.8, we actually proved something stronger
than condition (5.7). There and actually in all the constructions given in this chapter, we
prove that the stronger condition (5.18) below holds. The following proposition shows that
with such a strong definition, the seed has to be quite large. In particular, to show the
existence of QC-extractors (or even QQ or CC-extractors) with a short seed, one should use
different techniques to bound the trace distance directly.
Proposition 5.2.10 (Extractors for the 2-norm). Let A = A1A2. Let {U1, . . . , Ut} be
unitaries such that
1
t
t∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥TA→A1(UiρAEU †i )− idA1dA1 ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥2
2
≤ 
2
dA1
. (5.18)
Then, t ≥ 1/2 ·min ( dA
2k+1
, dA1/4
)
.
Proof Let S ⊆ [dA1 ] be an arbitrary subset of max(1,
⌈
2k/dA2
⌉
) basis elements of A1.
Then consider the state
ρA =
1
|S| · dA2
·
∑
a1∈S,a2∈[dA2 ]
U †1 |a1a2〉〈a1a2|U1 .
We have Hmin(A)ρ ≥ k and T (U1ρAU †1) = 1|S|
∑
a1∈S |a1〉〈a1|. We can then compute∥∥∥∥T (U1ρAU †1)− idA1dA1
∥∥∥∥2
2
≥
∑
a1∈S
(
1
|S| −
1
dA1
)2
= |S|
(
1
|S| −
1
dA1
)2
.
As a result, we have 1
t
· |S|
(
1
|S| − 1dA1
)2
≤ 2
dA1
. In the case 2k/dA2 ≤ 1, we obtain a lower
bound of t ≥ 1/2 · dA1(1− 1/dA1)2. In the other case, we get
t ≥ 1/2 · dA1/|S|
≥ 1/2 · dA1
2 · 2k/dA2
= 1/2 · dA
2 · 2k .
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uunionsq
Our results about QC-extractors are summarized in Table 5.1.
CC-extractors QC-extractors
Seed
LB log(n− k) + 2 log(1/) [2000] log(1/)
UBs
log(n− k) + 2 log(1/) m+ log n+ 4 log(1/) [5.2.8]
c · log(n/) [2009] 3n [5.2.11]
Output
UB k − 2 log(1/) [2000] n+H
√

min(A|E) [5.2.7]
LB k − 2 log(1/) [1989, 2005] n+ k − 2 log(1/) [5.2.11]
Table 5.1: Known lower bounds (LB) and upper bounds (UB) on the seed size and output
size in terms of (qu)bits for different kinds of (k, )-randomness extractors. n refers to the
number of input (qu)bits, m the number of output (qu)bits and k the min-entropy of the
input Hmin(A|E). Note that for QC-extractors, k can be as small as −n. Additive absolute
constants are omitted. We note that the constructions corresponding to the second line are
non-explicit.
5.2.2 Full set of mutually unbiased bases (MUBs)
We saw that unitary 2-designs define QC-extractors. As unitary 2-designs also define QQ-
extractors, it is natural to expect that we can build smaller and simpler sets of unitaries if
we are only interested in extracting random classical bits. To that end, in this section, we
construct simpler sets of unitaries that define QC-extractors. Two ingredients are used: a
full set of mutually unbiased bases and a family of pairwise independent permutations.
A set of unitaries {U1, . . . , Ut} acting on A is said to define mutually unbiased bases
if for all elements |a〉, |a′〉 of the computational basis of A, we have |〈a′|UjU †i |a〉|2 ≤ d−1A
for all i 6= j. In other words, a state described by a vector U †i |a〉 of the basis i gives
a uniformly distributed outcome when measured in basis j for i 6= j. For example the
two bases, sometimes called computational and Hadamard bases (used in most quantum
cryptographic protocols), are mutually unbiased. There can be at most dA + 1 mutually
unbiased bases for A. Constructions of full sets of dA + 1 MUBs are known in prime power
dimensions [Bandyopadhyay et al., 2002, Wootters and Fields, 1989]. Such unitaries can be
implemented by quantum circuits of almost linear size; see Lemma 3.4.1. Mutually unbiased
bases also have applications in quantum state determination [Ivonovic, 1981, Wootters and
Fields, 1989].
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To state our result, we will need one more notion. A family P of permutations of a set
X is pairwise independent if for all x1 6= x2 and y1 6= y2, and if pi is uniformly distributed
over P , Pr {pi(x1) = y1, pi(x2) = y2} = 1dX(dX−1) . If X has a field structure, i.e., if dX is a
prime power, it is simple to see that the family P = {x 7→ a · x + b : a ∈ X∗, b ∈ X} is
pairwise independent. In the following, a permutation of basis elements of a Hilbert space
A should be seen as a unitary transformation on A.
Theorem 5.2.11. Let A = A1A2 with n = log dA, dA a prime power, and consider the map
TA→A1 as defined in equation (5.3). Then, if {U1, . . . , UdA+1} defines a full set of mutually
unbiased bases, we have for δ ≥ 0,
1
|P|
1
dA + 1
∑
P∈P
dA+1∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥TA→A1 (PUiρAE (PUi)†)− idA1dA1 ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤
√
dA1
dA + 1
2−Hδmin(A|E)ρ + 2δ , (5.19)
where P is a set of pairwise independent permutation matrices. In particular, the set
{PUi : P ∈ P , i ∈ [dA + 1]} defines a (k, )-QC-extractor provided
log dA1 ≤ n+ k − 2 log(1/) ,
and the number of unitaries is
t = (dA + 1)|P| ,
which for the pairwise independent permutations described above gives t = (dA+1)dA(dA−
1).
Proof The idea is to bound the trace norm in equation (5.19) by the Hilbert-Schmidt norm
of some well-chosen operator. This term is then computed exactly using the fact that the set
of all the MUB vectors form a complex projective 2-design (Lemma A.3.3), and the fact that
the set of permutations is pairwise independent.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 5.2.8, but with the difference that now ρ˜AE =
(idA ⊗ σE)−1/4 ρAB (idA ⊗ σE)−1/4 for some σE ∈ S(E) to be chosen later, we get
1
|P|
1
dA + 1
∑
P∈P
dA+1∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥T (PUiρAE (PUi)†)− idA1A1 ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤
√
dA1
∑
a1a2a′2
tr
[
ρ˜⊗2AEΓa1,a2,a′2 ⊗ FEE′
]− tr [ρ˜2E] , (5.20)
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where Γa1,a2,a′2 = EP,i
{(
U †i P
†
)⊗2
|a1a2a1a′2〉〈a1a2a1a′2| (PUi)⊗2
}
and FEE′ is the swap
operator. We now compute Γa1,a2,a′2 handling the case a2 = a
′
2 and the case a2 6= a′2
differently. When a2 = a′2, we have (U
†
i )
⊗2|aa〉〈aa|U⊗2i = (U †i |a〉〈a|Ui)⊗2, where
a = P−1(a1a2). As {U1, . . . , UdA+1} form a full set of mutually unbiased bases, the vectors
{Ui|a〉}i,a define a complex projective 2-design (Lemma A.3.3), and we get∑
a1a2,a′2=a2
EP,i
{(
U †i P
†
)⊗2
|a1a2a1a′2〉〈a1a2a1a′2| (PU)⊗2
}
=
∑
a
Ei
{(
U †i
)⊗2
|aa〉〈aa|U⊗2i
}
= dA
2ΠsymAA′
(dA + 1)dA
=
idAA′ + FAA′
dA + 1
, (5.21)
where ΠsymAA′ is the projector onto the symmetric subspace of AA
′, i.e., the subspace spanned
by vectors |a′a〉+ |aa′〉. We now consider a2 6= a′2. We have
EP
{(
P †
)⊗2 |a1a2a1a′2〉〈a1a2a1a′2|P⊗2}
= EP
{|P−1(a1a2)〉〈P−1(a1a2)| ⊗ |P−1(a1a′2)〉〈P−1(a1a′2)|}
=
∑
a6=a′
PrP
{
P−1(a1a2) = a, P−1(a1a′2) = a
′} |a〉〈a| ⊗ |a′〉〈a′|
=
1
dA(dA − 1)
∑
a6=a′
|a〉〈a| ⊗ |a′〉〈a′|
=
idAA′
dA(dA − 1) −
1
dA(dA − 1)
∑
a
|aa〉〈aa| . (5.22)
Going back to equation (5.21), we get together with equation (5.22) that for any a2 6= a′2,
EP,i
{(
U †i
)⊗2 (
P †
)⊗2 |a1a2a1a′2〉〈a1a2a1a′2|P⊗2U⊗2i }
=
idAA′
dA(dA − 1) −
1
dA(dA − 1)
∑
a
Ei
{(
U †i
)⊗2
|aa〉〈aa|U⊗2i
}
=
idAA′
dA (dA − 1) −
idAA′ + FAA′
dA(dA − 1)(dA + 1)
=
dAidAA′ − FAA′
dA(d2A − 1)
.
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This being true for all a1, a2, a′2, it follows with equation (5.20) that,
EP,i
{∥∥∥∥T (PUiρAE (PUi)†)− idA1dA1 ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
}
=
√
dA1 tr
[
ρ˜⊗2AE
(
idAA′ + FAA′
dA + 1
+ dA(dA2 − 1)
dAidAA′ − FAA′
dA(d2A − 1)
)
⊗ FEE′
]
− tr [ρ˜2E].
(5.23)
Expanding the expression inside the square root, we obtain
dA1
(
1
dA + 1
+
dA(dA2 − 1)
d2A − 1
)
tr
[
ρ˜⊗2AE (idAA′ ⊗ FEE′)
]
+ dA1
(
1
dA + 1
− dA2 − 1
d2A − 1
)
tr
[
ρ˜⊗2AE (FAA′ ⊗ FEE′)
]− tr [ρ˜2E]
= dA1
dAdA2 − 1
d2A − 1
tr
[
trAA′
[
ρ˜⊗2AE (idAA′ ⊗ FEE′)
]]
+ dA1
(
dA − dA2
d2A − 1
)
tr[ρ˜2AE]− tr
[
ρ˜2E
]
.
Continuing from (5.23), we get
=
√(
d2A − dA1
d2A − 1
− 1
)
tr[ρ˜2E] +
(
dA1dA − dA
d2A − 1
)
tr[ρ˜2AE]
≤
√
dA1
dA + 1
tr [ρ˜2AE] =
√
dA1
dA + 1
2−H2(A|E)ρ|σ ,
where we used the definition of the conditional collision entropy (equation (2.17)) in the last
step. Now, by choosing σE appropriately, and an argument analogous to the very end of the
proof of Theorem 5.2.8, we conclude that,
EP,i
{∥∥∥∥T (PUiρAE (PUi)†)− idA1dA1 ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
}
≤
√
dA1
dA + 1
2−Hδmin(A|E)ρ + 2δ .
uunionsq
In terms of output size, this construction is almost optimal, but the number of unitaries
is again much larger than we expect should be possible.
5.2.3 Bitwise QC-extractor
The unitaries we construct in this section are even simpler. They are composed of unitaries
V acting on single qudits followed by permutations P of the computational basis elements.
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Note that this means that the measurements defined by these unitaries can be implemented
with current technology. As the measurement T commutes with the permutations P , we
can first apply V , then measure in the computational basis and finally apply the permutation
to the (classical) outcome of the measurement. In addition to the computational efficiency,
the fact that the unitaries act on single qudits, is often a desirable property for the design
of cryptographic protocols. In particular, the application to the noisy storage model that we
present in Section 5.4 does make use of this fact. But the price we pay is that the parameters
(both output and seed size) are worse than the previous construction.
Let d ≥ 2 be a prime power so that there exists a complete set of mutually unbiased
bases in dimension d. We represent such a set of bases by a set of unitary transformations
{V0, V1, . . . , Vd}mapping these bases to the standard basis. For example, for the qubit space
(d = 2), we can choose
V0 =
(
1 0
0 1
)
V1 =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
V2 =
1√
2
(
1 i
i −1
)
.
We define the set Vd,n of unitary transformations on n qudits by Vd,n def= {V = Vu1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Vun|ui ∈ {0, . . . , d}}.
As in the previous section, P denotes a family of pairwise independent permutations.
Theorem 5.2.12. Let A = A1A2 with dA = dn, dA1 = dξn, dA2 = d(1−ξ)n, and d a prime
power. Consider the map TA→A1 as defined in equation (5.3). Then for δ ≥ 0 and δ′ > 0,
1
|P|
1
(d+ 1)n
∑
P∈P
∑
V ∈Vd,n
∥∥∥∥TA→A1 (PV ρAE (PV )†)− idA1dA1 ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤
√
2(1−log(d+1)+ξ log d)n(1 + 2−Hδmin(A|E)ρ+z) + 2(δ + δ′) ,
(5.24)
where Vd,n is defined as above, P is a set of pairwise independent permutation matrices, and
z = log
(
2
δ′2 +
1
1−δ
)
. In particular, the set {PV : P ∈ P , V ∈ Vd,n} is a (k, )-extractor
provided
log dA1 ≤ (log(d+ 1)− 1)n+ min {0, k} − 4 log(1/)− 7
and if we choose the pairwise independent permutations described in Theorem 5.2.11, the
number of unitaries is
t = (d+ 1)ndn(dn − 1) .
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The analysis uses the same technique as in the proof of Theorem 5.2.11. The main
difference is that we were not able to express the Hilbert-Schmidt norm exactly in terms
of the conditional min-entropy Hmin(A|E)ρ. Instead, we use some additional inequalities,
which account for the slightly more complicated expression we obtain.
Proof We use the same strategy as in the proofs of Theorem 5.2.8 and Theorem 5.2.11;
here again with ρ˜AE = (idA ⊗ ρE)−1/4 ρAE (idA ⊗ ρE)−1/4. As in (5.20) and (5.22), we get
EP,V
{∥∥∥∥T (PV ρAE (PV )†)− idA1dA1 ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
}
≤
√√√√dA1 tr
[
ρ˜⊗2AE
(∑
a
Γa + dA (dA2 − 1)
idAA′
dA (dA − 1)
)
⊗ FEE′
]
− tr [ρ˜2E] , (5.25)
where Γa = EV
{(
V †|a〉〈a|V )⊗2}. We calculate
∑
a
EV
{(
V †|a〉〈a|V )⊗2} = 1
(d+ 1)n
∑
a1,a2,...,an
∑
V1,...,Vn
⊗
i
(
(V †i |ai〉〈ai|Vi)⊗2
)
=
1
(d+ 1)n
⊗
i
(∑
ai,Vi
(
V †i |ai〉〈ai|Vi
)⊗2)
. (5.26)
As {V0, . . . , Vd} form a maximal set of mutually unbiased bases in dimension d, and with
this form a complex projective 2-design (Lemma A.3.3), we have
∑
a∈{0,...,d},V ∈Vd,1
(
V †|a〉〈a|V )⊗2 = 2Πsym ,
where Πsym is the projector onto the symmetric subspace, i.e., the subspace spanned by
vectors |a′a〉 + |aa′〉. Furthermore (ΠsymB )⊗n ≤ ΠsymB⊗n for any inner product space B, and
hence we obtain
1
(d+ 1)n
⊗
i
(∑
ai,Vi
(
V †i |ai〉〈ai|Vi
)⊗2)
≤
(
2
d+ 1
)n
ΠsymAA′
=
(
2
d+ 1
)n
idAA′ + FAA′
2
. (5.27)
Plugging equation (5.27) into the expression inside the square root in equation (5.25), we
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can bound it by
≤ dA1 tr
[
ρ˜⊗2AE
((
2
d+ 1
)n
idAA′ + FAA′
2
+ dA(dA2 − 1)
idAA′
dA(dA − 1)
)
⊗ FEE′
]
− tr [ρ˜2E]
=
(
dA − dA1
dA − 1 +
dA1
2
(
2
d+ 1
)n)
tr
[
ρ˜⊗2AE (idAA′ ⊗ FEE′)
]
+
dA1
2
(
2
d+ 1
)n
tr
[
ρ˜⊗2AE (FAA′ ⊗ FEE′)
]− tr [ρ˜2E]
≤ (1 + 2(1−log(d+1)+ξ log d)n) tr [trAA′ [ρ˜⊗2AE (idAA′ ⊗ FE)]]
+ 2(1−log(d+1)+ξ log d)n tr[ρ˜2AE]− tr
[
ρ˜2E
]
.
Continuing from (5.25), we get
≤
√
2(1−log(d+1)+ξ log d)n tr [ρ˜2E] + 2(1−log(d+1)+ξ log d)n tr [ρ˜
2
AE]
=
√
2(1−log(d+1)+ξ log d)n
(
1 + 2−H2(A|E)ρ|ρ
)
,
where we used the definition of the conditional collision entropy (equation (2.17)) in the last
step. Again by an argument analogous to the very end of the proof of Theorem 5.2.8, we
conclude that,
EP,V
{∥∥∥∥T (PV ρAE (PV )†)− idA1dA1 ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
}
≤
√
2(1−log(d+1)+ξ log d)n(1 + 2−Hδmin(A|E)ρ+z) + 2(δ + δ′) ,
where z = log
(
2
δ′2 +
1
1−δ
)
. Setting δ = 0 and δ′ = /4, we conclude that the set
{PV : P ∈ P , V ∈ Vd,n} is a (k, )-QC-extractor provided
log dA1 = n · ξ log d
≤ (log(d+ 1)− 1)n− log(1 + 2−k+log(8/2+1)) + log((/2)2)
≤ (log(d+ 1)− 1)n+ min{0, k − log(8/2 + 1)}− 2 log(1/)− 3
≤ (log(d+ 1)− 1)n+ min {0, k} − 4 log(1/)− 7.
uunionsq
It seems that the parameters proved for this QC-extractor construction are not optimal.
In fact, equation (5.24) does not give anything non-trivial when Hmin(A|E)ρ < −(log(d +
1)− 1)n. We believe however that it should be possible to obtain a non-trivial statement for
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any min-entropy as long as it is larger than−cn log d for some c < 1. Such an improvement
would be quite interesting for the application we provide to two-party secure computation
in Section 5.4 (see the discussion following Theorem 5.4.2). We think that the place where
the analysis should be improved is the inequality (5.27). If we do not use this inequality, we
end up with having to handle an expression of the form∑
S⊆[n]
tr
[
ρ˜2ASE
]
, (5.28)
where AS refers to the qudits of A indexed by elements of S. Because we have tr[ρ˜2ASE] ≤
2|S| log d for any S, the sum in equation (5.28) is always bounded by (d + 1)n. It would
be interesting for example to show that whenever Hmin(A|E) ≥ −cn log d for some c < 1,
then there exists some β < (d+1) such that the sum in (5.28) is bounded by βn. This kind of
statement is related to min-entropy sampling [Konig and Renner, 2011]. The problem there
is to prove that for most subsets S of [n] of size r, we have Hmin(AS|E) & rnHmin(A|E).
Such a statement was proved by Konig and Renner [2011] in the case where A is classical.
It would be interesting to see if such a result holds when A is a general quantum system.
5.3 Entropic uncertainty relations with quantum side
information
In this section, we show how to obtain entropic uncertainty relations from general QC-
extractors.
5.3.1 Min-entropy uncertainty relations
We start by proving uncertainty relations for the smooth min-entropy, which is usually
the relevant measure in the context of cryptography. Consider the state ρXEJ =
1
t
∑t
j=1MA→X(UjρAEU †j ) ⊗ |j〉〈j|J . We note that unlike for the von Neumann entropy,
the conditional entropy Hmin(X|EJ)ρ is not the same as the average 1t
∑t
j=1Hmin(X|E)ρj ,
where ρj =MA→X(UjρAEU †j ). However, by concavity of the logarithm, we have
1
t
t∑
j=1
Hmin(X|E)ρj ≥ − log
[
1
t
t∑
j=1
2−Hmin(X|E)ρj
]
= Hmin(X|EJ)ρ .
Here, we used the expression for the conditional min-entropy in (2.11). It follows that
proving lower bounds for Hmin(X|EJ) is stronger and directly gives lower bounds for
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the average measurement entropy. For this reason, we use the conditional min-entropy
Hmin(X|EJ) in place of the average entropy.
The following lemma shows that a QC-extractor directly satisfies an uncertainty relation
for the smooth min-entropy. The idea is simple: if the outcome of the QC-extractor is -
close to idA1
dA1
⊗ρE , then by the definition of the smoothed entropies, the smooth min-entropy
of the outcome has to be at least log dA1 .
Lemma 5.3.1. Let ρAE ∈ S(AE), and {U1, . . . , Ut} be a set of unitaries on A such that,
1
t
t∑
j=1
∥∥∥∥TA→A1(UjρAEU †j )− idA1dA1 ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ (ρ) , (5.29)
for some (ρ) depending on the input state ρAE . Then
H
√
2(ρ)
min (X|EJ)ρ ≥ log dA1 ,
where ρXEJ = 1t
∑t
j=1MA→X(UjρAEU †j )⊗ |j〉〈j|J andMA→X is the measurement in the
computational basis.
Proof By the definition of the smooth min-entropy and the inequality (2.7) between the
purified and trace distance, condition (5.29) directly translates into
H
√
2(ρ)
min (A1|EJ)ρ ≥ Hmin(A1|EJ) idA1
dA1
⊗ρE⊗ idJt
= log dA1 ,
where ρ = 1
t
∑t
j=1 |j〉〈j|J ⊗ TA→A1(UjρAEU †j ). Recall that T performs a measurement in
the computational basis and then discards a (classical) system called A2. Because we are
only discarding a classical system, the min-entropy of the whole measurement outcome is
at least the min-entropy in the register A1 (see Lemma 2.2.6). As a result,
H
√
2(ρ)
min (X|EJ)ρ ≥ Hmin(A1|EJ) idA1
dA1
⊗ρE⊗ idJt
= log dA1 .
uunionsq
This allows us to translate all our constructions from Section 5.2 into a min-entropy
uncertainty relation form. Note that conversely, we can convert a min-entropy uncertainty
relation into a QC-extractor simply by applying a CC-extractor. We state below uncertainty
relations for mutually unbiased bases and for “single-qudit” bases.
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Corollary 5.3.2. Let A be a Hilbert space such that dA is a prime power. Let
{U1, . . . , UdA+1} be a full set of mutually unbiased bases. For any state ρAE , we have
for all  > 0 and 0 ≤ δ < 2/4,
Hmin(X|EJ)ρ ≥ log (dA + 1) +Hδmin(A|E)ρ − log
(
1
(2/2− 2δ)2
)
− 1,
where ρXEJ = 1dA+1
∑
jMA→X(UjρU †j )⊗ |j〉〈j|J .
Proof Recall that the unitaries of the QC-extractor of Theorem 5.2.11 are composed of
mutually unbiased bases U1, . . . , UdA+1 but also some permutations P ∈ P . Letting ρXEJ =
1
dA+1
∑
jMA→X(UjρU †j )⊗|j〉〈j|J , Lemma 5.3.1 givesHmin(P (X)|EJP )ρ ≥ log dA1 . But
P is a permutation that simply relabels the measurement outcomes, and thus does not change
the entropy. It follows that
Hmin(X|EJ)ρ ≥ log dA1 .
Now it only remains to choose the dimension dA1 . We pick
dA1 =
⌊
(′ − 2δ)2 dA + 1
2−Hδmin(A|E)
⌋
.
Plugging this value of dA1 in (5.19), we get
1
|P|
1
dA + 1
∑
P∈P
dA+1∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥TA→A1 (PUiρAE (PUi)†)− idA1dA1 ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ′.
As a result, condition (5.29) is satisfied with (ρ) = ′. The desired result follows from the
fact that log dA1 ≥ log(1/2) + log
(
(′ − 2δ)2 dA+1
2
−Hδ
min
(A|E)
)
. uunionsq
From the point of view of applications, the following entropic uncertainty relation
for single-qudit measurements is probably the most interesting. It can be seen as a
generalization to allow for quantum side information of uncertainty relations obtained by
Damga˚rd et al. [2007]. The proof is very similar to the proof of the previous corollary.
Corollary 5.3.3. Let d ≥ 2 be a prime power. For any state ρAE , we have
Hmin(X|EJ)ρ ≥ n · (log(d+ 1)− 1) + min
{
0,Hδmin(A|E)ρ − log
(
2
δ′2
+
1
1− 2δ
)}
− log
(
1
(2/2− 2(δ + δ′))2
)
− 2,
where ρXEJ = 1(d+1)n
∑
jMA→X(VjρV †j )⊗|j〉〈j|J and {Vj}j = Vd,n as defined in Theorem
5.2.12.
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Proof We choose the dimension dξn of the A1 system of Theorem 5.2.12 to be
dA1 =
⌊
(′ − 2(δ + δ′))2 2
(log(d+1)−1)n
1 + 2−Hδmin(A|E)ρ+z
⌋
.
We also compute
log dA1
≥ −1− log
(
1
(′ − 2(δ + δ′))2
)
+ n · (log(d+ 1)− 1)− log
(
1 + 2−H
δ
min(A|E)ρ+z
)
= n · (log(d+ 1)− 1) + min{0,Hδmin(A|E)ρ − z}− log( 1
(′ − 2(δ + δ′))2
)
− 2.
Setting
√
2′ = , we achieve the desired result. uunionsq
5.3.2 Uncertainty relations for the von Neumann entropy
Uncertainty relations for the conditional von Neumann entropy can also be obtained as in
Proposition 3.2.2.
Lemma 5.3.4. Let ρAE ∈ S(AE), and {U1, . . . , Ut} be a set of unitaries on A such that,
1
t
t∑
j=1
∥∥∥∥TA→A1(UjρAEU †j )− idA1dA1 ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ (ρ) ,
for some (ρ) depending on the input state ρAE . Then
1
t
t∑
j=1
H(X|E)ρj = H(X|EJ)ρ ≥ (1− 4(ρ)) log dA1 − 2h2((ρ)) ,
where ρj =MA→X(UjρAEU †j ) and ρXEJ = 1t
∑t
j=1 ρ
j ⊗ |j〉〈j|.
Proof The argument is the same as the proof of Lemma 5.3.1, except that instead
of just obtaining a bound on the smooth entropy, we use the Alicki-Fannes inequality
(Lemma 2.2.5). uunionsq
This lemma can naturally be applied directly to all the constructions of QC-
extractors. For example, for a full set of mutually unbiased bases, by choosing dA1 =⌊
(− 2δ)2(dA + 1)2Hδmin(A|E)
⌋
, we can get
1
t
∑
j
H(X|E)ρj
≥ (1− 4)
(
log (dA + 1) +H
δ
min(A|E)ρ − log
(
1
(− 2δ)2
)
− 1
)
− 2h2().
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Using the asymptotic equipartition property for the smooth min-entropy, we can obtain an
uncertainty relation only in terms of von Neumann entropies.
Proposition 5.3.5. Let d ≥ 2 be a prime power, and {V0, V1, . . . , Vd} define a complete set
of MUBs of Cd. Consider the set of measurements on the n qudit space A defined by the
unitary transformations {V = Vu1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Vun|ui ∈ {0, . . . , d}} that we index by numbers
from 1 to (d+ 1)n as {Vj}j∈{1,...,(d+1)n}. Then for all ρAE ∈ S(AE), we have
1
(d+ 1)n
(d+1)n∑
j=1
H(X|E)ρj ≥ n · (log(d+ 1)− 1) + min {0,H(A|E)ρ} ,
where ρj =MA→X(VjρV †j ).
Proof Using the QC-extractor for the single-qudit MUB of Theorem 5.2.12 with
dA1 =
⌊
(− 2δ)2 2
(log(d+1)−1)n
1 + 2−H
δ
min(A|E)ρ|ρ
⌋
,
we get
1
(d+ 1)n
(d+1)n∑
j=1
H(X|E)ρj
≥ (1− 4)
(
n (log(d+ 1)− 1)− log
(
1 + 2−H
δ
min(A|E)ρ|ρ
)
− log
(
1
(− 2δ)2
)
− 1
)
− 2h2()
≥ (1− 4)
(
n (log(d+ 1)− 1) + min{0,Hδmin(A|E)ρ|ρ}− 2− log( 1(− 2δ)2
))
− 2h2() . (5.30)
Here, we use a version with Hδmin(A|E)ρ|ρ instead of Hδmin(A|E)ρ that is in the statement of
Theorem 5.2.12. The expression with Hδmin(A|E)ρ|ρ is however easily obtained by looking
at the proof. Evaluating equation (5.30) on the m-fold tensor product of the original input
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system dn, and multiplying both sides with 1/m, we obtain
1
(d+ 1)n
(d+1)n∑
j=1
H(X|E)ρj
≥ (1− 4)
(
n (log(d+ 1)− 1) + min
{
0,
1
m
Hδmin(A|E)ρ⊗m|ρ⊗m
})
− 1− 4
m
(
2 + log
(
1
(− 2δ)2
))
− 2h2()
m
≥ (1− 4)
(
n (log(d+ 1)− 1) + min
{
0,H(A|E)ρ −
4
√
1− 2 log δ (2 + n
2
)
√
m
})
− 1− 4
m
(
2 + log
(
1
(− 2δ)2
))
− 2h2()
m
.
Here we used the fully quantum asymptotic equipartition property for the smooth
conditional min-entropy (Lemma 2.2.7). By first letting m → ∞ and then  → 0, we
obtain the desired result. uunionsq
Note that for n = 1, this again gives an uncertainty relation for the full set of MUBs
only in terms of von Neumann entropies
1
d+ 1
d+1∑
j=1
H(X|E)ρj ≥ log(d+ 1)− 1 + min {0,H(A|E)ρ} . (5.31)
In the special case when E is trivial, we arrive at
1
d+ 1
d+1∑
j=1
H(X)ρj ≥ log(d+ 1)− 1 , (5.32)
which is the best known bound for a full set of MUBs and general d [Ivanovic, 1992, Larsen,
1990, Sanchez, 1993]. But without side information and when d is even, this was improved
by Sanchez-Ruiz [1995] to
1
d+ 1
d+1∑
j=1
H(X)ρj ≥ 1
d+ 1
(
d
2
log
(
d
2
)
+
(
d
2
+ 1
)
log
(
d
2
+ 1
))
. (5.33)
For one qubit (d = 2) the latter gives 2/3 (which is best possible for three measurements),
whereas our bound gives log 3− 1 ≈ 0.585.
5.4 Applications to security in the noisy-storage model
We use the min-entropy uncertainty relation of Corollary 5.3.3 to prove the security of secure
function evaluation in the noisy storage model.
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5.4.1 Introduction
Consider two mutually distrustful parties Alice and Bob who want to collaborate to perform
a distributed computation in a secure fashion. Typically, Alice holds x and Bob holds y, and
they both want to figure out f(x, y) in such a way that each party does not learn too much
about the other party’s input. Unfortunately, if we are looking for information theoretic
security, it turns out that even quantum communication does not allow us to solve general
two-party secure function evaluation [Lo, 1997]. For example, it is known that only weak
variants of (information theoretically secure) bit commitment are possible; see Section 4.1.6
and [D’Ariano et al., 2007, Lo and Chau, 1997, Mayers, 1997].
The natural question then is under which assumptions can we obtain secure protocols for
two-party computations. Classically, these assumptions typically limit the computational
power of a party. One then assumes that a particular problem requires a lot of computational
resources to solve in some precise complexity theoretic sense, and then one proves using
this assumption that a cheating strategy needs more computational resources than what is
available. It goes without saying that the computational assumptions are almost always not
proven. As computation is such a complicated notion to understand, a natural question is
then whether one can make simpler assumptions on the devices of the parties.
Classically, it is possible to obtain security when we are willing to assume that the
adversary’s memory is limited in size [Cachin and Maurer, 1997, Maurer, 1992]. But
unfortunately, Dziembowski and Maurer [2004] showed that any classical protocol in which
the honest players need to store n classical bits to execute can be broken by an adversary
who can store O(n2) bits.
Motivated by this unsatisfactory gap, it was thus suggested to assume that the attacker’s
quantum storage was bounded [Damga˚rd et al., 2005, 2007]. The central assumption in
this model is that during waiting times ∆t introduced in the protocol, the adversary can
only store a limited number of qubits N . This is the only assumption on the adversary,
who is otherwise all powerful. In particular, he can store an unlimited amount of classical
information, and perform any operation instantaneously. The latter implies that he is able
to perform any encoding and decoding operation before and after using his memory device.
Ko¨nig et al. [2012] based on Damga˚rd et al. [2005, 2007] constructed a protocol for bit
commitment using BB84 encoded qubits that is secure whenever Bob is only allowed to
store N qubits while Alice and Bob exchange more than (roughly) 2N qubits during the
protocol.
A natural question then is to characterize the property of Bob’s storage device that allows
him and Alice to implement secure two-party function evaluation. The noisy-storage model
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introduced by Schaffner et al. [2008], Wehner et al. [2008] is a generalization of the bounded
storage model. As in the bounded storage model, during waiting times ∆t, the adversary
can only keep quantum information in his quantum storage device F . Mathematically, such
a quantum storage device is simply a quantum channel F : S(Hin) → S(Hout) mapping
input states on the space Hin to some noisy output states on the space Hout. An example
of a storage device would be N d-dimensional identical memory cells, so that F takes the
form F = N⊗N . In particular, in the bounded quantum storage model, the adversary is
only allowed to store N qubits, which means F = id⊗N2 [Damga˚rd et al., 2005, 2007]. The
kind of statement one proves in this framework is of the following form: Provided F cannot
be used to reliably transmit n bits or qubits of information, the protocol Pn is secure. We
describe precise versions of this statement in the following sections.
5.4.2 The noisy storage model
Weak string erasure
Ko¨nig et al. [2012] showed that bit commitment and oblivious transfer,6 and hence any two-
party secure computation, can be implemented securely against an all-powerful quantum
adversary given access to a simple primitive called weak string erasure (WSE). Hence, it
suffices to construct a protocol for WSE that is secure under the assumption that the storage
devices of the parties are noisy, and we will follow that approach here.
The motivation behind the weak string erasure primitive is to create a basic quantum
protocol that builds up classical correlations between Alice and Bob which are later used
to implement more interesting cryptographic primitives. Informally, weak string erasure
achieves the following task. WSE takes no inputs from Alice and Bob. Alice receives as
output a randomly chosen string Xn = X1, . . . , Xn ∈ {0, 1}n. Bob receives a randomly
chosen subset I ⊆ [n] and the substring XI of Xn corresponding to the bits in positions
indexed by I. For each i ∈ [n], we decide independently to put i in the set I with probability
p. Originally, p = 1/2 [Ko¨nig et al., 2012], but any probability 0 < p < 1 allows for
the implementation of oblivious transfer [Mandayam and Wehner, 2011]. The security
requirements of weak string erasure are that Alice does not learn I, and Bob’s min-entropy
given all of his information B is bounded as Hmin(X|B) ≥ λn for some parameter λ > 0.
To summarize all relevant parameters, we thereby speak of an (n, λ, , p)-WSE scheme.
The precise requirement of security is stated in terms of (approximate) indistinguisha-
6Oblivious transfer is an important primitive that was shown to be complete for two-party computation by
Kilian [1988]. The exact definition is not important here.
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bility between the states obtained in an execution of the real protocol and some ideal states.
We should highlight that the notion of distance we use here is the trace distance, which is
more relevant than the purified distance in the context of cryptography because of its inter-
pretation it terms of distinguishing probability [Helstrom, 1967]. It will be convenient to
express the distribution of the random subset I by a density operator:
Ψ(p) =
∑
I⊆2[n]
p|I|(1− p)n−|I||I〉〈I| . (5.34)
Definition 5.4.1 (Non-uniform WSE). An (n, λ, ε, p)-weak string erasure scheme is a
protocol between A and B satisfying the following properties:
Correctness: If both parties are honest, then there exists an ideal state σXnIXI such that
1. The joint distribution of the n-bit string Xn and subset I is given by
σXnI =
idXn
2n
⊗Ψ(p) , (5.35)
2. The joint state ρAB created by the real protocol is equal to the ideal state: ρAB =
σXnIXI where we identify (A,B) with (X
n, IXI).
Security for Alice: If A is honest, then there exists an ideal state σXnB′ such that
1. The amount of information B′ gives Bob about Xn is limited:
1
n
Hmin(X
n|B′)σ ≥ λ (5.36)
2. The joint state ρAB′ created by the real protocol is -close to the ideal state in trace
distance, where we identify (Xn, B′) with (A,B′).
Security for Bob: If B is honest, then there exists an ideal state σA′XˆnI where Xˆ
n ∈
{0, 1}n and I ⊆ [n] such that
1. The random variable I is independent of A′Xˆn and distributed over 2[n] according to
the probability distribution given by (5.34):
σA′XˆnI = σA′Xˆn ⊗Ψ(p) . (5.37)
2. The joint state ρA′B created by the real protocol is equal to the ideal state: ρA′B =
σA′(IXˆI), where we identify (A
′, B) with (A′, IXˆI).
Note that any positive λ allows one to build a protocol for bit commitment and oblivious
transfer but of course, larger values of λ naturally lead to better parameters. To give an
example, Mandayam and Wehner [2011] prove that using a (n, λ, , 1/3)-WSE, one can
obtain an 1-2 oblivious transfer of strings of length about λ/24 · n.
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Protocol for weak string erasure
We now construct a very simple protocol for weak string erasure, and prove its security
using our bitwise QC-randomness extractor. The only difference to the protocol proposed
in Ko¨nig et al. [2012] is that we will use three MUBs per qubit instead of only two. For sake
of argument, we state the protocol in a purified form where Alice generates the EPR-pairs
and later measures them. Note, however, that the protocol is entirely equivalent to Alice
creating single qubits and sending them directly to Bob. That is, honest Alice and Bob do
not need any quantum memory to implement the protocol below. In the purified protocol,
the choice of bit she encodes is determined randomly by her measurement outcome in the
chosen basis on the EPR-pair. The protocol is illustrated in Figure 5.1.
Protocol Weak string erasure (WSE): Outputs: xn ∈ {0, 1}n to Alice, (I, z|I|) ∈
2[n] × {0, 1}|I| to Bob.
1. Alice: Creates n EPR-pairs Φ, and sends half of each pair to Bob.
2. Alice: Chooses a bases-specifying string θn ∈R {0, 1, 2}n uniformly at random.
For all i, she measures the i-th qubit in the basis θi to obtain outcome xi.
3. Bob: Chooses a basis string θ˜n ∈R {0, 1, 2}n uniformly at random. When
receiving the i-th qubit, Bob measures it in the basis given by θ˜i to obtain outcome
x˜i.
Both parties wait time ∆t.
4. Alice: Sends the basis information θn to Bob, and outputs xn.
5. Bob: Computes I = {i ∈ [n] | θi = θ˜i}, and outputs (I, z|I|) := (I, x˜I).
The proof of correctness of the protocol, and security against dishonest Alice is identical
to Ko¨nig et al. [2012], Mandayam and Wehner [2011]. It essentially follows from the fact
that Bob never sends any information to Alice. The main difficulty lies in proving security
against dishonest Bob. Before embarking on a formal proof, let us first consider the general
form that any attack of Bob takes (see Figure 5.2). First of all, note that the noisy-storage
model only assumes that Bob has to use his storage device during waiting times ∆t. Let Q
denote Bob’s quantum register containing all n qubits that he receives. Note that since there
is no communication between Alice and Bob during the transmission of these n qubits, we
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Figure 5.1: Illustration of the protocol for weak string erasure
can without loss of generality assume that Bob first waits for all n qubits to arrive before
mounting any form of attack.
As any operation in quantum theory is a quantum channel, Bob’s attack can be described
by a quantum channel E : S(Q)→ S(Hin ⊗M). This map takes Q, to some quantum state
on the input of Bob’s storage device (Hin), and some arbitrarily large amount of classical
information (M ). For example, E could be an encoding into an error-correcting code. By
assumption of the noisy-storage model, Bob’s quantum memory is then affected by noise
F : S(Hin)→ S(Hout). After the waiting time, the joint state held by Alice and Bob in the
purified version of the protocol, i.e., before Alice measures, is thus of the form
ρABM = idA ⊗
[(F ⊗ idM) ◦ E] (Φ⊗n) , (5.38)
where Φ is an EPR-pair. After the waiting time, Bob can perform any form of quantum
operation to try and recover information about X from the storage device.
5.4.3 Security and the quantum capacity
Recall from the definition above that our goal is to show that Hmin(X|BMΘ)ρ ≥ λ · n
for some parameter λ > 0. Although it was always clear that security should be related
to the channel’s ability to store quantum information, i.e., the quantum capacity of F ,
proving this fact has been a challenge for several years. Partial progress to answering this
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Figure 5.2: Any attack of dishonest Bob is described by an encoding attack E and a guessing
attack, since for classical X the min-entropy Hmin(X|BMΘ) is directly related to the
probability that Bob guesses X . As we will see below, it is however sufficient to consider
how well a decoding attack D can preserve entanglement between Alice and Bob, where D
acts on BM on the state ρABM from equation (5.38).
question was made in Ko¨nig et al. [2012] and Berta et al. [2011a], where security was
linked to the classical capacity and entanglement cost of F , respectively. We informally
state these results. Both of them prove security of the protocol described above except that
two mutually unbiased bases are chosen instead of three. Ko¨nig et al. [2012] prove the
protocol is secure whenever for some R < 1/2, the channel F is such that any attempt
to transmit nR classical bits across F is bound to fail with probability exponentially close
to 1. Berta et al. [2011a] consider channels of the form F = N⊗N and they show that
the protocol is secure provided N ·EC(N )
n
is bounded away from 1/2, where EC(N ) is the
entanglement cost of the channel N . The entanglement cost is the amount of entanglement
needed to simulate the channel N when classical communication is given for free. EC(N )
is a measure of how good the channel is for sending quantum information but it is in general
larger than the quantum capacity.
Note that our objective is to make a statement about some classical information X
obtained by measuring A in a randomly selected basis Θ. That is, we effectively ask for
an uncertainty relation for these measurements. Previously, however, suitable uncertainty
relations were only known for classical side information. The missing ingredient was
an uncertainty relation with quantum side information, linked to the channel’s ability to
preserve quantum information. Here is where our uncertainty relation of Corollary 5.3.3
comes in.
To state the result, we first define the notion of channel fidelity introduced by Barnum
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et al. [2000] which is perhaps the most widely used quantity to measure how good a channel
is at sending quantum information. For a channel N : S(Q) → S(Q′), the channel fidelity
Fc quantifies how well N preserves entanglement with a reference:
Fc(N ) = F (ΦQA, [N ⊗ idA] (ΦQ′A)), (5.39)
where ΦQA is a maximally entangled state. For example, one way of defining the (one-
shot) quantum capacity with free classical forward communication of a channel F is by
the maximum of log dA over all encodings E : S(Q) → S(Hin × M) and decodings
D : S(B ⊗ M) → S(Q′) such that Fc(D ◦ (F ⊗ idM) ◦ E) ≥ 1 −  for small enough
. Here idM refers to a noiseless classical channel.
Theorem 5.4.2. Let Bob’s storage device be given by F : S(Hin) → S(B). Let  ∈ (0, 1),
κ = 8 log(4/), λ ≤ log 3− 1. Assume that we have
max
D,E
Fc(D ◦ (F ⊗ idM) ◦ E) ≤ 2−(2−log 3+λ)n−κ (5.40)
where the maximum is over all quantum channels E : S ((C2)⊗n) → S(Hin ⊗ M) and
D : S(B ⊗M)→ S((C2)⊗n).
Then, Protocol 1 implements a (n, λ, , 1/3)-WSE.
Proof The proof of correctness of the protocol, and security against dishonest Alice is
identical to Ko¨nig et al. [2012], Mandayam and Wehner [2011] and does not lead to any
error terms.
Using the uncertainty relation of Corollary 5.3.3, with E = BMΘ on ρABMΘ we get
Hmin(X|BMΘ)ρ & (log(3)− 1)n+ min{0,Hmin(A|BMΘ)ρ} . (5.41)
Note that because Θ is independent of ABM , we have Hmin(A|BMΘ)ρ = Hmin(A|BM).
To place a bound on (5.41), we would like to obtain a lower bound on
min
E
Hmin(A|BM)ρ ,
where the minimization is taken over all encoding attacks as described above. We will use
condition (5.40) to obtain such a lower bound. We now use an operational interpretation of
the conditional min-entropy due to Ko¨nig et al. [2009]:
Hmin(A|BM)ρ = − log dA max
ΛBM→A′
F (ΦAA′ , idA ⊗ Λ(ρABM)) , (5.42)
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where ΦAA′ is the maximally entangled state accross AA′. That is, the min-entropy is
directly related to the “amount” of entanglement between A and E = BM . The map Λ
in (5.42) can be understood as a decoding attack D aiming to restore entanglement with
Alice. Further, note that |A′| = |Q| and we can equivalently upper bound
max
D,E
F
(
ΦAB, idA ⊗
[D ◦ (F ⊗ idM) ◦ E] (ΦAQ)) = maxD,E Fc(D ◦ (F ⊗ idM) ◦ E) .
(5.43)
By the assumption on the storage device F , we obtain that for any encoding E and
decoding D attack of Bob
Hmin(A|BM)ρ ≥ − log 2nFc(D ◦ (F ⊗ idM) ◦ E)
≥ − (n− (2− log 3)n− λn− κ)
= −(log 3− 1)n+ λn+ κ.
Then, using the uncertainty relation for 3 MUBs per qubit of Corollary 5.3.3 (with δ = 0
and δ′ = 2/8), we get
Hmin(X|BMΘ)ρ ≥ λn− log
(
2 · 64/4 + 1)− log(16/4)− 2 + 8 log(4/) ≥ λn.
uunionsq
Note that ideally, we would want a statement of the form: if
max
D,E
Fc(D ◦ (F ⊗ idM) ◦ E) . 2−λn , (5.44)
then the Protocol 1 implements (n, λ, , 1/3)-WSE. Unfortunately, we have a stronger
constraint in equation (5.40) with an additional positive factor of 2 − log 3. If we wanted
to prove security with the condition (5.44), we would need to prove a stronger uncertainty
relation than in Corollary 5.3.3. In particular, observe that if Hmin(A|E) ≤ −(log(3)−1)n,
our uncertainty relation does not give any useful bound. It would be very interesting to
improve it so that we can get a non-trivial lower bound for any Hmin(A|E) ≥ −cn with
c < 1. Note that, as in [Mandayam and Wehner, 2011], we can get arbitrarily close to
proving security under a condition of the form (5.44) by using higher dimensional encodings
(i.e., using the uncertainty relation of Corollary 5.3.3 with larger values of d), but it becomes
hard to implement the protocol with current technology.
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Example: bounded storage
We look at the simple case where F = id⊗N , known as the bounded storage model. In this
case, it is simple to prove that if you try to send more than N qubits of information using F ,
the channel fidelity will decrease exponentially in n [Berta et al., 2011a].
Lemma 5.4.3. For n ≥ N , we have
max
D,E
Fc(D ◦ (id⊗N2 ⊗ idM) ◦ E) ≤ 2−n+N ,
where the maximum is over all quantum channels E : S ((C2)⊗n) → S((C2)⊗N ⊗M) and
D : S((C2)⊗N ⊗M)→ S((C2)⊗n)
Proof Consider a decomposition of the encoding and decoding map in terms of their
Kraus operators as E(ρ) = ∑j EjρE†j and D(ρ) = ∑k,m Dˆk,mρDˆ†k,m where Dˆk,m =
Dk,m ⊗ |m〉〈m|. Note that without loss of generality, the latter has this form since it is
processing classical forward communication on M . Let Πk,m denote the projector onto the
subspace that Dˆk,m maps to. We can now bound
Fc(D ◦ (id⊗N2 ⊗ idM) ◦ E)
=
1
2n
∑
i
〈ii|
(∑
`,`′
∑
jkm
Dˆk,mEj|`〉〈`′|E†j Dˆ†k,m ⊗ |`〉〈`′|
)∑
i
|ii〉
=
1
2n
(∑
`,`′
∑
jkm
〈`|Dˆk,mEj|`〉〈`′|E†j Dˆ†k,m|`′〉
)
=
∑
jkm
∣∣∣∣tr [Dˆk,mEj ( id2n/2
)
·
(
id
2n/2
)
Πm,k
]∣∣∣∣2
≤
∑
jkm
tr
[
Dˆk,mEj
(
id
2n
)
E†j Dˆ
†
k,m
]
tr
[
Πk,m
(
id
2n
)]
≤ 2−n+N tr
[
D ◦ E
(
id
2n
)]
= 2−n+N ,
where in the third equality, we used the cyclicity of the trace and fact that Πm,kDˆk,m = Dˆk,m.
We used the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality for the first inequality, and the fact that tr[Πk,m] =
rank[Dˆk,m] = rank[Dk,m⊗|m〉〈m|] ≤ 2N . For the last equality, we used the fact thatD and
E are trace preserving. uunionsq
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It then follows from Theorem 5.4.2 that if N/n is bounded away from log 3−1, then the
described protocol is secure. We note that the parameters obtained here are slightly worse
than what was obtained in Mandayam and Wehner [2011], where security was shown to
be possible for N/n bounded away from 2/3 instead of 0.585. This is due to the fact that
the lower bound 0.585 in our uncertainty relation stems from an expression involving the
collision entropy rather than the Shannon entropy. We emphasize however, that due to finite
size effects our bound is still better in the practically relevant regime of n . 106 (for the
same security parameters).
5.5 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, we considered uncertainty relations that take into account an adversary that
is potentially entangled with the system being measured. As in Chapter 3, the measure of
uncertainty we used is the distance to the uniform distribution. But in addition, we also
asked for the joint state of the outcome together with the system of the adversary to be close
to a product state. The advantage of this measure is that we were able to apply techniques
similar to the decoupling theorem. We first use a Ho¨lder type inequality to work with the `2-
norm, which is much easier to handle. Then, we use symmetry properties of the unitaries to
obtain bounds on these norms. This allowed us to analyse several constructions of basis, but
as we saw in Proposition 5.2.10, this technique cannot be used to show uncertainty relations
for small sets of bases. Handling quantum side information using the `1 norm directly seems
like a difficult technical challenge. In the context of CC-extractors, there are constructions
that have a small seed [De et al., 2009, Ko¨nig and Terhal, 2008, Ta-Shma, 2009]. It would
be interesting to use these ideas to construct QQ or QC-extractors with small seed.
We then used one of our uncertainty relations for single-qubit measurements to relate the
security of two-party secure function evaluation to the capacity of the storage device to store
quantum information reliably. We showed that provided the storage device is “very bad” at
storing n qubits, there is a protocol for performing secure function evaluation in which Alice
and Bob communicate n qubits. This is the first time the security is related to the capacity of
the channel to send quantum information. As explained in the discussion following Theorem
5.4.2, this is not totally satisfying, but is hopefully a step towards proving the ideal result
which would be that we get security as soon as the storage device is just “bad” at storing
quantum information.
Chapter 6
Discussion
6.1 Summary
In this thesis, we considered uncertainty relations for several observables and their
applications to quantum information theory. We have first seen how the problem of finding
uncertainty relations is closely related to the problem of finding large almost Euclidean
subspaces of `1(`2). Even though we did not use any norm embedding result directly, many
of the ideas presented here come from the proofs and constructions in the study of the
geometry of normed spaces. In particular, we obtained an explicit family of bases that satisfy
a strong metric uncertainty relation by adapting a construction of Indyk [2007]. Moreover,
using standard techniques from asymptotic geometric analysis, we were able to prove a
strong uncertainty relations for random bases.
We used these uncertainty relations to exhibit strong locking effects. In particular, we
obtained the first explicit construction of a method for encrypting a random n-bit string in an
n-qubit state using a classical key of size polylogarithmic in n. Moreover, our non-explicit
results give better key sizes than previous constructions while simultaneously meeting a
stronger locking definition. In particular, we showed that an arbitrarily long message can be
locked with a constant-sized key. Our results on locking are summarized in Table 4.1. We
should emphasize that, even though we presented information locking from a cryptographic
point of view, it is not a composable primitive because an eavesdropper could choose to store
quantum information about the message instead of measuring. For this reason, a locking
scheme has to be used with great care when composed with other cryptographic primitives.
We also used uncertainty relations to construct quantum identification codes. We proved
that it is possible to identify a quantum state of n qubits by communicating n classical bits
and O(log(1/)) quantum bits. We also presented an efficient encoder for this problem that
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uses O(log2(n/)) qubits of communication instead. The main weakness of this result is
that the decoder uses a classical description of the state |ϕ〉 that is in general exponential in
the number of qubits of |ϕ〉. One cannot hope to avoid this difficulty because, as shown by
Winter [2004], if Bob was to receive a copy of the quantum state |ϕ〉, the task of quantum
identification becomes the same as the task of transmission of quantum information.
We then considered uncertainty relations that hold even in the presence of quantum side
information. For this, we defined QC-extractors which are sets of unitary transformations
that have the following property: for any state ρAE for which Hmin(A|E)ρ is sufficiently
larger than − log dA, applying a typical unitary on A followed by a measurement of some
prefix of the output gives an outcome that is almost uniformly distributed and independent
of E. Such a definition fits in the general framework of the decoupling theorem of
Dupuis [2010], Dupuis et al. [2010a] and we use similar techniques to analyse the different
constructions we propose; see Table 5.1 for a summary. All these constructions lead to
strong min-entropy uncertainty relations. We used them to prove the security of two-
party function evaluation under a condition on the capacity of the parties’ storage device to
maintain quantum information. We also proved von Neumann entropy uncertainty relations
with quantum side information for a full set of mutually unbiased bases, thus generalizing
the results of Ivanovic [1992], Sanchez [1993].
6.2 Open questions
We expect to see more applications to quantum information theory of the tools used in the
theory of pseudorandomness. An interesting open question is whether these techniques can
be helpful in constructing explicit subspaces of highly entangled states. Such subspaces are
related to one of the central problems in quantum information theory: the classical capacity
of a quantum channel. An explicit construction of such spaces would lead to explicit
channels that violate additivity of the minimum output entropy [Hastings, 2009, Hayden and
Winter, 2008], but also explicit protocols for superdense coding of quantum states [Harrow
et al., 2004]. As shown by Aubrun et al. [2010, 2011], this problem amounts to finding
explicit almost Euclidean sections for matrix spaces endowed with Schatten p-norms, which
corresponds to the `p norm of the singular values. In addition to the applications in quantum
information theory, such almost Euclidean sections are closely related to rank minimization
problems for which the nuclear norm heuristic allows exact recovery [Dvijotham and Fazel,
2010].
Addressing this question is related to finding explicit constructions of (0, )-QQ-
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extractors with output size close to n/2 (which is optimal) and with small (say sublinear
in n) seed size. In fact, by applying the unitaries of the QQ-extractor in superposition, all
input pure states get mapped to highly entangled output states. More generally, it would be
very interesting to understand what kinds of sets of unitaries other than unitary two-designs
satisfy the decoupling theorem. Is it possible to use a number of unitaries that is smaller
than the output dimension? Even non-explicit constructions would be interesting. In the
special case of QC-extractors, do the metric uncertainty relations of Chapter 3 remain valid
in the presence of quantum side information?
From a computational complexity point of view, I think it would be also interesting to
study the hardness of some natural problems related to uncertainty relations. For example,
given a set of unitaries as an input, can one compute efficiently how good uncertainty
relations they define? Does quantum side information make things significantly harder?
We might also wonder whether the decoupling theorem, or the different notions of
quantum extractors defined here have applications to complexity theory, just as classical
extractors have applications in derandomization for example.
There is also an intriguing general question on the power of the second moment. We
know that pairwise independent permutations are good (classical) extractors. We also know
that a full set of mutually unbiased bases — which defines a state 2-design — satisfies good
uncertainty relations. In addition, the decoupling theorem says that unitary 2-designs satisfy
a strong decoupling statement. All these results are based on a second moment argument.
Is there a precise way of unifying these results?
On the cryptography side, are there cryptographic applications of locking schemes? For
example, suppose that we authenticate the message before encoding it. Then the receiver can
check whether an eavesdropper has altered the encoded message. Conditioned on passing
the authentication test, is it true that the state held by the eavesdropper is independent of
the message? If this is the case, then the security guarantee would be composable and we
could use a locking scheme as a key distribution protocol that only uses communication
from Alice to Bob.
Appendices
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Appendix A
Deferred proofs
A.1 Existence of metric uncertainty relations
In this section, we prove the lemmas used for proving Theorem 3.3.2.
Lemma 3.3.3 (Average value of `A1 (`B2 ) on the sphere). Let |ϕ〉AB be a random pure state
on AB. Then,
E
{
‖|ϕ〉AB‖`A1 (`B2 )
}
=
Γ(dB +
1
2
)
Γ(dB)
Γ(dAdB)
Γ(dAdB +
1
2
)
≥
√
1− 1
dB
√
dA.
where Γ is the Gamma function Γ(z) =
∫∞
0
uz−1e−udu for z ≥ 0.
Proof The presentation uses methods described in Ball [1997].
Observe that the random variable ‖|ϕ〉AB‖12 is distributed as the `dA1 (`2dB2 ) norm of
a real random vector chosen according to the rotation invariant measure on the sphere
S2dAdB−1. We define for integers n and m the norm `n1 (`m2 ) of a real n + m-dimensional
vector {vi,j}i∈[n],j∈[m] as for the complex case (Definition 3.2.3)
‖v‖`n1 (`m2 ) =
∑
i
√∑
j
|vi,j|2.
Note that we only specify the dimension of the systems as the systems themselves are not
relevant here. In the rest of the proof, we use ‖ · ‖12 as a shorthand for ‖ · ‖`dA1 (`2dB ).
Our objective is to evaluate the expected value E {‖Θ‖12} where Θ has rotation invariant
distribution on the real sphere Ss−1 and s = 2d with d = dAdB. For this, we start by relating
the E {‖Z‖12} and E {‖Θ‖12} where Z has a standard Gaussian distribution on Rs . By
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changing to polar coordinates, we get
E {‖Z‖12} =
∫
Rs
‖x‖12 e
− 1
2
∑s
i=1 x
2
i
(2pi)s/2
dx
=
∫ ∞
0
∫
Ss−1
‖rθ‖12 e
−r2/2
(2pi)s/2
· spi
s/2dσ(θ)
Γ( s
2
+ 1)
rs−1dr
where σ is the normalized Haar measure on Ss−1. The term spis/2
Γ( s
2
+1)
is the surface area of the
sphere in dimension s − 1. Using the equality Γ(z + 1) = zΓ(z), we have spis/2
Γ( s
2
+1)
= 2pi
s/2
Γ( s
2
)
.
Thus,
E {‖Z‖12} = 2pi
s/2
(2pi)s/2Γ( s
2
)
∫ ∞
0
rse−r
2/2dr ·
∫
Ss−1
‖θ‖12dσ(θ)
=
1
2s/2−1Γ( s
2
)
∫ ∞
0
rse−r
2/2dr ·
∫
Ss−1
‖θ‖12dσ(θ)
We then perform a change of variable u = r2/2:
E {‖Z‖12} = 1
2s/2−1Γ( s
2
)
∫ ∞
0
(2u)(s−1)/2e−udu ·
∫
Ss−1
‖θ‖12dσ(θ)
=
2(s−1)/2Γ( s−1
2
+ 1)
2s/2−1Γ( s
2
)
·
∫
Ss−1
‖θ‖12dσ(θ)
=
√
2Γ( s+1
2
)
Γ( s
2
)
· E {‖Θ‖12} . (A.1)
Now, we compute
E {‖Z‖12} =
∫
Rs
‖x‖12 e
− 1
2
‖x‖22
(2pi)s/2
dx
=
dA∑
i=1
∫
Rs
‖xi‖2 e
− 1
2
‖x‖22
(2pi)s/2
dx
where we decomposed x = (x1, . . . , xdA) where xi ∈ R2dB . As all the terms of the sum are
equal
E {‖Z‖12} = dA
∫
R2dB
‖x0‖2 e
− 1
2
‖x0‖22
(2pi)dB
dx0
(∫
R2dB
e−
1
2
‖x1‖22
(2pi)dB
dx1
)dA−1
= dA
√
2Γ(2dB+1
2
)
Γ(dB)
∫
S2dB−1
‖θ‖2dσ(θ)
= dA
√
2Γ(2dB+1
2
)
Γ(dB)
.
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To get the second equality, we use the same argument as for equation (A.1). We conclude
using equation (A.1)
E
{
‖|ϕ〉‖`A1 (`B2 )
}
= E {‖Θ‖12}
= dA
Γ(dB +
1
2
)
Γ(dB)
· Γ(dAdB)
Γ(dAdB +
1
2
)
.
We now prove the inequality in the statement of the lemma. We use the following two
facts about the Γ function: log Γ is convex and for all z > 0, Γ(z + 1) = zΓ(z). The
first property can be seen by using Ho¨lder’s inequality for example and the second using
integration by parts. Using these properties, we have
log Γ
(
x+
1
2
)
≤ 1
2
log Γ(x) +
1
2
log Γ(x+ 1)
=
1
2
log
(
xΓ(x)2
)
= log
(√
xΓ(x)
)
.
Thus, Γ(x+
1
2
)
Γ(x)
≤ √x. Similarly, we have Γ(x)
Γ(x− 1
2
)
≤
√
x− 1
2
which implies that Γ(x+
1
2
)
Γ(x)
≥√
x− 1
2
when writing Γ(x+ 1/2) = (x− 1/2)Γ(x− 1/2).
We conclude that
E
{
‖|ϕ〉‖`A1 (`B2 )
}
≥ dA ·
√
dB − 1
2
1√
dAdB
=
√
dA ·
√
1− 1
2dB
.
uunionsq
Lemma 3.3.4 (Levy’s lemma). Let f : Cd → R and η > 0 be such that for all pure states
|ϕ1〉, |ϕ2〉 in Cd,
|f(|ϕ1〉)− f(|ϕ2〉)| ≤ η‖|ϕ1〉 − |ϕ2〉‖2.
Let |ϕ〉 be a random pure state in dimension d. Then for all 0 ≤ δ ≤ η,
Pr {|f(|ϕ〉)− E {f(ϕ)} | ≥ δ} ≤ 4 exp
(
−δ
2d
cη2
)
where c is a constant. We can take c = 9pi2.
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Proof We can instead study the concentration of a Lipschitz function on the real sphere
S2d−1. Note that the induced function (that we also call f ) is still α-Lipschitz. Concentration
on S2d−1 can be proved in a simple way using concentration of the standard Gaussian
distribution. This proof is due to Maurey and Pisier and can be found in [Milman and
Schechtman, 1986, Appendix V]. Specifically, using [Milman and Schechtman, 1986,
Corollary V.2], we get
Pr {|f(Z)− E {f(Z)} | ≥ t} ≤ 2 exp
(
− δ
2(2d)
18pi2η2
)
+ 2 exp
(
− 2d
2pi2
)
≤ 4 exp
(
− δ
2d
9pi2η2
)
.
In the notation of the proof of [Milman and Schechtman, 1986, Corollary V.2], we have
set δ = 1/2. This can be done because using the same arguments as in the proof of
Lemma 3.3.3, we can show that the expected `2 norm of the standard Gaussian distribution
in dimension n at least
√
2
√
n− 1
2
>
√
n for n ≥ 2.
We used this version of Levy’s lemma because it has an elementary proof and it gives
directly the concentration about the expected value. Different versions involving the median
of f and giving better constants can be found in [Milman and Schechtman, 1986, Corollary
2.3] or [Ledoux, 2001, Proposition 1.3] for example. uunionsq
Lemma 3.3.6 (δ-net). Let δ ∈ (0, 1). There exists a set N of pure states in Cd with
|N | ≤ (3/δ)2d such that for every pure state |ψ〉 ∈ Cd (i.e., ‖|ψ〉‖2 = 1), there exists
|ψ˜〉 ∈ N such that
‖|ψ〉 − |ψ˜〉‖2 ≤ δ.
Proof A proof can be found in [Hayden et al., 2004, Lemma II.4]. We repeat it here for
completeness. Let N be a maximal set of pure states satisfying ‖|ψ1〉 − |ψ2〉‖2 ≥ δ for all
pure states |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉 ∈ N . This set can be constructed iteratively by adding at each step
a state that is at distance at least δ from all states already in the set. First, we show that
this procedure terminates by bounding the size of such a set. We do this using a volume
argument. For this it is simpler to look at vectors |ψ〉 ∈ N as real vectors in dimension 2d.
The open balls of radius δ/2 centered at each |ψ〉 ∈ N are disjoint and are contained in the
open ball of radius 1 + δ/2 centered at the origin. Therefore,
|N |
(
δ
2
)2d
≤
(
1 +
δ
2
)2d
≤
(
3
2
)2d
.
123 CHAPTER A. Deferred proofs
We conclude by observing that such a set has the desired property. In fact, if there exists a
state |ψ〉 ∈ H such that for all |ψ˜〉 ∈ N , ‖|ψ〉 − |ψ˜〉‖2 > δ, then |ψ〉 can be added toN and
contradict the fact that N is maximal. uunionsq
Lemma 3.3.5 (Concentration of the average). Let a, b ≥ 1, δ ∈ (0, 1) and t a positive
integer. Suppose X is a random variable with 0 mean satisfying the tail bounds
Pr {X ≥ η} ≤ ae−bη2 and Pr {X ≤ −η} ≤ ae−bη2 .
Let X1, . . . Xt be independent copies of X . Then if δ2b ≥ 16a2pi,
Pr
{∣∣∣∣∣1t
t∑
k=1
Xk
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ δ
}
≤ exp
(
−δ
2bt
2
)
.
Proof For any λ > 0, using Markov’s inequality
Pr
{
t∑
k=1
Xk ≥ tδ
}
= Pr
{
exp
(
λ
t∑
k=1
Xk
)
≥ exp (λtδ)
}
≤ E
{
exp
(
λ
t∑
k=1
Xk
)}
e−λtδ
= E
{
eλX
}t
e−λtδ.
We now bound the moment generating function E
{
eλX
}
of X using the tail bounds.
E
{
eλX
}
=
∫ ∞
0
Pr
{
eλX ≥ u} du
=
∫ ∞
0
Pr
{
X ≥ lnu
λ
}
du
=
∫ 1
0
Pr
{
X ≥ lnu
λ
}
du+
∫ ∞
1
Pr
{
X ≥ lnu
λ
}
du
≤ 1 +
∫ ∞
1
a exp
(
−b ln
2 u
λ2
)
du
= 1 + a
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−bz
2
λ2
)
ezdz
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by making the change of variable z = log u.
E
{
eλX
} ≤ 1 + a∫ ∞
0
exp
(
− b
λ2
(
z − λ
2
2b
)2
+
λ2
4b
)
dz
≤ 1 + a exp
(
λ2
4b
)∫ ∞
−∞
exp
(
− b
λ2
(
z − λ
2
2b
)2)
dz
= 1 + a exp
(
λ2
4b
)
λ√
2b
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
(
−u
2
2
)
du
= 1 + a
√
2piλ√
2b
· exp
(
λ2
4b
)
≤ 2 max
(
1, a
√
piλ√
b
· exp
(
λ2
4b
))
.
We choose λ = 2δb (this is not the optimal choice but it makes expressions simpler),
Pr
{
t∑
k=1
Xk ≥ tδ
}
≤ max
(
2t,
(
2a
√
piλ√
b
)t
· exp
(
λ2t
4b
))
exp (−λtδ)
= max
(
exp
(−2δ2bt+ t ln 2) , exp(δ2bt− 2δ2bt+ t ln(4a√piδ√b)))
= max
{
exp
((−2δ2b+ ln 2) t) , exp((−δ2b+ ln(4a√piδ√b)) t)} .
Claim. For all c ≥ 1 and x ≥ c
1
2
ln(cx)− x ≤ −x
2
.
The function x 7→ x
2
− 1
2
ln(cx) is increasing for x ≥ 1. It suffices to show that it is
nonnegative for x = c. To see that, we differentiate the function y 7→ y − ln(y2) to prove
that for all y ≥ 1, we have y − ln(y2) ≥ 0. This proves the claim.
Using this inequality, we have for δ2b ≥ 16a2pi,
−δ2b+ ln(4a√piδ
√
b) ≤ −δ
2b
2
and − 2δ2b+ ln 2 ≤ −δ
2b
2
.
Finally,
Pr
{
t∑
k=1
Xk ≥ tδ
}
≤ exp
(
−δ
2bt
2
)
.
uunionsq
125 CHAPTER A. Deferred proofs
A.2 Permutation extractors
In order to prove the existence of strong permutation extractors with good parameters, we
use the construction of Guruswami, Umans, and Vadhan [2009] which is inspired by list
decoding. Their main construction is a lossless condenser based on Parvaresh-Vardy codes.
Using this condenser, they build an explicit extractor with good parameters. However, this
lossless condenser based on Parvaresh-Vardy codes does not seem to be easily extended
into a permutation condenser. The same paper also presents a lossy condenser based
on Reed-Solomon codes, which can indeed be transformed into a permutation condenser.
This permutation condenser can then be used in the extractor construction instead of the
lossless condenser giving a strong permutation extractor. In this section, we describe this
construction. For completeness, we reproduce most of the proof here, except the results that
are used exactly as stated in Guruswami et al. [2009].
It is also worth mentioning that to obtain metric uncertainty relations, we want strong
extractors. Even though the extractors in Guruswami et al. [2009] are not directly described
as strong, they are essentially strong. In this section, we describe all the condensers and
extractors as strong.
Definition A.2.1 (Condenser). A functionC : {0, 1}n×S → {0, 1}n′ is an (n, k)→ (n′, k′)
condenser if for every X with min-entropy at least k, C(X,US) is -close to a distribution
with min-entropy k′ when US is uniformly distributed on S. A condenser C is strong if
(US, C(X,US)) is -close to (US, Z) for some random variable Z such that for all y ∈ S,
Z|US=y has min-entropy at least k.
A condenser is explicit if it is computable in polynomial time in n.
Remark. The set S is usually of the form {0, 1}d for some integer d. Here, it is convenient
to take sets S not of this form to obtain permutation extractors. Note also that an extractor
is an (n, k)→ (m,m) condenser.
Definition A.2.2 (Permutation condenser). A family {Py}y∈S of permutations of {0, 1}n is
an (n, k) → (n′, k′) strong permutation condenser if the function PC : (x, y) 7→ PCy (x)
where PCy (x) refers to the first n
′ bits of Py(x) is an (n, k)→ (n′, k′) strong condenser.
A strong permutation condenser is explicit if for all y ∈ S, both Py and P−1y are
computable in polynomial time.
The following theorem describes the condenser that will be used as a building block in
the extractor construction. It is an analogue of Theorem 7.2 in Guruswami et al. [2009].
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Theorem A.2.3. For all positive integers n and ` ≤ n, as well as α,  ∈ (0, 1/2), there
exists an explicit family of permutations {RSy}y∈S of Fn2t that is an
(nt, (`+ 1)t)→ (`t, (1− α)`t− 4)
strong permutation condenser with t = d1/α · log(24n2/)e and log |S| ≤ t. Moreover, the
functions (x, y) 7→ RSy(x) and (x, y) 7→ RS−1y (x) can be computed by a circuit of size
O(n polylog(n/)).
Proof Set q = 2t and 0 = /6. Consider the function C ′ : Fnq × Fq → F`+1q defined by
C ′(f, y) = [y, f(y), f(ζy), . . . , f(ζ`−1y)]
where Fnq is interpreted as the set of polynomials over Fq of degree at most n − 1 and ζ is
a generator of the multiplicative group F∗q . First, we compute the input and output sizes in
terms of bits. The inputs can be described using log |Fnq | = n log q = nt bits, the seed using
log |Fq| = t bits and the output using log |F`+1q | = (`+ 1)t. Using [Guruswami et al., 2009,
Theorem 7.1], for any integer h, C ′ is a(
nt, log
(
q` − 1
0
))
→20
(
`t+ t, log
(
Ah` − 1
20
))
(A.2)
condenser where A def= 0q − (n − 1)(h − 1)`. We now choose h = dq1−αe. As
q ≥ (4n2/0)1/α, we have A ≥ 0q − n2h ≥ 0q − 0qα/4 · (q1−α + 1) ≥ 0q/2. Thus, we
can compute the bounds we obtain on the condenser C ′:
log
(
q` − 1
0
)
= `t+ log(1/0) ≤ (`+ 1)t
and
log
(
Ah` − 1
20
)
= log
(
Ah`
20
)
+ log
(
1− 1
Ah`
)
≥ log(q/4) + ` log h− 1
≥ t+ (1− α)`t− 3.
Plugging these values in equation (A.2), we get that C ′ is a
(nt, (`+ 1)t)→20 (`t+ t, (1− α)`t+ t− 3)) (A.3)
condenser.
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Observe that the seed y is part of the output of the condenser. As we want to construct
a strong condenser, we do not consider the seed as part of the output of the condenser. For
this, we define C : Fnq × Fq → F`q by C(f, y) = [f(y), . . . , f(ζ`−1y)]. Moreover, as will be
clear later when we try to build a permutation condenser, we take the seed to be uniform on
S
def
= F∗q = Fq −{0} instead of being uniform on the whole field Fq. Note that this increases
the error of the condenser by at most 2−t ≤ 0 (because one can choose UF∗q = UFq with
probability 1− 2−t). Here and in the rest of this proof, we will be using Doeblin’s coupling
lemma (see Chapter 2).
Equation (A.3) then implies that ifX has min-entropy at least (`+1)t and US is uniform
on S, then the distribution of (US, C(X,US)) is 30-close to a distribution with min-entropy
at least (1 − α)`t + t − 3. Let Y ∈ S and Z ∈ {0, 1}(`+1)t be random variables such
that Hmin(Y, Z) ≥ (1−α)`t+ t− 3 and (US, C(X,US)) = (Y, Z) with probability at least
1−30. If Y was uniformly distributed on S, then it would follow directly that for all y ∈ S,
Hmin(Z|Y = y) ≥ (1− α)`t− 3. However, Y is not necessarily uniformly distributed. We
define a new random variable Z ′ by
Z ′ =
{
Z if Y = US
U ′ if Y 6= US
where U ′ is uniformly distributed on {0, 1}(`+1)t and independent of all the other random
variables. We have for any z ∈ {0, 1}(`+1)t and y ∈ S,
Pr {Z ′ = z|US = y} = 1
Pr {US = y}
(
Pr {Z ′ = z, Y = y, Y = US}
+Pr {Z ′ = z, US = y, Y 6= Us}
)
≤ 1
Pr {US = y}
(
2−(1−α)`t−t+3 + 2−(`+1)t · 1|S|
)
≤ 2 · 2−(1−α)`t+3.
Moreover, we have (US, C(X,US)) = (US, Z ′) with probability at least 1− 60.
We conclude that C is a
(nt, (`+ 1)t)→ (`t, (1− α)`t− 4)) (A.4)
strong condenser.
To define our permutation condenser, we set the first n′ = `t bits RSCy (x) of
RSy(x) to be RSCy (x) = C(x, y). We then define the remaining bits by RS
R
y (f) =
[f(ζ`y), . . . , f(ζn−1y)]. As q ≥ n − 1 and ζ is a generator of F∗q , the elements
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y, ζy, . . . , ζn−1y are distinct provided y 6= 0. So for y 6= 0, (RSC , RSR)y(f) is the
evaluation of the polynomial f of degree at most n − 1 in n distinct points. Thus,
f 7→ RSy(f) is a bijection in Fnq for all y 6= 0. This is why the value 0 for the seed
was excluded earlier.
Concerning the computation of the functions RSCy and RS
R
y , they only require the
evaluation of a polynomial on elements of the finite field Fq. Computations in the finite
field Fq can be performed efficiently by finding an irreducible polynomial of degree log q
over F2 and doing computations modulo this polynomial. In fact, finding an irreducible
polynomial of degree log q over F2 can be done in time polynomial in log q (see for example
Shoup [1990] for a deterministic algorithm and Corollary 14.43 in the book von zur Gathen
and Gerhard [1999] for a simpler randomized algorithm). Since addition, multiplication and
finding the greatest common divisor of polynomials in F2[X] can be done using a number of
operations in F2 that is polynomial in the degrees, we conclude that computations in Fq can
be implemented in time O(polylog(n/)). Moreover, one can efficiently find a generator
ζ of the group F∗q . For example, Theorem 1.1 in Shoup [1992] shows the existence of a
deterministic algorithm having a runtime O(poly(log(q))) = O(polylog(n/)).
To evaluate RSy at a polynomial f , we compute the field elements y, ζy, . . . , ζn−1y, and
then evaluate the polynomial f on these points. Using a fast multipoint evaluation, this step
can be done in O(n polylog n) number of operations in Fq (see Corollary 10.8 in von zur
Gathen and Gerhard [1999]). Moreover, given a list [f(y), . . . , f(ζn−1y)] for y 6= 0, we can
find f by fast interpolation in Fq[X] (see Corollary 10.12 in von zur Gathen and Gerhard
[1999]). As a result RS−1y can also be computed in O(n polylog n) operations in Fq. uunionsq
This condenser will be composed with other extractors, the following lemma shows how
to compose condensers.
Lemma A.2.4 (Composition of strong permutation condensers). Let (P1,y1)y1∈S1 be an
(n, k)→ (n′, k′) strong permutation condenser and (P2,y2)y2∈S2 be an (n′, k′)→ (n′′, k′′)
strong permutation condenser. Then (Py)y=(y1,y2)∈S1×S2 = (P
C
y , P
R
y ) where P
C
y1y2
=
PC2,y2 ◦ PC1,y1 and PRy1y2 = (PR2,y2 ◦ PC1,y1) · PR1,y1 is an (n, k)→2 (n′′, k′′) strong permutation
extractor.
Proof Py is clearly a permutation of {0, 1}n. We only need to check that PC is a strong
condenser. By definition, if Hmin(X) ≥ k, (US1 , PC1,US1 (X)) is -close to (US1 , Z) where
Z|US1=y1 has min-entropy at least k′. Now putting Z into the condenser PC2 , we get that for
any y1, (US2 , P
C
2,US2
(ZUS1 )) is -close to (US2 , Z2) where Z2|US2=y2 has min-entropy at least
k′′ for any y2 ∈ S2. Thus, Z2|US1US2=y1y2 has min-entropy at least k′′. Moreover, by the
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triangle inequality, we have ∆
(
(US1 , US2 , P
C
US1US2
(X)), (US1 , US2 , Z2)
)
≤ 2. uunionsq
Next, we present one of the standard extractors that are used as a building block in many
constructions.
Lemma A.2.5 (“Leftover Hash Lemma” extractor [Impagliazzo et al., 1989]). For all
positive integers n and k ≤ n, and  > 0, there exists an explicit family (Py)y∈S
of permutations of {0, 1}n that is an (n, k) → m strong permutation extractor with
log |S| = log(2n − 1) and m ≥ k − 2 log(2/).
Proof We view {0, 1}n as the finite field F2n and the set S = F∗2n . We then define the
permutation Py(x) = x · y where the product x · y is taken in the field F2n . The family
of functions Py is pairwise independent. Applying the Leftover Hash Lemma [Impagliazzo
et al., 1989], we get that if Y uniform on F2n , the distribution of the first dk − 2 log(1/)e
bits of PY (X) together with Y is -close to uniform. Now if US is only uniform in F∗2n ,
(US, PUS(X)) is  + 2
−n-close to the uniform distribution. The result follows from the fact
that we can suppose  ≥ 2−n (otherwise, k − 2 log(1/) ≤ 0 and the theorem is true). uunionsq
The problem with this extractor is that it uses a seed that is as long as the input. Next,
we introduce the notion of a block source.
Definition A.2.6 (Block source). X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xs) is a (k1, k2, . . . , ks) block source
if for every i ∈ {1, . . . , s} and x1, . . . , xi−1, X|X1=x1,...,Xi−1=xi−1 is a ki-source. When
k1 = · · · = ks = k, we call X a s× k source.
A block source has more structure than a general source. However, for a source of large
min-entropy k (or equivalently with small entropy deficiency ∆ = n − k), one does not
lose too much entropy by viewing a general source as a block source where each block has
entropy deficiency roughly ∆. See [Guruswami et al., 2009, Corollary 5.9] for a precise
statement.
Lemma A.2.7 ([Guruswami et al., 2009, Lemma 5.4]). Let s be a (constant) positive integer.
For all positive integers n and ` ≤ n and all  > 0, setting t = d8s log(24n2 · (4s+ 1)/)e,
there is an explicit family {Ly}y∈S of permutations of {0, 1}n that is an
(n, 2`t)→ `t
strong permutation extractor with log |S| ≤ 2`t/s+ t.
Proof As the extractor is composed of many building blocks, each generating some
error, we define 0 = /(4s + 1) where  is the target error of the final extractor. The
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idea is to first apply the condenser RS of Theorem A.2.3 with α = 1
8s
to obtain a string
X ′ = RSC(X,UF∗
2t
) of length n′ = (2`− 1)t which is 0-close to a k′-source where
k′ =
(
1− 1
8s
)
(2`− 1)t− 4
The entropy deficiency ∆ of this k′-source can be bounded by ∆ = n′ − k′ ≤ (2`−1)t
8s
+ 4.
Then, we partition X ′ = (X ′1, . . . , X
′
2s) (arbitrarily) into 2s blocks of size n
′′ = bn′/2sc or
n′′+ 1 . Using [Guruswami et al., 2009, Corollary 5.9], (X ′1, . . . , X
′
2s) is 2s0-close to some
2s× k′′-source where k′′ = (n′′ −∆− log(1/0)).
We have ∆ ≤ `t/(4s) + 3 ≤ `t/(3s) for n large enough. Thus,
k′′ ≥ 2`t
2s
− `t
3s
− log(1/0) = 2
3s
`t− log(1/0).
We can then apply the extractor of Lemma A.2.5 to all the 2s blocks using the same seed of
size n′′ + 1. Note that we can reuse the same seed because we have a strong extractor and
the seed is independent of all the blocks. This extractor extracts almost all the min-entropy
of the sources. More precisely, if we input to this extractor a 2s × k′′-source, the output
distribution is 2s0-close to m uniform bits where
m ≥ 2s · (k′′ − 2 log(2/0)) ≥ 4
3
`t− 6s log(2/0) ≥ `t.
Overall, the output of this extractor is 0 + 2s0 + 2s0 = -close to the uniform
distribution on m bits.
It only remains to show that the extractor we just described is strong and can be extended
to a permutation. This follows from Lemma A.2.4 and the fact the condensers (coming from
Theorem A.2.3 and Lemma A.2.5) are strong permutation condensers. uunionsq
Remark. As pointed out in Guruswami et al. [2009], a stronger version of this lemma (i.e.,
with larger output) can be proved by using the condenser of Theorem A.2.3 and the high
min-entropy extractor in Goldreich and Wigderson [1997] with a Ramanujan expander
(for example, the expander of Lubotzky et al. [1988]). This construction can also give
a strong permutation extractor. However, using this extractor would slightly complicate
the exposition and does not really influence the final extractor construction presented in
Theorem 3.4.5.
The following lemma basically says that the entropy is conserved by a permutation
extractor. It is an adapted version of [Raz et al., 1999, Lemma 26].
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Lemma A.2.8. Let {Py}y∈S be a (n, k) → m strong permutation extractor. Let X be a
k-source, then (US, PEUS(X), P
R
US
(X)) is 2-close to (U ′S, U
′
{0,1}m ,W ) where U
′
S and U
′
{0,1}m
are independent and uniformly distributed over S and {0, 1}m respectively, and for all
y ∈ S, z ∈ {0, 1}m
Hmin(W |(U ′S, U ′{0,1}m) = (y, z)) ≥ k −m− 1.
Proof As {PEy } is a strong extractor, there exist random variables U ′S and U ′{0,1}m uniformly
distributed on S and {0, 1}m such that Pr
{
(US, P
E
US
(X)) 6= (U ′S, U ′{0,1}m)
}
≤ . Define
Γ = {(y, z) ∈ S × {0, 1}m : Pr{PEy (X) = z} < 12 · 2−m}. We have for every (y, z) /∈ Γ
and x ∈ {0, 1}n−m,
Pr
{
PRy (X) = x|PEy (X) = z
} ≤ Pr{PRy (X) = x, PEy (X) = z}
2−m−1
≤ 2m+1Pr{X = P−1y (x, z)}
≤ 2−(k−m−1).
We then show that Pr
{
(US, P
E
US
) ∈ Γ} ≤ . Using the fact that {PEy } is a strong extractor,
we have ∣∣Pr{U ′S, U ′{0,1}m ∈ Γ}−Pr{(US, PEUS) ∈ Γ}∣∣ ≤ .
But recall that, by definition of Γ, Pr
{
(US, P
E
US
) ∈ Γ} < 1
2
Pr
{
(U ′S, U
′
{0,1}m) ∈ Γ
}
, so we
get
Pr
{
(US, P
E
US
) ∈ Γ} ≤ .
Finally we define
W =
{
PRUS(X) if (US, P
E
US
(X)) /∈ Γ
U∗ if (US, PEUS(X)) ∈ Γ
where U∗ is uniform on {0, 1}n−m and independent of all other random variables. We
conclude by observing that with probability at least 1 − 2, we have (US, PEUS(X)) =
(U ′S, U
′
{0,1}m) and P
R
US
(X) = W . uunionsq
We then combine these results to obtain the desired extractor. The proof of the
following theorem closely follows [Guruswami et al., 2009, Theorem 5.10] but using the
lossy condenser presented in Theorem A.2.3 and making small modifications to obtain a
permutation extractor.
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Theorem A.2.9. For all integers n ≥ 1, all  ∈ (0, 1/2), and all k ∈
[200 d200 log(24n2/)e , n] there is an explicit (n, k) → bk/4c strong permutation
extractor {Py}y∈S with log |S| ≤ 200 d200 log(24n2/)e. Moreover, the function (x, y) 7→
Py(x) can be computed by a circuit of size O(n polylog(n/)).
Proof If n ≤ 2 · 106, we can use the extractor of Lemma A.2.7 with s = 200 and
` ≥ 1 such that 2`t ≤ k ≤ 2(` + 1)t. This gives an extractor whose seed has size
k
200
≤ 104 ≤ 200 d200 log(24n2/)e and that extracts `t ≥ 1
4
· 2(` + 1)t ≥ k
4
bits, so
the statement still holds true. In the rest of the proof, we assume n > 2 · 106.
The idea of the construction is to build for an integer i ≥ 0 an explicit (n, 2i · 8d) →
2i−1 · 8d extractor using d bits of seed by induction on i. Fix t() = d200 log(24n2/)e and
d() = 200t(). The induction hypothesis for an integer i ≥ 0 is as follows: For all integers
i′ ≤ i and n and  > 0, there is an explicit
(n, 2i
′ · 8d())→ 2i′−1 · 8d()
strong permutation extractor with seed size d(). This extractor is called {P (i)y }y∈Si .
For both i = 0 and i = 1, we can use the extractor of Lemma A.2.7 with s = 20. For
i ∈ {0, 1}, this gives an extractor with seed 2i·8d(/81)
20
+ t ≤ 16
20
d() + 16
20
200 d200 log(81)e ≤
d().
We now show for i ≥ 2 how to build the extractor {P (i)y } using the extractors {P (i′)y }
for i′ < i. Using the induction hypothesis, we construct the following extractor, which will
be applied four times to extract the necessary random bits to prove the induction step. The
choice of the form of the min-entropy values will become clear later. Set 0 = /20.
Claim. There exists an
(n, 2i · 4.5d(0))→50 2i · d(0)
strong permutation extractor {Qy}y∈T with seed size log |T | ≤ d(0)8 .
To prove the claim, we start by applying the condenser of Theorem A.2.3 with α =
1/200 and  = 0 (so we use a seed of size t(0)). The output X ′ of size at most 2i · 4.5d(0)
is then 0-close to having min-entropy at least (1 − α)2i · 4.5d(0) − t(0). The entropy
deficiency of this distribution is α2i · 4.5d(0) + d(0)200 ≤ 2
i·4.5d(0)
100
. We then divide X ′ into
two equal blocks X ′ = (X ′1, X
′
2), and we know that it is 20 close to being a 2 × k′-source
for
k′ =
2i · 4.5d(0)
2
− 2
i · 4.5d(0)
100
− log(1/0) ≥
(
49
100
· 2i · 4.5− 1
200
)
d(0)
133 CHAPTER A. Deferred proofs
X
RS
Random bits
C
R
X ′1
X ′2
L
P (i−2)
US′′
R
E
E
R
US′
Figure A.1: The extractor Q is obtained by first applying the condenser of Theorem A.2.3
and decomposing the output into two parts. The Leftover Hash Lemma extractor (Lemma
A.2.7) is applied to the first half and its output is used as a seed for the extractor {P (i−2)y }
coming from the induction hypothesis.
as log(1/0) ≤ t(0) = d(0)200 . For the extractors we will apply next to this source, we should
note that k′ ≥ 2d(0) and that 2i · 4d(0) ≤ k′ < 2i · 8d(0).
We now apply the extractor of Lemma A.2.7 to X ′1 (viewed as a 2d(0)-source) using a
seed of size 2d(0)
20
and obtaining X ′′ that is 0 close to uniform on d(0) bits. We then use
the extractor {P (i−2)y } obtained by induction for i − 2 to the X ′2 (of size 2i · 4.5d(0) ≤ n)
with seed X ′′ (of size d(0)): it is an (n, 2i−2 · 8d(0))→0 2i · d(0) permutation extractor.
The construction is illustrated in Figure A.1. Note that the number of bits of the seed is
log |T | ≤ t(0) + 2d(0)20 ≤ d(0)8 . This concludes the proof of the claim.
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X
U ′T U ′′T U
′′′
T
Q
Q
Q
Q
Random bits
E
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E
E
E
R R R
UT
Figure A.2: The permutation extractor {Qy} described in the claim is applied four times
with independent seeds in order to extract 2i−1 · 8d() random bits.
The source X we begin with is a 2i · 8d()-source. But we have 2i · 8d() ≥
2i · 8d(0)− 2i · 8 · 2002 log 20 ≥ 2i · 4.5d(0) so that we can apply the permutation extractor
(Qy)y∈T of the claim. We obtain QEUT (X) which is 0-close to 2
i · d(0) random bits. As QE
is part of a permutation extractor, the remaining entropy is not lost: it is in QRUT (X). More
precisely, applying Lemma A.2.8, we get QRUT (X) is 0-close to a source of min-entropy at
least 2i · 8d()− 2i · d(0)− 1. As 2i · 8d()− 2i · d(0)− 1 ≥ 2i · 4.5d(0), we can apply
the extractor {Qy}y∈T of the claim to this source. Note that the input size has decreased but
this only makes it easier to extract random bits as one can always encode in part of the input
space. To apply Q, we use a fresh new seed that outputs a bit string that is close to uniform
on 2i−3 · 8d(0) bits and the remaining entropy can be found in the R register. We apply this
procedure four times in total as shown in Figure A.2. Note that the reason we can apply it
four times is that at the last application 2i · 8d()− 3 · 2i−3 · 8d(0)− 3 ≥ 2i · 4.5d(0). As
the extractor {Qy}y∈T has error at most 50, the total error is bounded by 200 = .
We thus obtain an
(n, 2i · 8d())→ 4 · 2i−3 · 8d(0)
strong permutation extractor with seed set S = T 4 so that log |S| ≤ 4 · d(0)
8
≤ d(). This
proves the induction step. To obtain the theorem, we simply choose the smallest i such that
2i · 8d() ≥ k. uunionsq
By a repeated application of the previous theorem, we can extract a larger fraction of the
min-entropy.
Theorem 3.4.5. For all (constant) δ ∈ (0, 1), there exists c > 0, such that for all
positive integers n, all k ∈ [c log(n/), n], and all  ∈ (0, 1/2), there is an explicit
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(n, k) → (1 − δ)k strong permutation extractor {Py}y∈S with log |S| = O(log(n/)).
Moreover, the functions (x, y) 7→ Py(x) and (x, y) 7→ P−1y (x) can be computed by circuits
of size O(n polylog(n/)).
Proof We start by applying the extractor of Theorem A.2.9. We extract part of the min-
entropy of the source and the remaining min-entropy is in the R system (Lemma A.2.8).
This min-entropy can be extracted using once again the extractor of Theorem A.2.9. After
O(log(1/δ)) applications of the extractor, we obtain the desired result. uunionsq
A.3 Various technical results
This section contains various technical results. We start by a lower bound on the key size
for an encryption scheme.
Proposition A.3.1. Let E : {0, 1}n×[t]→ S(A) be an encryption scheme with the following
properties: there exists a decoding mapDk for every k ∈ {0, 1}s such thatDk(E(x, k)) = x
and for all x 6= x′, we have
∆
(
1
t
∑
k
E(x, k), 1
t
∑
k
E(x′, k)
)
≤ . (A.5)
Then, log t ≥ n− 2 provided  ≤ 1/2.
Proof The argument we use is quite similar to [Desrosiers and Dupuis, 2010, Theorem 6].
First by averaging (A.5) over all x′, we obtain
∆
(
ρXA, ρX ⊗ ρA) ≤ + 2−n,
where ρXKA = 1
t·2n
∑
x,k |x〉〈x|X⊗|k〉〈k|K⊗E(x, k)A. Using the relation between the trace
distance and fidelity (equation (2.7)), we get
F
(
ρXA, ρX ⊗ ρA) ≥ 1− − 2−n. (A.6)
Now, using the key K, one should be able to recover X from A: this will allow us to get
an upper bound on F
(
ρXA, ρX ⊗ ρA). Using Uhlmann’s theorem (Theorem 2.2.1), we can
find a purification |ρ〉XKAR of ρXKA and a purification |σ〉XKAR of ρX ⊗ ρA such that
F
(
ρXA, ρX ⊗ ρA) = F(ρXKAR, σXKAR)
≤ F(ρXKA, σXKA)
≤ F(D(ρXKA),D(σXKA))
= F
(
Φ¯XX
′
,D(σXKA)
)
.
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Here, D = ∑k |k〉〈k| ⊗ Dk acts on KA and Φ¯XX′ = 12n ∑x |x〉〈x| ⊗ |x〉〈x|. The two
inequalities follow from the monotonicity of the fidelity (equation (2.8)). The last equality
comes from the fact that D decodes X correctly given K and A. Note that we can assume
that σXKA is classical on the XK system (otherwise, you can simply measure XK in
the computational basis and use the monotonicity of the fidelity). We can then write
σXKA = 1
2n
∑
x |x〉〈x| ⊗ σKAx . In this case F
(
Φ¯XX
′
,D(σXKA)) is simply the probability
of successfully guessing X given the system KA by applying D, the underlying state being
σXKA. In fact, expanding the fidelity, we have
F
(
Φ¯XX
′
,D(σXKA)
)
=
∥∥∥∥∥ 12n/2 ∑
x
|x〉〈x| ⊗ |x〉〈x| · 1
2n/2
∑
x
|x〉〈x| ⊗
√
D(σKAx )
∥∥∥∥∥
1
=
1
2n
∑
x
∥∥∥|x〉〈x| ·√D(σKAx )∥∥∥
1
=
1
2n
∑
x
tr
[√
|x〉〈x|D(σKAx )|x〉〈x|
]
=
1
2n
∑
x
〈x|D(σKAx )|x〉
≤ Pguess(X|KA)σ = 2−Hmin(X|KA)σ ,
where we used the operational interpretation of the min-entropy (2.12) in the last line. Now
using a chain rule for the min-entropy in [Desrosiers and Dupuis, 2010, Lemma 7], we have
Hmin(X|KA)σ ≥ Hmin(X|A)σ − log t = n− log t (note that it is important here that K is
classical). Combining with (A.6), we get 1 −  − 2−n ≤ 2n/t, which leads to the desired
result. uunionsq
Next, we state the general decoupling result of Dupuis [2010], Dupuis et al. [2010a] for
exact unitary 2-designs.
Lemma A.3.2 ([Dupuis, 2010, Theorem 3.7]). Let A = A1A2, and consider the map
TA→A1 as defined in Equation (5.3). Then, if {U1, . . . , Ut} defines an exact unitary 2-design
(Definition 5.2.4), we have for δ ≥ 0,
1
t
t∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥TA→A1(UiρAEU †i )− idA1|A1| ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤
√
dA1
dA
2−Hδmin(A|E)ρ + 2δ . (A.7)
We also use the fact that a full set of MUBs defines a complex projective 2-design.
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Lemma A.3.3 (Klappenecker and Rotteler [2005]). Let {U1, . . . , UdA+1} define a full set of
mutually unbiased bases of A. Then
1
dA(dA + 1)
dA+1∑
i=1
∑
a∈[d]
(Ui|a〉〈a|U †i )⊗2 =
2Πsym
dA(dA + 1)
,
where Πsym is the projector onto the symmetric subspace of A⊗ A′ (with A′ ' A) spanned
by the vectors |aa′〉+ |a′a〉 for a, a′ ∈ [A]. Note that Πsym = idAA′+FAA′
2
.
The following well known ‘swap trick’ is used to prove decoupling statements.
Lemma A.3.4. Let M,N ∈ L(A). Then,
tr[MN ] = tr[(MA ⊗NA′)FAA′ ],
where A′ ' A and FAA′ =
∑
aa′ |aa′〉〈a′a| is the swap operator.
The following is called operator Chernoff bound.
Lemma A.3.5 ([Ahlswede and Winter, 2002, Theorem 19]). LetX1, . . . , Xt be independent
and identically distributed operator valued random variables and 0 ≤ Xi ≤ id, E {Xi} =
Γ ≥ αid. Then
Pr
{
1
t
t∑
i=1
Xi ≤ (1 + η)Γ
}
≥ 1− d exp
(
− tη
2α
4 ln 2
)
.
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